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Chapter 1
Introduction
The existence of a public sector that raises tax revenue and provides public goods and services
almost naturally justifies that the issue of public-sector modernisation is on the political
agenda. Taxation of households and firms has opportunity costs: foregone consumption and
investment. Hence, politicians (should) always have the goal to organise the public-sector
efficiently: either by delivering more goods and services with a given tax revenue or by holding
the level of public goods and services constant while cutting expenditure and eventually – at
least in an intertemporal sense – taxation.1
This thesis contributes to the analysis of the relationship between interjurisdictional
competition and public-sector modernisation. It hence tries to clarify whether there is
a “market-solution” for the task of public-sector modernisation. Inspired by the welfare
implications of perfect competition in microeconomic theory, one might be tempted to see
the lack of competition between jurisdictions and their governments as the underlying cause
of public-sector inefficiency.
Both theoretical and empirical work is presented in the following chapters. These chapters
are at the same time independent research papers, dealing with selected topics in the fields of
interjurisdictional competition and public-sector modernisation. The relevant literature is
introduced subsequently in the context of my own research presented below.
In the course of the research project “Interjurisdictional competition and public-sector
modernisation” – see the acknowledgements for more details about this project – it turned out
that the modelling of interjurisdictional competition in a dynamic context is very challenging.
Hence, the theoretical chapters are dealing with this question, in particular chapters 2 and
4. In chapter 3, it is argued that public-sector modernisation should be modelled in a
dynamically (as it is obviously a dynamic process). Furthermore, the dynamic modelling
of interjurisdictional competition allows to develop a consistent concept of the intensity of
interjurisdictional competition that is used in all theoretical chapters. Alternatives are rare
in the literature about fiscal competition.
The empirical part (chapter 5) applies a state-of-the-art method of efficiency measurement
to the public sector of national countries. A summary of the most important results and a
research agenda can be found in chapter 6.
1 The OECD, in a series of policy briefings, reviews real world initiatives to modernise the public sector
[OECD 2003, 2004a,b,c, 2005a,b,c].
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2 1 Introduction
Chapter 2
Comparative dynamics in a fiscal
competition model
This chapter is based on Becker [2007].
2.1 Introduction
Fiscal competition often occurs in the form of tax competition for a mobile tax base. It is
often assumed that productive capital is the mobile tax base. Capital accumulation is a
process where the stock of capital for a given point of time is the result of investment flows
in the past. A natural task on the research agenda therefore is: the analysis of the dynamics
of capital tax competition. Almost all models of tax competition are static and therefore
their results are limited to the “long run” or steady state situations. Wildasin’s [2003] paper
shows that this limit matters when capital accumulation is a time consuming process.
He shows that a government that has to decide about the taxation of mobile capital faces a
trade-off. As has been known in the literature for a long time, capital taxation hurts workers.
Less capital means that labor is less productive and this in turn depresses wages. But this
disadvantage from the perspective of workers matters only in the long run. Capital taxation
has also beneficial effects as it generates revenue that can be redistributed in favor of workers.
Wildasin shows that the speed of capital de-accumulation in response of capital taxation – i.e.
how promptly the deterioration of productivity of workers comes into effect – is crucial for the
decision of a government that has to weigh immediate benefits against future disadvantages.
To introduce dynamics into the model, Wildasin uses a standard adjustment cost function
for investment. In his model, a convex adjustment cost function has the effect that the
adjustment of the capital allocation across jurisdictions after a change in capital taxation is
not immediate. From a normative point of view, this means that the tax rate chosen by a
local jurisdiction is positive.
From a technical point of view, Wildasin [2003] is a paper in comparative dynamics. The
point that comparative static models may be misleading for the analysis of tax incidence has
been made earlier by Boadway [1979, p. 505]: “Since the process of tax shifting through a
change in capital accumulation takes time, comparative steady-state analysis may be quite
3
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inappropriate for considering the effects of tax changes over more limited time horizons.”
Boadway studies “... the effect of tax changes on the growth path of an economy between
two arbitrary points of time in a single-sector neoclassical model ...”. Wildasin uses a similar
methodology and applies it to the problem of fiscal competition. Fiscal or tax competition
here means a situation where the possibility for capital owners to shift capital to another
jurisdiction results in lower tax rates than those that would occur in the case of a closed
economy. The analysis in Wildasin [2003] is about the optimal policy of a local jurisdiction,
given this constraint. Wildasin does not solve for the Nash equilibrium for a system of
jurisdictions. This note doesn’t do that, either.
The main motivation for this note is to state clearly the basics of comparative dynamics in
a fiscal competition model in which dynamics are driven by the accumulation of capital like
in traditional Ramsey-type models of optimal growth. It hopefully has helped to improve the
author’s understanding of the methodology of comparative dynamics in this special context.
And maybe it is useful for others that have the intention to work in the field of dynamic
models in fiscal competition.
2.2 The model
For a detailed introduction of variables and the model setup, the reader is referred to Wildasin
[2003]. The model is very similar to the model of an open-economy with an exogenous interest
rate that is discussed in Barro / Sala-i-Martin [1995, ch. 3.5]. I will keep the description of
the model setup and assumptions very brief.
A representative firm chooses its investment rate i(t) in the local capital stock k(t). The
initial value of the capital stock in t = 0 is labeled k0. The alternative investment opportunity
is to invest in assets that bear an interest at rate r. The interest rate is assumed to be
exogenous to the jurisdiction. The firm produces with a neoclassical production function
f(k(t)), where the size of the labor force has been normalized to one. The firm’s investment
decision is determined in part by the local tax rate on capital, τ , which is assumed to be
a constant flat-rate tax. Hence, the tax rate is a parameter in the dynamic optimization
problem. The other major determinant of firm’s behavior is a convex adjustment cost function
c (i(t)). It will turn out that it is its curvature that determines the speed of a capitalist’s
reaction to a variation in the capital tax rate.
The current-value Hamiltonian for the decision problem of the firm is:
H = f(k(t))− c (i(t)) k(t)− τk(t)− i(t)k(t)− w(t) + λ(t) (i(t)− δ) k(t) , (2.1)
where λ(t) is the costate variable of capital, δ is the depreciation rate and w(t) is the wage
rate of workers.
Using the Maximum Principle, the process of capital accumulation by an optimizing firm
can be described as follows.
k˙(t) = (i(t)− δ) k(t) (2.2a)
λ˙(t) = −f ′(k(t)) +Ψ (λ(t)) + τ + λ(t) (r + δ) (2.2b)
λ(t) = 1 + c′ (i(t)) (2.2c)
k(0) = k0 > 0 is given; lim
t→∞
(
λ(t)e−rtk(t)
)
= 0, (2.2d)
2.2 The model 5
where (2.2c) has been used to substitute for λ and Ψ = c (i(t)) + i(t) (1− λ(t)) = c (i(t)) +
i(t)c′ (i(t)). The investment rate i(t) can implicitly be determined by the first-order condition
(2.2c). The boundary conditions in (2.2d) are standard.1 (2.2a) and (2.2b) together are the
canonical equations.
To simplify the notation, assume the following quadratic specification of adjustment costs:
c (i(t)) k(t) =
b
2
i(t)2k(t), (2.3)
where c(0) = 0, c′ = bi(t), c′′ = b. Parameter b can be interpreted as a measure of the
mobility of capital: The lower b, the cheaper it is to adjust the capital stock. The total costs
of investing one unit of capital are i(t) (1 + c (i(t)) k(t)) = i(t)
(
1 + b2 i(t)
2k(t)
)
. This implies
that the investment rate can be expressed as a function of the costate variable λ, using the
first-order condition (2.2c):
λ(t) = 1 + c′ (i(t))⇔ λ(t) = 1 + bi(t)⇔
i(t) =
λ(t)− 1
b
, (2.4)
and this in turn
c(i) =
(
λ− 1
b
)2 b
2
c′(i) = λ− 1
Ψ =
(λ− 1)2
2b
.
(2.2) is a system of ordinary differential equations. Its solution {k(t, τ), λ(t, τ)} depends
on the parameter τ . Rewrite (2.2) for the functional form of the adjustment cost function
defined in (2.3) and get
k˙(t) =
(
λ(t)− 1
b
− δ
)
k(t) (2.5a)
λ˙(t) = −f ′(k(t)) + τ + λ(t) (r + δ) + (λ− 1)
2
2b
(2.5b)
k(0) = k0 > 0 is given; lim
t→∞
(
λ(t)e−rtk(t)
)
= 0 . (2.5c)
Given all parameters and the initial value of k0 = k(0), the economy grows towards a steady
state {KSS(τ), λSS(τ)}, that is defined by
δb+ 1 = λSS (2.6a)
τ + (δb+ 1) (r + δ) +
δ2b
2
= f ′(kSS) . (2.6b)
The system is saddle-point stable. See figure 2.1, which displays the phase diagram.2
1 The initial value of the capital stock, k0, is given historically. The other condition is not an initial condition
but a terminal or transversality condition. From an economic perspective, the following condition is more
intuitive: limt→∞
[
k(t)e−rt
]
≥ 0. It states that the discounted capital stock must be non-negative at the end
of time. But this can be rewritten – given that a few conditions discussed in the literature hold – as in (2.2d).
The intuition is that the value of capital must be asymptotically zero as it would be irrational not to make use
of something valuable. This is achieved if the shadow price of capital λ is zero asymptotically (when capital
is positive for t→∞). See the mathematical appendix in Barro / Sala-i-Martin [1995] or Caputo [2005, ch.
14] for references on the topic of transversality conditions in control problems with an infinite time horizon.
See also Feichtinger / Hartl [1986, ch. 2.6], who discuss the conditions for limt→∞ e
−rtλ(t) being a necessary
condition for an optimal solution.
2 The k˙ = 0 locus is given from (2.5a) by λ = δb + 1. The λ˙ = 0 locus is given implicitly from (2.5b) by
0 = λ
2
2b
+ λ
(
r + δ − 1
b
)
− f ′(k) + τ + 1
2b
.
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λ
k
λSS = δb + 1 k˙ = 0
λ˙ = 0
kSS
Figure 2.1: Phase diagram
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This figure shows the phase diagram for a numerical example corres-
ponding to (2.5). For the production function, I use a Cobb-Douglas
specification: f(k) = kα with α = 0.3. The other parameters have been
set to: δ = 0.05, r = 0.1, τ := 0.1, b = 0.4. The saddle-path (indicated by
the dashed line) is drawn for an initial capital stock of k(0) = 0.2 (to the
left from the equilibrium point) and for k(0) = 2 (right). In both cases,
the second condition used to define the boundary-value problem is that λ
reaches its equilibrium value λSS = 1.475 after 100 Periods. This defines a
boundary-value problem that has been solved with numerical methods. The
corresponding Maple 9.5 workfile is available from the author on request.
Figure 2.2: Phase diagram - numerical example.
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2.3 Comparative Dynamics
The next step is to characterize the comparative dynamic behavior of the system described
in the preceding section.
In a comparative static analysis, one is interested in the comparison of an initial equilibrium
with another equilibrium that results from the change of a parameter of the model. In a
comparative dynamic analysis of an optimal control problem, the focus is on the effect of
a parameter variation not only on the difference between an “old” steady state equilibrium
and a “new” one, which corresponds to the new value of a parameter. Comparative dynamic
analysis aims also to show how the optimal solution of the control problem is altered due to
the parameter change.
There are several ways to perform a comparative dynamic analysis. Caputo [1990b]
distinguishes three different approaches:
The first approach is to investigate (or assume) stability of a dynamic system and linearize
it around its steady state.3 For the linearized system, a closed-form solution can then be
calculated and the effect of a parameter change investigated. The result is an approximation
of the comparative dynamics in a small neighborhood of the steady state. This procedure is
only possible for control problems with an infinite time horizon and when they are autonomous
in either current-value or present-value terms.4
The second approach is to do a comparative dynamic analysis has been introduced into
the economics literature by Oniki [1973]. The idea is to make use of the Peano Theorem in
the derivation of a variational differential equation system that needs to be solved in order
to get the comparative dynamics of the system. Wildasin’s [2003] analysis is an example of
this approach. His model is a fortunate example as one can derive a closed-from solution
for the variational equations. In cases where this is not possible, a graphical solution is an
alternative. Of course graphical solutions are feasible for models with only one state variable.
An advantage in comparison to the linearization approach is that the results are not limited
to the effects of a (infinitesimal small) change of a parameter on the optimal solutions in the
neighborhood of the steady state and is not only applicable to control problems that are of
the infinite-horizon type and autonomous.
A third approach, which resembles the application of duality theory in comparative statics,
has been put forward by Caputo [1990b]. This approach shares the advantages of the second
approach of applying the Peano Theorem but has the advantage to be useful even when there
is more than one state variable. Caputo [2003], moreover, claims that only the third approach
is able to analyze closed-loop solutions of optimal control problems.5
The next subsection will present an application of the second approach. The question that
will be discussed is how a small variation of a parameter (here: the tax rate τ) affects the
optimal solution of the control problem from the last section, namely the optimal investment
plan of a firm that is subject to taxation. The approach chosen allows to calculate the effects
on the entire time paths of the state and costate variables.6
3 Note that (2.5) is not linear.
4 Another approach is to rely for comparative dynamic analysis on the Laplace transforms of the endogenous
variables, see Judd [1982]. Central for this approach is the discussion of border conditions. A generalization is
found in Barelli / de Abreu Pessôa [2005] .
5 The same author has also published a textbook in optimal control problems and their analysis that highlights
the application of duality-theory to comparative dynamics, see Caputo [2005].
6 It will turn out that the effect of an increase in the tax rate on the time path of the capital stock will be
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2.3.1 Step 1: differentiation
In the framework of the model addressed in this note, comparative dynamic analysis means to
discuss the effect of a parameter-variation (here: dτ) on the system of differential equations
(2.5). The solution {k(t, τ), λ(t, τ)} of this system – the time path from k = k0 towards
the steady state – depends on time t, on the two boundary conditions (2.5c), and on the
parameter τ . Denote this solution by
{k(t, τ), λ(t, τ)} . (2.7)
Note that there is no initial condition for λ. Instead, a transversality condition is used to
ensure that the optimal solution of the firm’s maximisation problem is on the saddle-path.
Once the solution (2.7) is found, one can substitute back into the system (2.5):
k˙(t, τ) =
(
λ(t, τ)− 1
b
− δ
)
k(t, τ) (2.8a)
λ˙(t, τ) = −f ′(k(t, τ)) + τ + λ(t, τ) (r + δ) + (λ(t, τ)− 1)
2
2b
(2.8b)
k(0) = k0 > 0 is given; lim
t→∞
(
λ(t, τ)e−rtk(t)
)
= 0 . (2.8c)
The Peano Theorem states that the solution of (2.8), i.e.
{
dk(t)
dτ
, dλ(t)
dτ
}
, satifies a system of
variational equations as it is shown below:
˙(dk(t)
dτ
)
=
(
λ(t, τ)− 1
b
− δ
)
dk(t)
dτ
+
(
k(t, τ)
b
)
dλ(t)
dτ
+ 0 (2.9a)
˙(dλ(t)
dτ
)
= −f ′′(k(t, τ))dk(t)
dτ
+
(
r + δ +
(λ(t, τ)− 1)
b
)
dλ(t)
dτ
+ 1 (2.9b)
dk(0)
dτ
= 0, lim
t→∞
dλ(t)
dτ
= 0 . (2.9c)
For a detailed statement of the Peano Theorem see Oniki [1973, p. 273]. Note first that the
endogenous variables in (2.9), dk(t)
dτ
and dλ(t)
dτ
, depend on time. They are the variables I am
interested in: how does the time path of the state variable k and of the co-state variable λ
change when the parameter τ changes.
The system of variational equations, (2.9), is to be evaluated at the initial solution (2.7),
the one that depends on the initial parameter value τ . It is now ready to be solved for dk(t)
dτ
and dλ(t)
dτ
.
Remark 1 (boundary conditions): The Peano theorem also states the initial conditions of
the system of variational equations. In this application it is assumed that the change of the
tax-rate does not change the initial value of the state variable k0 = k(0) as it is historically
given. Nor does it change the initial time itself – time starts in t = 0 regardless of a possible
perpetuation of the parameter.7 This said, the first of the two conditions in (2.9c) is a direct
application of the Peano Theorem as stated in Oniki [1973, eq. (26)].
The second condition in (2.8c) is an end-point condition. Assume that limt→∞ k(t) > 0.
negative for all future periods. See Huggett [2003] for conditions that ensure the monotonicity of comparative
dynamic statements.
7 The Peano Theorem also deals with situations in which the initial value or the initial time, or both, depend
on the parameter.
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Given that the Inada Conditions hold, a situation where capital approaches zero cannot be
an optimal investment plan. This means that the discounted shadow price of capital must
approach zero. The end-point condition in (2.8c) is equivalent to limt→∞ λ(t) = 0. Note also
that it is possible to transform any endpoint condition into a condition on the initial value of
the co-state variable. In a phase diagram, the endpoint condition in (2.8c) makes sure that
for any initial value of the state variable, the corresponding value of the co-state variable is
such that the system converges to a steady state. Hence, there always exists a corresponding
initial condition for an endpoint condition as in (2.8c).
The second condition in (2.9c) is the variational-equations endpoint condition corresponding
to limt→∞ λ(t) = 0. If there was a condition λ0 = λ(0) in (2.8c), the Peano Theorem
would state that dλ(0)
dτ
= 0. The second condition shown in (2.9c) is the corresponding
endpoint-condition.8
Remark 2 (solvability of the variational system): System (2.9) cannot be solved analytically
as the entries in the Jacobian are not constants. This problem will be tackled in the next step.
Note that is is a system with time-varying constants. One way to deal with this situation is
to use phase diagrams, as there are only two equations. This is done in Caputo [1990a] and
in Oniki [1973]. To allow for an analytical solution, the next step is necessary – and this is
the approach taken by Boadway [1979] and also in Wildasin [2003].
2.3.2 Step 2: it is a transition between steady states
The problem with system (2.9) is that the entries in the Jacobian are not constant as they
contain the original solutions (2.7) which are generally not constant over time. This would
be different if I had chosen to substitute the initial system by its linearized version. But the
drawback of a linearization is that the investigation of the dynamic system is then limited
to a small neighborhood of the steady state. To avoid this limitation, the idea in Boadway
[1979], Wildasin [2003] is to make a strong assumption, discussed in detail in the following,
that has the advantage that (2.9) turns out to be a system with constant coefficients.
There is one special case where the original solution {k(t, τ), λ(t, τ)} is time independent:
if the system initially has been in a steady state. This is the case if the initial value k0 for
k in (2.5) happens to be a steady state value, labeled kSS(τ) and the corresponding value
of the shadow price of capital is λSS(τ). Then the solution (2.7) – the solution prior to a
change in the parameter – can be written as
{k(t, τ) = kSS(τ) = constant, λ(t, τ) = λSS(τ) = constant}.
The system of variational equations then is:
˙(dk(t, τ)
dτ
)
= 0
dk(t)
dτ
+
(
kSS(τ)
b
)
dλ(t)
dτ
(2.10a)
˙(dλSS(τ)
dτ
)
= −f ′′(kSS(τ))dk(t)
dτ
+ (r + 2δ)
dλ(t)
dτ
+ 1 (2.10b)
dkt=0
dτ
= 0, lim
t→∞
dλ(t)
dτ
= 0 . (2.10c)
8 Here I follow Caputo [1990a, footnote 3] who claims that the uniqueness of the solution (2.7) implies that
the terminal boundary condition can always be rewritten as an initial condition and that therefore the Peano
Theorem applies. There is no need for an initial condition for λ or dλ
dτ
. The terminal condition in Wildasin
[2003, p. 2586] has the same effect.
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This system is now ready to be solved analytically for dk(t)
dτ
and dλ(t)
dτ
.
2.3.3 Step 3: solving
It is relatively straightforward to verify the solution found in Wildasin [2003]: The Jacobi-
Matrix of coefficients is, given the form of the adjustment cost function,[
0 kSS/b
−f ′′(kSS) r + 2δ
]
.
The corresponding eigenvalues are real and distinct, one of them being negative and one
positive: 
 ρ1 =
br+2 bδ+
√
b(br2+4 brδ+4 bδ2−4 f ′′(kSS) kSS)
2b > 0
ρ2 =
br+2 bδ−
√
b(br2+4 brδ+4 bδ2−4 f ′′(kSS) kSS)
2b < 0

 .
The long-term solution (particular solution) is found from (2.10) and is
lim
t→∞
dλt
dτ
= 0 (2.11a)
lim
t→∞
dKt
dτ
=
1
f ′′(kSS(τ))
. (2.11b)
(2.11c)
The general solution then is
dk(t)
dτ
= a1e
ρ1t + a2e
ρ2t +
1
f ′′(kSS(τ))
(2.12a)
dλ(t)
dτ
= a1e
ρ1t + a2e
ρ2t . (2.12b)
The remaining constants a1, a2 can be calculated from the boundary conditions (2.10c) and
the result for the comparative-dynamic impact of a change in τ on k(t) is
dk(t)
dτ
=
1
f ′′(kSS(τ))
(
1− eρ2t
)
. (2.13)
Note that this approach to comparative dynamics calculates the impact of a change in the
parameter τ for the entire path of the state and costate variable. (2.13) is not limited to the
neighborhood of the initial steady state as there is no linear approximation involved. The
result holds globally, see [Caputo 1990a, p. 224].
Linearization of 2.5 and a differentiation of the linearized system would have taken us
to the same result.9 But the drawback would have been that (2.13) would be valid only in
the neighborhood of the steady state. Outside this neighborhood, the marginal effect of the
change of the tax rate on the evolution of the capital stock and on the optimal investment
policy would be unknown. The assumption of an initial steady state allows to calculate a
global solution.
9 The algebraic calculations would have been almost the same. The system of diffential equations in dk(t)/dτ
and dλ(t)/dτ would be linear and with constant coefficients. A linearization means that a non-linear saddle
path is approximated by a linear saddle-path. The assumption of an initial steady state means that the initial
conditions is a special case where the saddle path is irrelevant as there is no evolution of the state variable
and the co-state variable to the equilibrium point.
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Proposition 1 (local/global) Result (2.13) holds globally if the dynamic system of invest-
ment and capital accumulation (2.5) has been in a steady state at time t = 0 (the point in
time when the tax-rate change occurs). Otherwise, it is limited to the neighborhood of the
steady state.
This does of course not mean that the closed-form solution for the time path of the capital
stock is found. As in a comparative static exercise, (2.13) is an approximation of the reaction
to a infinitesimal small change of the parameter. The actual change needs not to be small.
And even if it was small10 – or turned out to be smallonce the optimal tax rate is found –
there would remain an approximation error.
It is shown in the next section how the comparative dynamic result derived above is used
for the determination of the optimal tax rate by a local tax authority.
2.4 Optimal taxation
A well known result from many static models of tax competition is the following property:
dk
dτ
=
1
f ′′(k)
.
In words: an increase of the tax rate on capital by a small (marginal) amount induces an
outflow of capital. This leads to a tax-base externality, see Wilson [1999]. Equation (2.13)
above is the dynamic version of that result: In the long run, the marginal reaction of the
capital stock will be the same as in a standard static setup. But it will take some time.
In the model discussed here, the strength of the tax-base externality depends on time.
Initially, there is no capital flight at all and the local capital stock is a perfectly inelastic
tax base. But as time goes on, firms subject to taxation reallocate capital and the tax-base
externality becomes stronger. Local governments need to take that into account when they
calculate optimal local tax policy. The time profile for the tax base externality matters when
the marginal response is used in the first-order condition for the calculation of the optimal
tax rate. Equation (8) in Wildasin [2003] is
dY
dτ
=
∫ ∞
0

−kSSf ′′(kSS)dk(t)dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
a)
+ τ
dk(t)
dτ
+ kSS︸ ︷︷ ︸
b)

 e−rtdt . (2.14)
The government seeks to find the tax rate that maximizes the life-time wealth,
Y =
∫ ∞
0
(
f(k(t)− k(t)f ′(k(t) + τk(t)) e−rt ,
of worker households.11 The overall effect of a marginal change in the tax rate on life-time
income consists of two effects. Labeled with a) in (2.14), there is the effect of a marginal
10 As will be seen in the next section, in the model discussed here, the tax rate a local government chooses
depends on the initial capital stock. That in turn – as I have assumed that the initial situation is a steady
state – depends on the initial, historically given tax rate in a way that is described in (2.6). One could of
course imagine a situation where initial taxation is very high and hence the tax rate change on top of the
historically given one is small. But it is not small in general.
11 I assumed here for simplicity that the capital stock is owned by foreigners only, hence θ = 0 in Wildasin’s
notation. A worker households income then consists of wages and redistribution.
2.4 Optimal taxation 13
change in the tax rate on wage-income and, labeled with b), the effect it has on revenue from
capital taxation as this is redistributed to worker households.12
The optimal tax rate chosen by a tax authority, given the initial steady state, is found by
equating (2.14) to zero and is 13
τ˜ =
rkSSf
′′(kSS)
ρ2
> 0 . (2.15)
Note that the tax rate corresponding with the initial steady state is labeled τ and the optimal
tax rate chosen by the local government, given the initial circumstances, is labeled τ˜ . If
τ 6= τ˜ , there will be a transition away from the initial steady state.
The essential point in Wildasin [2003] is that the optimal tax rate is positive. Note that
the effect b) is an approximation. A change in the tax rate means that there will be a tax
rate effect (given the current tax base, revenue increases when the tax rate increases) and the
tax base effect (for a given rate, revenues become smaller as the tax base shrinks). Wildasin’s
result can be stated also like this:
Proposition 2 (Wildasin) The optimal tax rate described in (2.15) is always positive. It
can be greater or smaller than the initial tax rate. Accordingly, there can be an inflow or an
outflow of capital from time t = 0 on.
Proposition 2 follows directly from (2.15) and from the fact that the initial value for the
local capital stock, kSS , that depends on the initial tax rate τ , can be arbitrarily chosen.
Another important point for the interpretation of (2.15) is to note that it depends on the
initial situation (in particular on the initial capital stock and therefore also on the initial
tax rate τ), both directly and because of the dependence of the negative Eigenvalue ρ2 on
the initial capital stock. The tax rate that is chosen is not independent from history. The
decision characterized in the present model is a one-shot decision, with full commitment, to
set a constant capital tax rate. (2.15) is an open-loop strategy. The fact that it is not history
independent is important if one considers the closed-loop strategy where the tax authority
can decide again about the optimal tax rate in all subsequent periods. In general, a tax
authority that has the possibility to revise its decision in the future will find that the capital
stock is lower than initially and hence will choose another tax rate.
Proposition 3 (time consistency) The optimal tax policy described in (2.15) is not time
consistent.
12 Here I use the same approximation as Wildasin does, namely that d(τK(t))
dτ
= τ dk(t)
dτ
+kSS . The approximation
error stems from the difference between Kss and k(t). As will be shown in a moment, the local government
strictly sets positive tax rates if capital is less then perfectly mobile. Hence Kss > k(t). The effect of a change
in the tax rate on redistribution, labeled with b) in (2.14), is hence overstated.
13 Without the approximation error mentioned in the previous footnote, the optimal tax rate would be
τ˜ =
rkSSf
′′(kSS)
ρ2
+
ǫf ′′(kSS)(ρ2 − r)
−ρ2
,
where ǫ =
∫
∞
0
k(t)− kSSe
−rtdt. Wildasin’s approximation assumes implicitely ǫ = 0. The additional term
as compared with (2.15) is a negative number. The property that τ˜ > 0 holds for the tax rate without the
approximation if kSSr is not too small.
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This result is mainly due to the very restrictive assumption of the tax rate being constant
over time. An alternative would be to let local government choose a time path of tax rates.
The restriction that tax rates are equal in all periods allows to apply the Peano Theorem as
taxation in this case is similar to the choice of a parameter. But this comes at the cost of
time inconsistency.
The result of positive tax rates in Wildasin [2003] can also be seen as a variant of a result
known from the literature on optimal taxation. Without the restriction of a constant tax rate,
optimal taxation of capital usually means to tax capital strongly initially, to choose lower tax
rates in the subsequent periods and not to tax capital in the steady state. The restriction of
a constant tax rate has the effect that is becomes optimal to choose some average of initially
high taxes and lower taxes later on. See, for example, Chari / Kehoe [1998].
2.5 Summary
This note has discussed in detail the comparative dynamic analysis in Wildasin [2003]. The
importance of the assumption that the economy of the jurisdiction in question is in a steady
state initially has been stressed. It allows to derive a global solution for the comparative
dynamics of capital taxation when capital owners can either invest in the local capital stock
or in financial assets abroad. It has been argued that the optimal local policy in this model
setting, where the tax rate is assumed to be constant over time, is not time-consistent.
Appendix: The time path of the local capital stock for a linearized
version of the model
An alternative strategy to solve for the comparative-dynamic properties of the model would
have been to linearize around the steady state of the dynamic system (2.5) – the first approach
mentioned in 2.3 on page 8. Employing the Peano Theorem for the comparative dynamics
exercise dicussed in this chapter has the advantage that the results are exact and there is
no approximation involved. The disadvantage is that the time path of the capital stock is
unknown.
Let’s consider the following scenario: The economy is initially in a steady state {KSS(τ), λSS(τ)}
corresponding with an initial tax rate τ . The government then sets a tax rate τ˜ > τ . What is
the time path of the local capital stock, from kSS(τ) to the new steady state, labeled k˜SS(τ˜)?
To derive a closed solution for k(t), there is then the possibility to use numerical methods
given explicit values for all parameters. An alternative is to use a linearization technique.
This appendix provides the linear approximation for the time path of k(t), given its initial
value and the optimal tax rate τ . A textbook exposition of the linearization of a growth
model of the Ramsey-type can be found, for example, in Barro / Sala-i-Martin [1995, ch. 2]
or Blanchard / Fischer [1989, ch. 2]. Other approaches to derive analytically a closed-form
solution of the Ramsey model are based on special assumptions about the structure of the
model, see Smith [2006] and references therein.
The negative, stable root of the dynamic system (2.5) has already been calculated as ρ2.
The dynamics of the local capital stock around its new steady state k˜SS are then given by
k(t) = k˜SS +
(
kSS − k˜SS
)
eρ2t , (2.A1)
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where k˜SS is given implicitly by
τ˜ + (δb+ 1) (r + δ) +
δ2b
2
= f ′(k˜SS)
⇔ rkSSf
′′(kSS)
ρ2
+ (δb+ 1) (r + δ) +
δ2b
2
= f ′(k˜SS) (2.A2)
Once a functional form for the production function f(k) is given, the time path of the local
capital stock could be calculated as a function of the initial capital stock r, kSS , ρ2(b, r, δ, kSS),
δ, b.
Note that this would also allow to calculate the time path of revenue, τ˜ k(t). However, this
would not necessarily allow a better approximation of d(τk(t))/dτ than the one used above,
d(τK(t))
dτ
= τ
dk(t)
dτ
+ kSS ,
to derive (2.15).
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Chapter 3
Dynamic tax competition and public-sector
modernisation
This chapter is based on Becker [2005].
3.1 Introduction
Competition for mobile resources can lead to an inefficiently low provision of public goods
and can therefore be harmful for the wellbeing of nations. This is the major lesson to be
drawn from the tax-competition literature surveyed by Wilson [1999]. However, there are
circumstances under which the underprovision result does not hold. For example, if the
public sector’s activities involve the waste of ressources - caused by rent-seeking politicians or
by an inefficiently operating bureaucracy - tax competition can be beneficial as it promotes
public-sector modernisation. See, for example, Edwards / Keen [1996], Rauscher [2000] and
Keen / Kotsogiannis [2003] for models in which the public sector is seen as such a Leviathan
that needs to be tamed.
This paper takes a different look at the efficiency of the public sector. Improvements in
public-sector efficiency are modelled as reducing its reliance on tax revenue for the provision
of public services. In the model presented below, there is no wasteful behavior of the public
bureaucracy that needs to be repelled. The public sector’s main task in this model is to
provide a redistributive transfer to households. But this is not as simple as raising tax revenue
and giving it away to a group of the society that has been selected by the political process.
Instead, I model redistribution as a production process where current revenue is only one
input. The efficiency of the public sector’s production technology depends on the availability
of “public-sector efficiency” that is modelled similar to an input. “Public-sector efficiency” is
the result of past investment of the public sector and could be IT technology, knowledge or
some other stock that is necessary to fulfill the task of providing a transfer to a target group.
As public-sector efficiency is modelled as a stock, a local government has control over its
evolution. It decides about the investment in the efficiency of the production process, given
the revenue it raises.
When public-sector modernisation is seen as an investment activity as in this paper, higher
capital mobility is not helpful to improve public-sector efficiency. When capital is mobile,
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firms are able to shift capital to other jurisdictions. This loss of the tax base is the major
disadvantage of capital taxation in open economies. Of course, the severity of this negative
effect depends on the degree of capital mobility. Capital mobility in this paper weakens the
ability of local governments to raise tax revenue that is needed for beneficial tasks such as
the provision of redistribution and public-sector modernisation. The exact meaning of this
statement will be developed below.
The aim of the paper is not only to express some doubt concering the “Leviathan wisdom”
[Keen / Kotsogiannis 2003] about the benefits of tax competition when the public sector has
a “grabbing hand”.1 Another aim is to present the use of a particular dynamic modelling
framework based on Wildasin [2003]. It allows the introduction of dynamics in an analytically
solvable model of interjurisdictional competition. Furthermore it allows to characterise
different degrees of capital mobility.2 Both the accumulation of public-sector knowledge and
the re-location of capital in response to a change in capital taxation are dynamic processes
and therefore a dynamic framework seems to be appropriate.
Wildasin (2003) presents a dynamic version of the “canonical” tax-competition model
and analyses the dynamic reaction of the local capital stock to a change in capital taxation.
Whether the reaction of firms is immediate or not depends on the convexity of an adjustment-
cost function that is common in macroeconomic models. Wildasin’s dynamic model provides
some support for static models of tax competition. The long-term effects in the dynamic
model are similar to those known from static models. However, the decision whether to tax
capital or not, and at which rate, differs under imperfect capital-mobility. When it takes time
for capital to flee a jurisdiction, the trade-off between capital-taxation and the loss of tax
base is altered. The adjustment speed in Wildasin [2003] can serve as a reasonable measure
of the degree of capital mobility. This allows to consider not only the polar cases of autarky
compared with perfect integration but also the more realistic intermediate cases.
Modelling public-sector modernisation as an dynamic investment problem as in this paper
introduces another consideration a government needs to take into account when deciding
about the optimal tax structure. Investing in the stock of efficiency means that future
redistribution becomes more efficient. To discuss intertemporal considerations like this, it is
necessary to use a dynamic model as it is presented in this paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 presents the setup of the model, including
the dynamic approach to capital mobility and tax competition. Section 3.3 analyses the
decision problem the government faces in this dynamic environment. The following result
are derived: the optimal input mix in the production of redistribution, for the comparative
dynamics of public-sector efficiency and of local capital, for the optimal tax rate given a certain
degree of capital mobility, and for the relationship between capital mobility and public-sector
efficiency. Section 3.4 provides some numerical examples and section 3.5 concludes the paper.
1 There are a number of arguments both in favor and against the view that tax competition might be
favourable for the efficiency of the public sector. In Wilson [2005], for example, the mobility of the tax base is
unambiguously welfare-improving because the Leviathan in his model is identified as a bureaucracy that has
an interest to strengthen the tax base when capital is more mobile. Cai / Treisman [2005] are more pessimistic
as they argue that poorly endowed governments do not engage in tax competition at all as they anticipate
that they are not able to attract capital. Hence, tax competition cannot be a discipline device for these
governments. In Cai / Treisman [2004], competition between jurisdiction weakens the central government that
could otherwise eliminate the disadvantages of interjurisdictional competition.
2 There are surprisingly few models in the tax competition literature that deal with imperfect factor mobility,
with Lee [1997] being one of the exceptions. Public-sector modernisation, growth and tax competition is
also analysed in Rauscher [2005], albeit in an endogenous growth model and with an alternative modelling
of imperfect capital mobility. He finds that the effect of increased capital mobility on growth and on the
behaviour of a Leviathan is ambiguous.
3.2 The model 19
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Households
Let us consider a federation with many small jurisdictions. A single jurisdiction cannot
influence decisions in other jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction is inhabited by an immobile
representative household that has no market power. The household’s budget constraint is
C(t) = w(t) +G(t) +A(t)r − S(t), (3.1)
where C(t) is consumption of a numeraire good, w(t) is the wage rate, G(t) is a redistributive
transfer via a consumption good provided by the government and t is an index of time.
Labour is inelastically supplied in a perfectly competitive labour-market and the number
of households is normalized to one. There is an international capital market where a stock
of accumulated savings A(t) earns a return of r, expressed in terms of the numéraire good.
A(t) is a stock of financial capital. All agents take the interest rate r as given and I assume
that r ≥ 0. Capital is supplied by an integrated world capital market consisting of the
accumulated savings of all countries. The federation is a small country compared to the
rest of the world. Therefore, A(t) represents the part of the world capital stock that is
held by domestic residents. To simplify the model, I assume that domestic households hold
only shares of foreign firms and that local firms are exclusively owned by foreigners.3 S(t)
represents current savings.
3.2.2 Government
The role of the government is to provide a redistributive transfer G(t). This is more complex
than simply to redistribute tax revenue from the foreign-owned firms to the worker-household:
G(t) is produced with a Cobb-Douglas-Technology
G(t) = R(t)γH(t)1−γ with 0 < γ < 1 , (3.2)
where H(t) is a stock of knowledge and R(t) a flow of revenues devoted to the production
of redistribution. Technology (3.2) plays a central role in this model. G(t) is a lump-sum
transfer to households and can also be labeled redistribution.4 The level of G(t) a government
can provide does not only depend on the tax revenue R(t) devoted to redistribution, but also
on the stock of H(t).
In an ideal world, a government that provides redistribution simply diverts revenue taken
from one group of citizens to another group of citizens that has been defined as a target group.
One Euro raised implies that there is one Euro that can be passed on to the target group.
This would be a perfectly efficient redistribution technology. The idea behind technology (3.2)
is that in reality, redistribution is a complex procedure that can be modelled as a production
process. Redistribution involves flow inputs of labour, for example public servants that process
applications for social assistance. And it also involves stock inputs, for example IT-technology
or knowledge about good practices to provide redistribution according to a politically defined
goal. A government that produces redistribution with a technology like (3.2) has - similar to
3 Alternatively I could introduce foreign and domestic shares. I will discuss this and other assumptions in the
conclusion.
4 A referee pointed out that redistribution in this model is not across consumers but from foreign capital
owners to local households.
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a private firm that produces goods - to decide about an optimal input mix between stocks
and flows. It needs to decide about an investment strategy, where investment is broadly
defined and includes training of public servants or the establishment of rules and procedures
in the bureaucracy.
G(t) and labour income are perfect substitutes. One could see technology (3.2) also as
a way to model situations where the public sector provides a private good that is a close
substitute to private consumption. Examples are public education or public health care.
They are rival in consumption and can also be provided privately. Another way to interpret
(3.2) is to see it as the technology of tax collection. H(t) would then be the effectiveness of
the public sector to raise tax revenue.
Public-sector efficiency in this paper is measured by the level of H(t). It can be interpreted
as the knowledge of the public sector about efficient technologies to transform tax revenue
into a transfer. Without any knowledge, i.e. H(t) = 0, the public sector is a black hole in
which tax revenues vanish without any benefits for the citizens. A high level of H(t) can
be seen as an indicator of a very efficient public sector where at least the first units of tax
revenue generate very high marginal benefits for the household. The development of H(t)
over time reflects the development of public-sector efficiency. I assume throughout the paper
that parameters are such that the efficiency of the public sector is not above the efficiency
frontier (G 6 R).5
Tax revenue is used to provide a redistributive transfer and to modernise the public sector.
It is assumed that the government cannot tax the immobile factor labour, but imposes a
source tax τ per unit on the local capital stock k(t). To keep the model simple, public debt
is ruled out6 and therefore, the government’s budget constraint is
τk(t) = R(t) +M(t) , (3.3)
whereM(t) is the investment in public efficiency or the modernisation effort at time t. Current
public expenditure is financed by current capital tax revenue. Public-sector efficiency develops
according to
H˙(t) =M(t) = τk(t)−R(t) with H(0) = H0 ≥ 0 given . (3.4)
Initially, the public sector’s efficiency is H0. If H0 = 0, modernisation, i.e. accumulation of
H(t), is a prerequisite for redistribution. It is assumed, again for the sake of simplicity, that
the public sector does not forget technologies and procedures to transform tax revenue into
redistribution it has previously known. Thus, there is no depreciation in (3.4).
5 The usage of an input as a measure of efficiency is a bit unusual. Think of a general technology G = f(R),
where G is one output, R is an input. Productivity is then measured as G/R. A more productive production
unit is also more efficient. In this paper, where R is tax revenue and G a transfer, the efficiency border is
naturally given by R = G. Hence, the productivity of the public sector and its distance from the efficiency
border are related in a simple way. The reason for efficiency differences is usually that different technologies
are used. The idea behind (3.2) is that the state of technology behind the transformation of R into G is under
the control of the public sector. The state of technology is H1−γ and modelled similar to an input. The
assumption that parameters are such that the public does not produce above its efficiency frontier means that
I assume that the level of H is always low enough to ensure that G(t) < R(t). Efficiency is not defined as the
best possible way to use R and H for the production of G.
6 The assumption that the public sector has no access to the international capital market is meant to reflect
borrowing constraints governments face. An example is the Europan Growth and Stability Pact or the common
practice of states in the U.S. to impose constitutional bans on borrowing. I see the assumption of no access at
all as a simple way to incorporate such restrictions into the model.
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3.2.3 Private firms and the dynamics of taxation and capital accumulation
In the local jurisdiction there are many identical firms. The representative firm takes prices
and decisions by the government as given. This firm produces with a constant-returns-to-scale
production function F (k(t), L). The decision to hire labour and capital is dominated by the
aim to maximise the current value of future cash flows. Labour is normalised to one such
that the production function can be written as f(k(t)). The wage rate is determined in a
competitive labour market. It depends on the current capital stock only and is given by
w(t) = f(k(t))− f ′(k(t))k(t) . (3.5)
The development of the local capital stock k(t) depends on the investment rate i(t) chosen
by the representative firm. The local capital stock evolves according to
k˙(t) = (i(t)− δ) k(t) with k(0) = k0 ≥ 0 given, (3.6)
where δ is the depreciation rate.
The alternative investment opportunity for the local firm is to invest in financial capital
A which bears an interest at rate r. The interest rate is assumed to be exogenous to the
jurisdiction. Hence, the objective of the firm is to maximize the present value of profits with
r being the discount rate. The cash flow at time t is
π(t) = f(k(t))− c (i(t)) k(t)− τk(t)− i(t)k(t)− w(t) , (3.7)
with c(i) being an investment cost function. The objective of the firm is
max Π =
∫ ∞
0
π(t)e−rtdt , (3.8)
subject to (3.6). Profits and therefore investment depend on the local tax rate on capital, τ ,
which is assumed to be constant. From a technical point of view, τ is a parameter in the
firm’s optimization problem. Another important determinant of the firm’s decision about the
local capital stock is the investment cost function c(i). It is assumed to be convex and its
curvature will turn out to be crucial for the speed of a firm’s reaction to a variation in the
capital tax rate. To simplify the notation, assume the following quadratic specification of
investment costs:
c (i(t)) k(t) =
b
2
i(t)2k(t), (3.9)
where c(0) = 0, c′ = bi(t), c′′ = b. Parameter b can be interpreted as a measure for the
mobility of capital. The lower b, the cheaper it is to adjust the capital stock. The total costs
of investing one unit of capital are i(t) (1 + c (i(t)) k(t)) = i(t)
(
1 + b2 i(t)
2k(t)
)
.
Employing the Maximum Principle, and making use of the functional form for the investment
cost function, the process of capital accumulation of the firm can be described as follows:7
k˙(t) =
(
λ(t)− 1
b
− δ
)
k(t) (3.10a)
λ˙(t) = −f ′(k(t)) + τ + λ(t) (r + δ) + (λ− 1)
2
2b
(3.10b)
k(0) = k0 > 0 is given; lim
t→∞
(
λ(t)e−rtk(t)
)
= 0 . (3.10c)
7 See Becker [2007] for a step-by-step derivation.
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λ is the costate variable associated with capital. The first-order condition for investment,
λ(t) = 1+ c′ (i(t)), has been used to express investment as a function of λ and the investment
cost parameter b. Investment is i(t) = λ(t)−1
b
. The boundary conditions in (3.10c) are
standard.
(3.10) is a system of ordinary differential equations. Its solution {k(t, τ), λ(t, τ)} depends on
the parameter τ . The additional argument τ will be omitted if this does not cause any confusion
in the remainder of the paper. Given all parameters and the initial value of k0 = k(0), the local
capital stock grows towards a steady state
{KSS(τ), λSS(τ)}, which is defined by
δb+ 1 = λSS (3.11a)
τ + (δb+ 1) (r + δ) +
δ2b
2
= f ′(kSS) . (3.11b)
The setup of the private sector is very similar toWildasin [2003], where the focus is on the
comparative-dynamic response of the local capital stock to taxation. A key insight of Wildasin
[2003] is that when capital is modelled as a stock variable, the elastic reaction of the local
capital stock to a change of the capital tax rate evolves over time. Wildasin finds that a
convex investment cost function implies that the tax base capital is not perfectly elastic as
it is assumed in most static models of tax competition. The scenario in Wildasin [2003]
and also in this paper is the following: At time t = 0, the government sets a time-invariant
tax rate τ which comes as a surprise to the private sector.8 Furthermore, it is assumed
that the government can commit itself to its policy announcements. Raising the capital
tax rate drives capital out of the jurisdiction as local firms have an incentive to disinvest.
When this adjustment of the local capital stock in response to capital taxation is immediate,
the mobility of (physical) capital is perfect.9 If capital is not perfectly mobile, firms face
the following trade off: When the new tax rate is higher than initially, local capital is less
profitable compared with the external rate of return r. Therefore, they find it profitable to
de-accumulate until the net return of local capital equals the external rate of return. On the
other hand, de-accumulation (a negative rate of investment) raises adjustment costs. If the
investment-cost function is convex, quick adjustments of the capital stock are more expensive
per unit than slow adjustments.
The immobility of capital is an important determinant of the optimal tax policy. Assume
for simplicity that firms are owned only by foreigners. The inhabitants of the local jurisdiction
are workers. The local government tries to raise tax revenue that it can then redistribute to
workers. Tax revenue is a prerequisite for redistribution. Furthermore, in this model, tax
revenue is also needed to improve the efficiency of the public sector. On the other hand,
capital taxation implies a lower local capital stock, lower marginal productivity of labour and
therefore lower wages. If the adjustment of the capital stock in response to capital taxation is
not immediate, the benefits of taxation occur immediately but the disadvantages need time
to take effect. In a dynamic model, this is an elegant way to model imperfect capital mobility.
Trading off the present values of benefits and costs can result in positive capital tax rates
8 One could argue that real-world governments decide about a path of tax rates. While this might be true, a
model with a time-invariant tax rate generates dynamics that can be analysed by making use of the Peano
Theorem about the comparative dynamic response of a dynamic system to a variation of a parameter. This
will be shown below.
9 There are no constraints on the mobility of financial capital. The adjustment of the stock of financial capital
is free of cost. See, for example, Persson / Tabellini [1992] or Gordon / Bovenberg [1996] for models where
capital mobility costs are associated with the investment abroad. In the present model, investment is either
local (in physical capital k) or it is investment in the federation-wide market for financial capital.
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even if non-distorting lump-sum taxes are available, as has been shown in Wildasin [2003].
The reason is that the tax burden is shifted away from worker-households and towards foreign
owners of the capital stock temporarily. While the economy adjusts, the government extracts
quasi-rents from foreign capital owner.
A key result in Wildasin [2003, eqs. (5), (6)] that will be derived for the specific functional
forms in this paper later on, is
dk(t)
dτ
=
1
f ′′(k)
(
1− eρ2t
)
, (3.12)
with ρ2 < 0 representing the speed of adjustment.
10
This is the comparative-dynamic response of the local capital stock to a change in the
capital tax rate τ . When time goes to infinity, the response of the local capital stock to a
change in the tax rate is the inverse of the second derivative of the production function with
respect to capital, a result that is familiar from static models of tax competition. See, for
example, Zodrow / Mieszkowski [1986, eq. 5]. For 0 < t < ∞, the comparative-dynamic
response to a change in the tax rate is less, depending on the magnitude of ρ2. For the
derivation of (3.12), it has been assumed that the starting value for capital, k0 happens to
be a steady state value. The need for this assumption will be explained later on, but let us
introduce some notation: Initially, the capital stock has a value of k0 that is a steady state.
There might be an historically given tax rate on capital τ such that the initial steady state
can be denoted by {kSS(τ), λSS(τ)}, where λ is the costate variable associated with capital.
The local government decides in time t = 0 about a new tax rate on capital. The new tax
rate will be denoted by τ˜ . If τ˜ 6= τ , the local capital stock will adjust from the initial steady
state to another one, denoted by
{
k˜SS(τ˜), λ˜SS(τ˜)
}
.
Further on, the parameter b in the adjustment cost function is used as a measure for capital
mobility as it measures the speed with which the response of the local capital stock to a
change in the tax rate becomes effective. More convex investment cost functions imply higher
values of b and values of ρ2 that are smaller (shown in detail later on). The investment
cost function can be seen as a punishment of quick adjustments. High investment or de-
investment implies higher than proportional investment costs and therefore it is profitable to
adjust the capital stock only gradually, in a process that takes time. A more pronounced
punishment is represented by a greater value of b and a value of ρ2 that is smaller. If ρ2 → 0,
capital is immobile. If ρ2 → −∞, capital is perfectly mobile. When adjustment costs per
unit of investment are strongly convex, firms are reluctant to adjust the local capital stock
immediately as this would imply very high adjustment costs.11
The structure of the model in this paper is such that the comparative dynamics of the
local capital stock are similar to (3.12). The speed of capital-stock adjustment will be crucial
10 At time t = 0, dk(t)
dτ
= 0. For t→∞, dk(t)
dτ
= 1
f ′′(k)
. The absolute value of ρ2 determines the speed of the
transition of dk(t)
dτ
from 0 to 1
f ′′(k)
.
11 A potential problem with Wildasin’s approach is that this adjustment cost function can be applied to closed
economies as well. One might argue that adjustment costs should therefore not be used as a microfoundation
for imperfect capital mobility that instead could to be caused by barriers to cross-border capital flows, see for
example Persson / Tabellini [1992] or Lejour / Verbon [1997]. In this paper, it is assumed that it is costless to
borrow and invest in the international capital market. Nevertheless, capital is not perfectly mobile in the
sense that the process of capital flight is time-consuming.
Another possibility is to model the investment decision of the firm with investment in a second capital stock
abroad as the alternative investment opportunity. Investment abroad then can be associated with a cost
function similar to an adjustment cost function but representing the cost of overcoming barriers to capital.
The resulting response of a firm would be very similar to the one illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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for the results in this paper, where the government uses the revenue of capital taxation for
redistribution and for public-sector modernisation. The solid line in Figure 3.1 shows the
adjustment of the local capital stock in response to a change in the tax rate on capital from
τ to τ˜ with τ < τ˜ and a convex investment cost function (b > 0).
k(t)
t
k0 = kSS
new steady
state level
Figure 3.1: Comparative-dynamic response of the capital stock for τ < τ˜ and b > 0
A local government solves the problem of optimally exploiting (foreign) capital owners.
Capital owners can defend themselves against exploitation because they can adjust the local
capital stock. This in turn needs to be considered by a local government as the wage rate of
its inhabitants depends on the capital stock. The other decision the local government needs
to make is how to split the revenue extracted from foreigners between modernisation and
redistribution.
Local governments are engaged in tax competition as they have to consider that the tax
base capital depends on their decisions. Raising the tax on local capital triggers an outflow of
capital. Many model of tax competition deal with the Nash equilibrium in a federation where
tax rates are too low a long as the positive externality of capital outflows is not corrected.
In this model, the local jurisdiction is assumed to be small such that the federation-wide
interest rate does not depend on the decisions of the local government. Hence, there is no
externality by definition. Nevertheless, local jurisdictions have an incentive to set tax rates
that attract capital, a scenario that is commonly seen as one of tax competition.
This completes the setup of the model.
3.3 The intensity of tax competition and public-sector
modernisation
3.3.1 The problem
The government’s policy instruments are τ , M(t) and R(t). It needs to take the technology
(3.2), the budget constraint (3.3) and the equation of motion for public-sector efficiency (3.4)
and the evolution of the local capital stock into account. The objective is to maximise the
lifetime income of the jurisdiction’s citizens. The optimisation problem therefore is
max
τ,R(t)
∫ ∞
0
(
w(t) +R(t)γH(t)1−γ
)
e−rtdt , (3.13)
subject to (3.4) and (3.10a)-(3.10c). The present value of the household’s income from saving
over time,
∫∞
0 (A(t)r − S(t)) e−rtdt, is not part of the objective function. The world interest
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rate serves as discount factor, as households can borrow and lend on the international capital
market. The government controls the supply of redistribution and (indirectly, via the capital
stock) also the wage rate. Whatever the paths of w(t) and G(t) are, households will adjust
their savings to maximise their lifetime utility of consumption. In this model, the government
has no interest to intervene in the intertemporal consumption decision but maximises the
income that is distributed over time to the household. Using this objective function instead
of the discounted lifetime utility from consumption will simplify the algebra considerably and
has the additional advantage that the government’s decisions do not rely on the knowledge of
the household’s utility function.
The assumption that the income from assets and the saving decision of households is not
part of the objective function may sound a bit unusual. In many growth models, it is the
discounted utility of households that is maximised. In a model with an externally given
interest rate, the best possible lifetime utility from consumption is achieved with the highest
possible lifetime income. The path of consumption is irrelevant. A benevolent government
has no reason to influence the time path of consumption as it has no influence on the external
interest rate by assumption. A benevolent government tries to achieve the highest possible
lifetime-income for its citizens and it can do so by maximising the lifetime-income from
redistribution and work as it is assumed in (3.13). In a model without a fixed interest rate,
this would be different. A government could try manipulate the time path of interest rate
and investment activity in order to achieve a higher life-time utility, for example if saving
and investment generates external effects not taken into account by households. This is
not possible in this model where any investment project is evaluated against the alternative
investment in assets bearing a fixed interest rate determined on the world market.
The assumption of an externally given and fixed interest rate is critical in this model.
Note that with a utility function that implies consumption smoothing additional transfers to
households will be used for both current consumption and savings. There is an additional
supply of savings in the international capital market. The assumption of small jurisdictions
means that the governments’ decision to manipulate households income will not change
supply and demand conditions in the international capital market substantially and that
the market clearing interest rate is unchanged. The model is solved from the perspective of
a single jurisdiction, given external conditions on the world capital market. I do not solve
for the equilibrium of a system of identical jurisdictions. If jurisdictions were symmetric,
all jurisdictions would set the same tax rate simultaneously, implying that the relative
attractiveness of jurisdictions would not change and ex post, capital would not flee the country
when the tax rate is raised. In a symmetric model, this would imply that the market-clearing
interest rate would be lowered by the simultaneous decision to change capital taxation. The
assumption that jurisdictions are small means that the decision of the individual government
have no influence on the demand and supply conditions in the international capital market,
neither ex ante nor ex post.12
12 The endogeneity of the interest rate is considered, for example, by Makris [2005]. He considers whether
decentralised decision making implies too low or too high capital tax rates and what the coordinated tax rate
should be. Another paper where the interest rate effect of tax competition between indentical jurisdictions is
considered is Becker / Rauscher [2007a].
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3.3.2 Public-sector efficiency, the dynamics of the local capital stock and
optimal taxation
The current-value Hamiltonian H for the government’s decision problem is
H = w(t) +R(t)γH(t)1−γ + µ(t) (τk(t)−R(t)) . (3.14)
Hestenes’ Theorem13 states that the following conditions hold for an optimal policy {τ,R(t)}:
∂H
∂R(t)
= γR(t)γ−1H(t)1−γ − µ(t) = 0 , (3.15a)
˙µ(t) = µ(t)r − ∂H
∂H(t)
= µ(t)r − (1− γ)
(
R(t)
H(t)
)γ
, (3.15b)
d
dτ
∫ ∞
0
w(t)e−rtdt = (3.15c)
− d
dτ
∫ ∞
0
(
R(t)γH(t)1−γ + µ(t) (τk(t)−R(t))
)
e−rtdt ,
H(0) = H0 > 0 is given; lim
t→∞
(
µ(t)e−rtH(t)
)
= 0 , (3.15d)
together with (3.10) and (3.4).
Before the determination of the optimal tax rate from (3.15c), I solve for the dynamics
of the model for a given tax rate τ . It is necessary to find closed-form solutions for the
comparative-dynamic response of the state variables to a change of the tax rate before the
integrals in (3.15c) can be calculated. Hence, the next step is to analyse the dynamic system
that is described by (3.15a), (3.15b) and (3.15d).
From (3.15a), it follows that
R(t) =
(
µ(t)
γ
) 1
γ−1
H(t). (3.16)
This is the optimal flow of revenues devoted to the production of G(t). Using (3.16) in (3.4)
and (3.15b) results in the following non-linear and non-homogeneous system of differential
equations:
˙H(t) = −
(
µ(t)
γ
) 1
γ−1
H(t) + τk(t) , (3.17a)
˙µ(t) = rµ(t)− (1− γ)
(
µ(t)
γ
) γ
γ−1
, (3.17b)
where k(t) is given by (3.10). Equation (3.17b) is can be reduced to the linear form and there-
fore easily solved.14 Applying the appropriate border condition
limt→∞
(
µ(t)e−rtH(t)
)
= 0 reveals15 that µ(t) is a constant:
µ(t) = γ
(
1−γ
rγ
)1−γ
. (3.18)
13 As τ is time-invariant, it is not a control-variable in the maximisation of (3.14) but a “control parameter”.
For this kind of policy variables, Hestenes’ Theorem applies, see Takayama [1985, ch. 8.C]. For the same
reason, the equations of motion for k(t) and λ(t) (3.10) are not incorporated in the Hamiltonian. They are
constraints for the local government’s optimization problem, but for any given parameter value of τ , the
expression τk(t) could in principle be substituted by the solution of (3.10) that is independent of the choice of
the control variable R(t).
14 (3.17b) is an Bernoulli Equation, see Chiang [1984, p. 491]. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing
this out.
15 See the appendix on page 40 for the details.
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Together with (3.16), this yields
Proposition 4 (constant optimal input mix) The optimal mix
R(t)/H(t) for the provision of the publicly provided consumption good G(t) is
R(t)
H(t)
=
rγ
1− γ . (3.19)
and constant over time. There are no transitional dynamics for the input mix.
It is a standard result that for a given price, the input mix is constant (linear exapnsion
path). In this model, the relative price of the inputs R and H is also constant, both in a
steady state and in a transition phase. The local government always chooses some optimal
input mix that reflects a trade-off between the future and the presence. A high return of
households’ savings in the international capital market makes investment in future benefits,
i.e. in public-sector efficiency, relatively unattractive. This implies a relatively low level of
H(t) in the optimal input mix. A high output elasticity of current tax revenue R(t) has a
similar effect.
Using (3.18) in (3.17a) simplifies the equation of motion for public-sector efficiency a lot:
˙H(t) = − rγ
1− γH(t) + τk(t) . (3.17a’)
The remaining problem is that the path for k(t) is unknown. Hence, the dynamic system that
describes the evolution of public-sector efficiency consist of three differential equations for
H(t), k(t) and the costate variable for capital, λ(t). It has non-constant coefficients. There
exists a steady state for this system consisting of (3.17a’), (3.10a) and (3.10b) when time
goes to infinity. One possible solution method would be to linearise around this steady state.
The disadvantage of this approach would be that the solution would be valid only locally, in
the neighbourhood of the steady state. To avoid this limitation and to achieve results that
are global, the method used in Boadway [1979], and also in Wildasin [2003], is employed.
The idea of this method can be described as follows: Assume that the system is initially
in a steady state. The system of “variational equations” which is derived by differentiation
of the system of equations (3.17) with respect to the policy parameter τ then has constant
coefficients. It is then possible to solve the resulting system and to calculate the response of
the state variable H(t) to a variation of the policy parameter τ .16
The system of variational equations that needs to be solved is

d ˙k(t)
dτ
d ˙λ(t)
dτ
d ˙H(t)
dτ

 =


λ(t,τ)−1
b
− δ k(t,τ)
b
0
−f ′′(k(t, τ)) r + δ + λ(t,τ)−1
b
0
τ 0 −rγ1−γ




dk(t)
dτ
dλ(t)
dτ
dH(t)
dτ

+

 01
k(t, τ)

 . (3.20)
To see the effect of a change in capital taxation on the efficiency H(t) of the public sector
and on the local capital stock k(t), system (3.20) has to be solved for dH(t)/dτ and dk(t)/dτ .
Note that I do not try to find a closed-form solution for H(t) or k(t).
16 This method employs the Peano-Theorem from the theory of differential equations that deals with the
behaviour of a system of differential equations when a parameter – here the time-invariant tax rate – is changed,
see for a textbook discussion Caputo [2005, ch.11]. The assumption of an initial steady state is necessary to
achieve the property of constant coefficients in the system of differential equations that describe the evolution
of the state and costate variables in response to the change of a parameter. Becker [2007] contains a more
detailed discussion of the Peano-Theorem in the comparative-dynamic analysis of fiscal competition models.
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The next step to transform (3.20) in a dynamic system that can be solved with standard
methods is to make use of the assumption that the system has been initially in a steady state.
(3.20) describes how the dynamic system {k(t, τ), λ(t, τ), H(t, τ)} for a given parameter value
τ reacts to a variation of the parameter.In this case to a change of τ to τ˜ . The remaining
problem is that the coefficients of the dynamic system are not constant in general and the
closed-form solution for k(t, τ), λ(t, τ) and H(t, τ) that corresponds to the initial value of the
parameter τ is unknown. This is where the assumption of an initial steady state is useful. If
the initial situation happens to be steady state, then {k(t, τ), λ(t, τ), H(t, τ)} is constant by
assumption.
Assumption 1 (initial steady state) The capital stock k(t), its costate variable λ(t) and
public-sector efficiency H(t) are in a steady state in time t = 0. Their initial steady state
values are denoted as kSS, λSS and HSS, respectively.
Assumption 1 together with equation (3.11) allows to rewrite (3.20) as:

d ˙k(t)
dτ
d ˙λ(t)
dτ
d ˙H(t)
dτ

 =


0 kSS(τ)
b
0
−f ′′(kSS(τ)) r + 2δ 0
τ 0 −rγ1−γ




dk(t)
dτ
dλ(t)
dτ
dH(t)
dτ

+

 01
kSS(τ)

 . (3.21)
(3.21) is a dynamic system with constant coefficients that can be solved with standard
methods. Note that d
˙k(t)
dτ
and d
˙λ(t)
dτ
are independent from dH(t)
dτ
due to the structure of the
model where the representative firm is connected with the local government only through the
parameter τ .
By setting
˙dk(t)
dτ
=
˙dλ(t)
dτ
=
˙dH(t)
dτ
= 0, one can find the long-term solution of (3.21):
Proposition 5 (long-term effect) In the long run (limt→∞), the effects of a change of
the capital tax rate on the local capital stock k(t), its co-state variable and on public-sector
efficiency H are:
lim
t→∞
dk(t)
dτ
=
1
f ′′(kSS)
, (3.22a)
lim
t→∞
dλ(t)
dτ
= 0 , (3.22b)
lim
t→∞
dH(t)
dτ
=
1− γ
rγ
(
τ
1
f ′′(kSS)
+ kSS
)
. (3.22c)
(3.22a) is well known from static models of tax competition, see, for example, Zodrow /
Mieszkowski [1986, eq. 5]. It states that the tax base capital shrinks when the tax rate is
raised. (3.22b) stems from the fact that the steady state of the co-state variable for capital is
δb+1 and therefore independent of τ , see equation (3.11a). (3.22c) states that the loss or gain
of revenue that results by a change in the capital tax rate has a stronger effect on public-sector
efficiency the more important the role of the stock-variable H(t) is for redistribution.17
The long-term effects of a change in the capital tax rate on public-sector efficiency depends
only on parameters of the production technology for redistribution, on the initial tax rate
17 The long-term effect on revenues is calculated as limt→∞
d(τk)
dτ
= limt→∞ τ
dk(t)
dτ
+ k(t). This can be seen as
an approximation.
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τ , and the corresponding initial capital stock kSS . Investment in public-sector efficiency
is costly from the perspective of the household as it is foregone current income through
redistribution. The investment opportunity alternative to public-sector modernisation from
the households point of view is to save and earn a return r. Higher rates of interest in the
international capital market therefore let a government choose a lower stock of capital in the
long run. Furthermore, a high output-elasticity of H(t) in the public production technology
(3.2) makes investment in public-sector efficiency attractive and vice versa. Once the steady
state level of public-sector efficiency is reached, tax revenue is entirely used as a flow input in
the production of redistribution.
The eigenvalues corresponding to the Jacobi matrix of coefficients in (3.21) are


ρ1 =
br+2 bδ+
√
b(br2+4 brδ+4 bδ2−4 f ′′(kSS) kSS)
2b > 0
ρ2 =
br+2 bδ−
√
b(br2+4 brδ+4 bδ2−4 f ′′(kSS) kSS)
2b < 0
ρ3 =
−rγ
1−γ < 0

 . (3.23)
There are two negative eigenvalues and one positive eigenvalue and the system therefore has
the property of saddle-point stability. Applying the appropriate border conditions18 yields
Proposition 6 (comparative dynamics) 1. The comparative-dynamic response of the
local capital stock k and public-sector efficiency H is
dk(t)
dτ
=
1
f ′′(kSS(τ))
(
1− eρ2t
)
< 0 ∀ t > 0 , (3.24a)
dH(t)
dτ
=
1− γ
rγ
(
τ
1
f ′′(kSS)
+ kSS
)(
1− eρ3t
)
. (3.24b)
2. The sign of dH(t)
dτ
depends on the initial tax rate τ and technological parameters: If
τ 1
f ′′(kSS)
+ kSS > 0 (i.e. if the initial tax rate τ is low enough), then
dH(t)
dτ
> 0 ∀ t > 0
and vice versa. In the former case, raising the tax rate implies higher public-sector
efficiency H(t) ∀ t > 0.
3. The initial tax rate τ , the initial capital stock kSS and the initial level of public-sector
efficiency HSS are not independent from each other as it has been assumed that the
economy is in a steady state initially (Assumption 1). The initial tax rate determines
the initial steady state of capital (equation (3.11b)). The initial value of public-sector
efficiency, HSS, is then implicitely given by the initial revenue τkSS and by setting
˙H(t) = 0 in (3.17a’).
(3.24a) replicates the result for the comparative-dynamic response of the local capital stock
to a change in the tax rate that has already been introduced in equation (3.12) on page 23.
Note that ρ2, ρ3 do not contain endogenous variables. The speed of adjustment of k(t) and
H(t) depends on parameters and initial values only, see (3.23). Capital mobility, measured
by b, has no direct influence on the comparative dynamics of public-sector efficiency as long
as the initial capital stock kSS is held constant. But – as will be shown below – it has an
impact on the optimal tax rate that is chosen by local governments.
18 The border conditions are dk(0)
dτ
= 0, limt→∞
dλ(t)
dτ
= 0 and dH(0)
dτ
= 0. See Oniki [1973] and Becker [2007]
for a more detailed discussion about border conditions when applying the Peano-Theorem.
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The capital tax rate chosen by the local government can in principle be both positive or
negative, depending on how the local government decides in the trade-off between raising
capital tax revenue for modernisation and redistribution versus dispelling capital and reducing
labour productivity. I will discuss the necessary conditions for a positive tax rate in more
detail below.
The tax rate τ in this model is time-invariant. Technically spoken, the government sets a
parameter to find the maximum of the objective function. Using the results from Proposition
6 in (3.15c), the optimal tax rate when capital is imperfectly mobile (0 < |ρ2| <∞ or b > 0)
can be calculated as
τ˜ =
kSS f
′′(kSS) (ρ2r(−ρ3)−γ + (2− γ(3− γ)) (r − ρ2))
(ρ2(2− γ)− r(1− γ)) (1− γ) . (3.25)
See the appendix for the derivation of (3.25). The tax rate is labeled τ˜ to make clear that
this the optimal tax rate. The tax rate that is historically given is labeled τ (without a tilde).
Interestingly, the tax rate τ˜ does not depend on the initial value of public-sector efficiency
H0. A local government with a low level of public-sector efficiency does not set a higher tax
rate than other governments. The initial capital stock K0 = kSS is crucial for the question
whether capital should be taxed (further).
The optimal tax rate τ depends on the size of the integrals in (3.15c). If the time needed
for the transition from the initial to the new steady state changes, the size of those integrals
representing the welfare effects of taxation changes and, accordingly, the optimal tax rate.
The government in this model can tax capital in order to provide redistribution to households.
In addition to the trade-off between capital flight and redistribution, it has to take into
account that the amount of redistribution depends on its modernisation effort. Hence the
complicated role of the technical parameter γ in the tax rate formula.
The optimal tax rate is positive if the following assumption is met:
Assumption 2 The parameter space is restricted to values that fulfill the following condition:
− rρ−γ3 + γ(γ − 3) + 2 > 0 . (3.26)
Figure 3.2 illustrates it for the range 0 < γ < 1 <. Interest rates below the solid line ensure
that the assumption is met.
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Figure 3.2: Condition (3.26) in the {r, γ}-Space.
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I assume in the remainder of the paper that parameters fulfil Assumption 2. It is a sufficient
but not a necessary condition to ensure positive tax rates. If it fails, positive tax rates are
still possible if capital is not very mobile.
Note that
lim
γ→1
τ˜ =
kSSf
′′(kSS)r
ρ2
> 0 . (3.27)
With γ approaching 1, the relevance of the capital good H(t) for the production of the capital
good vanishes. The tax rate established in (3.27) is identical to the tax rate in Wildasin
[2003, eq. (9)]. In Wildasin’s paper, the government redistributes tax revenue directly to
households. The tax rate (3.25) in comparison to the one in (3.27) reflects the additional
considerations because of the need to accumulate knowledge in the public sector.
Even in the presence of perfect capital mobility (b→ 0 or ρ2 → −∞), there is an incentive
to tax capital:
lim
ρ2→−∞
τ˜ =
−kSSf ′′(kSS) (−r(−ρ3)−γ + γ(γ − 3) + 2)
2− 3γ + γ2 . (3.28)
A condition for the tax rate being positive in the special case of limρ2→−∞ is again given by
(3.26). The government does not only have to consider the trade-off between the immediate
benefits of redistribution versus lower wages later on. In addition, taxation allows to invest
in public-sector modernisation and to achieve a higher level of redistribution in the economy.
The possibility to use tax revenue to generate benefits that accrue in all following moments
of time is another motivation to tax capital even if capital flight is possible immediately. It is
this additional incentive which lets the optimal tax rate be positive even in the presence of
perfect capital mobility.
Higher capital mobility leads governments to choose lower tax rates. This can be seen by
differentiation of (3.25) with respect to b while holding the initial capital stock kSS constant:
dτ˜
db |kSS constant
=
dτ˜
dρ2 |kSS constant
dρ2
db
=
r
(
2− γ + r (−ρ3)−γ
)
(kSSf
′′(kSS))
2
b (−r + 2 ρ2 + rγ − γ ρ2)2
√
b (br2 + 4 brδ + 4 bδ2 − 4 f ′′(kSS)kSS)
> 0
Lower values of b imply smaller values of ρ2 such that dρ2 < 0 – as long as the initial capital
stock is not altered by the change in b.19 The result in (3.29) is straightforward: higher
capital mobility makes it easier (less costly) for foreign capital owners to flee jurisdictions that
try to redistribute from foreigners to local households. The capital stock, labour productivity
and wages shrink faster. Shrinking wages are the main reason for local governments to be
reluctant to use capital taxation for the purpose of providing a transfer to households.
The optimal tax rate τ is always positive as long as Assumption 2 holds. But it is not
necessarily greater than the initial tax rate. Consider two extreme situations. If the initial
tax rate τ equals zero, the initial capital stock is relatively high, the tax rate τ˜ is greater
than the initial tax rate and there will be an outflow of capital from time t = 0 on. If the
initial tax rate is almost a confiscatory rate, the initial steady state value for the local capital
19 The statement that increasing capital mobility (lower values of b) implies lower a tax rate is only valid if
the initial capital stock is the same. The initial capital stock depends on b itself, see (3.11b). Holding kSS
constant while b varies can be achieved by a variation of the initial tax rate τ .
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stock is close to zero and the tax rate τ˜ is below the initial tax rate. In this situation, there
will be an inflow of capital. The initial situation is historically given. Both cases – τ˜ > τ
with an outflow of capital and τ˜ < τ with an inflow – are possible. The local government – as
long as capital mobility is imperfect (ρ2 > −∞) – doesn’t always have an interest to extract
rents from foreign capital owners. In situations where the historically given capital stock is
very low, the opportunity costs of loosing even more capital due to a higher tax rate than
initially are too high.
The dependence of the optimal tax rate on the historically given capital stock has an
important consequence: The decision about capital taxation in time t = 0 that is characterized
in the present model is a one-shot decision, with full commitment, to set a constant capital
tax rate. It has been assumed that capital-owners do not anticipate the decision. (3.25) is an
open-loop strategy. The fact that it is not history independent is important if one considers
the closed-loop strategy where the tax authority can decide again about the optimal tax rate
in all subsequent periods. In general, a tax authority that has the possibility to revise its
decision in the future will find that the capital stock is lower than initially and hence will
choose another tax rate. (3.25) is therefore not time-consistent.
Proposition 7 summarizes the results on the optimal tax rate on capital:
Proposition 7 (optimal capital taxation) The optimal tax rate τ˜ in (3.25) has the fol-
lowing properties:
1. It is positive if Assumption 2 if fulfilled.
2. If Assumption 2 is not fulfilled, values of ρ2 that are close enough to zero (high enough
values of b) ensure a positive tax rate.
3. Even in the presence of perfect capital mobility ( b→ 0 or ρ2 → −∞), τ˜ is positive as
long as Assumption 2 holds.
4. τ˜ and capital mobility are negatively related: higher capital mobility leads governments
to choose lower tax rates, given that the initial value of the local capital stock is the
same.
5. τ˜ can be greater or smaller than the initial tax rate τ . If the initial tax rate τ is small
enough, τ˜ > τ and there will be an outflow of capital.
6. τ is not time-consistent.20
3.3.3 Capital mobility, optimal taxation and public-sector modernisation
Does increased mobility of capital enhance public-sector modernisation? Is tax competition
conducive to an efficient public sector? This is the central question in this paper. Proposition
7 states that higher capital mobility lets local governments choose lower tax rates. There
is no direct effect of capital mobility on the accumulation of public-sector efficiency. The
decision about the taxation of capital and the decision about the use of the resulting revenue
are separate decisions. It follows from Proposition 6 that the direction of the change of the
path of public-sector efficiency caused by a change in the tax rate on capital depends on the
long-term consequences of that tax rate change on revenue. The second part of Proposition
6 already states that the path of public-sector efficiency is below the initial path if the tax
20 Note that 5. and 6. apply also to the model in Wildasin [2003].
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rate, τ˜ , is smaller than the old, τ , and if revenue shrinks because of that change in capital
taxation. It is therefore necessary to know under which circumstances the local government
lowers the capital tax rate and whether this is revenue enhancing or not.
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Figure 3.3: Stylized Laffer-curve
Figure 3.3 shows a stylized Laffer curve.21 If the tax rate is zero (point A), the local
government doesn’t raise any revenue. If the tax rate is confiscatory22, there is no capital
accumulation in the economy and the revenue is again zero (point E). There is a revenue-
maximising tax rate corresponding to the peak of that stylized Laffer curve (point C). The
local government in this model does not choose the revenue-maximising tax rate. Revenue is
beneficial for worker-households as it can be used for redistribution both directly or indirectly
through public-sector modernisation. But raising the tax rate comes at the cost of lower
wages. In equation (3.15c), if the left hand side would be zero, the local government would
choose the revenue-maximising tax rate. But in this model, the optimal tax rate is always
somewhere below, for example at point B in Figure 3.3. The position of point B depends on
the degree of capital mobility. The more mobile capital is, the more rapid is the adjustment
of the capital stock and the more important is the wage effect on life-time income that is
caused by a change in capital taxation. In Wildasin [2003], the optimal tax rate is zero when
capital is perfectly mobile. In this model, point B is always somewhere to the right of the
origin.
The revenue consequences of the tax rate chosen in time t = 0 can be categorized depending
on the initial position of the local government on the Laffer Curve. Take point B as the optimal
position on the Laffer curve. If the initial tax rate is greater than the one corresponding to B,
the local government decides to lower it, τ˜ < τ , and there is an inflow of capital during the
adjustment to the new steady state. The revenue-consequences of this change of the capital
21 The exact shape of the Laffer curve depends on the functional form of the private production function f(k).
The Laffer curve is single-peaked, for example, if the production function is f(k) = kα with α < 1.
22 As capital taxation is not a taxation of capital income in this model, the tax rate has no natural upper
bound at 100 %. A confiscatory rate is the tax rate for which capital accumulation is not profitable in the
long run. This is the case for τ →∞.
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tax rate can be either negative (for a initial position somewhere between B and D) or positive
(for a initial position somewhere between D and E). If the initial tax rate is below the one
corresponding with B, the local government decides to raise it, τ˜ > τ and there is an outflow
of capital and revenue rises (initial position somewhere between A and B). This leads to:
Proposition 8 (capital mobility and public-sector modernisation)
Whether capital mobility enhances public-sector modernisation or not, for t→∞, depends on
the initial position of the local government on a Laffer curve like the one in Figure 3.3. The
local government will always choose a capital tax rate τ˜ that is below the revenue-maximising
rate. Group local governments according to their initial tax policy as follows:
• (low-tax) Local governments with an initial tax rate below τ˜ choose a higher tax rate on
capital and face an outflow of capital. Revenue for t→∞ rises. Public-sector efficiency
is higher than initially.
• (high-tax) Local governments with an initial tax rate that is higher than τ˜ and less
revenue than that corresponding with τ˜ face an inflow of capital and an increase of
revenue in the long run. Public-sector efficiency is higher than initially.
• (intermediate-tax) Local governments with an initial tax rate that is higher than τ˜ and
higher revenue than that corresponding with τ˜ face an inflow of capital and less revenue
in the long run. Public-sector efficiency is lower than initially.
Higher capital mobility lets a local government choose a lower tax rate τ˜ . The range of tax
rates that correspond with being a low-tax government is smaller when capital mobility is
higher. In this sense, higher capital mobility causes lower public-sector efficiency. Whether
this statement is true for a specific local government depends on its initial position on the
Laffer-curve.
Whether increased mobility of capital enhances public-sector modernisation or not depends
on the ability of local governments to increase revenue that is then used to support local
households either through the modernisation of the public sector or by direct redistribution.
But their problem is not simply to choose the revenue-maximising tax rate on a Laffer curve:
To maximise the life-time income of households, they have to consider the time path of
revenues and of the local capital stock as well.
The model in this paper is such that the relationship between public-sector efficiency and
capital mobility narrows down to the question whether revenue shrinks or increases when the
local government raises capital taxes. It is only necessary to know the long-term consequences
on revenue, as can be seen from equation (3.24b) in Proposition 6. The revenue plotted in
Figure 3.3 as a Laffer curve is the revenue in a steady state. The impact of capital mobility
on the efficiency of the public sector depends on the existence of a Laffer effect. In a situation
where increased capital mobility lets local governments choose lower tax rate, is this revenue
enhancing or not?23 However, whether a local government raises its capital taxes or not
23 It is of course difficult to decide in which part of the Laffer curve for the taxation of capital a specific
country or jurisdiction is. See Blinder [1981] for an example of an “guesstimation” of such a question. In
general, it can be said that it is more likely to be on the wrong side of the Laffer curve if the activity taxed
can be substituted by other activities easily. In the case of capital taxation, the integration of capital markets
make the substitution of real investment in the local capital stock by investment in financial assets easier. In
this model, this is captured by the fact that point B in Figure 3.3 moves to the left when capital mobility is
increased.
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depends on the initial situation: The higher the initial tax rate is, the more likely it is that a
local government sets a lower tax rate than initially.24
Mankiw / Weinzierl [2006] show for a closed economy and several variants of the neoclassical
growth model that tax cuts can be partly self-financing, depending on the assumptions about
parameters. The main difference in this paper compared to Mankiw / Weinzierl [2006] is
that the adjustment path of the local capital stock is not determined by local conditions
only. In this paper, the adjustment path of the local capital stock depends on the externally
interest rate r and on the intensity of tax competition ρ2. In the long run, the local capital
stock is determined by the equilibrium condition 3.11 and does not depend on local capital
taxation as in Mankiw / Weinzierl [2006]. To what extent a tax cut is partly self-financing in
the long run through its positive effect on the local capital stock can then be found out by a
simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, once a functional form for the production function
and the initial values for the capital tax rate are known. According to Proposition 8, it is
also sufficient to associate initial tax rates with one of the three groups to make a qualitative
statement.25
Market integration in the form of higher capital mobility hampers public-sector modernisa-
tion. The reason is that higher capital mobility implies that a smaller range of initial positions
on the Laffer curve correspond to increased revenues and higher public-sector efficiency in
the long run. The intuition for this result is that public-sector modernisation is modelled
as an investment activity that needs to be funded by tax revenues. Higher capital mobility
discourages taxation and tax revenues that are needed to pursue public-sector modernisation.
Before the results are summarized in the conclusion, the next section presents several
numerical examples to illustrate the model.
3.4 A numerical example
This section provides a numerical example to illustrate the results derived so far.26 In this
numerical example, with given parameters and functional forms, it is possible to find a
closed-form solution for the path of the local capital stock and to provide plots of tax rates,
revenue and public-sector efficiency.
Throughout the section, I assume f(k) = k0.3, r = 0.1 and δ = 0.1. Assumption 2 is
fulfilled. This allows to calculate the initial capital stock that corresponds to a tax rate τ or
τ˜ (equation (3.11b)), if necessary. From equation (3.25), it is possible to calculate the tax
rate τ˜ that corresponds to some initial τ .
24 In many static models of tax competition, capital tax rates of a closed economy is compared against those
of an open economy. In a standard tax competition model where capital taxation gives rise to a positive
externality, comparing those polar cases leads to the clear result that capital tax rates too low in the presence
of tax competition. In this model, I do not compare those polar cases. Parameter b ranges from perfect capital
mobility (b = 0) to a closed economy (b→∞) and covers all intermediate cases. In this model, the sign of
dτ˜/db is non-ambiguous. But whether a local government raises its tax rate in capital or lowers it depends on
the characteristics of an initial steady state.
25 Agell / Persson [2001] analyse Laffer effects in a simple AK model of endogenous growth. The key message
of their paper is that in a dynamic context, it is very important to have a proper definition of what they call a
dynamic Laffer effect. Note that in the preceding analysis, where growth is not endogenous and the central
question is whether capital mobility has an influence on the level of public-sector efficiency, I am not looking
for a dynamic Laffer effect. It is only necessary to know the revenue effect of a tax variation in the long run.
26 I have used Maple 9.5 for Mac OS X to derive the plots in this section. The workfile is available on request.
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Figure 3.4: Numerical example (tax rate, revenue) (a) Tax rate (3.25) for different values
of the capital mobility parameter b and an initial capital stock kSS = 10. (b)
Difference between the revenue in the initial and the new situation b = 1). (c)
New tax rate τ˜ as a function of the initial tax rate τ (b = 1)
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Figure 3.4a shows the optimal tax rate for all possible values of γ and different values of
b. The initial capital stock is assumed to be kSS = 10. Note that fixing the initial capital
stock kSS ensures that higher values of b correspond with values of ρ2 that are closer to zero.
Higher values of b correspond with less capital mobility. The initial tax rate differs in the
three cases illustrated in Figure 3.4a such that equation (3.11b) holds. In Figure 3.4a, higher
capital mobility (lower values of b) implies lower tax rates. See Proposition 7.
Figure 3.4b plots the difference between the revenue raised in the initial steady state and
the steady state that corresponds to the new tax rate that is chosen in time t = 0. Parameter
b is set to 1. The initial situation is characterised by a tax rate between zero and 0.4. The
initial capital stock then varies according to (3.11b). For small and high values of the initial
tax rate, there is a clear revenue gain. These are tax rate of local governments in either the
“low-tax” or the “high-tax” group in Proposition 8. The negative values are the revenue losses
of local governments in the “intermediate-tax” group.
Figure 3.4c compares the initial tax rate 0 < τ < 1 with the new tax rate chosen, τ˜ . Again,
Parameter b is set to 1 and the initial capital stock varies. It can be seen that τ˜ > τ for small
values of the tax rate. This implies a shrinking capital stock. There is a crucial initial tax
rate where this changes and the local government sets a tax rate the triggers a capital inflow
from time t = 0 on.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the evolution of tax revenue and public-sector efficiency for different
values of the capital-mobility parameter b when the initial capital stock is set to kSS = 1 in
all three scenarios. The initial tax rate is different in the three scenarios shown. Figure 3.5a
shows the path of tax revenue. In all three scenarios, the new tax rate τ˜ is lower than the
initial tax rate. Revenue is higher than initially but then shrinks with the capital stock - see
table 3.1 for the numbers. The initial values of public-sector efficiency differs. In all three
cases, public-sector efficiency rises over time (Figure 3.5b).
b τ τkSS HSS τ˜
b = 1.0 0.08 0.08 6.75 0.22
b = 0.5 0.09 0.09 7.88 0.21
b = 0.1 0.10 0.10 8.78 0.20
Table 3.1: Values of some key parameters and variables used for figure 3.5. All numbers
rounded to two digits.
In Figure 3.6, the initial value of public-sector efficiency is set to zero. The initial tax rate
is zero as well. The initial capital stock differs and shrinks as the new tax rate τ˜ is positive.
Revenue shrinks over time (Figure 3.6a) but is greater than initially. The higher capital
mobility is (the lower b), the faster is the modernisation of the public sector (Figure 3.6b).
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Figure 3.5: Revenue and public-sector efficiency for different values of the capital mobility
parameter b and a common initial capital stock. (a) Revenue τ˜ k(t) (b) Public-
sector efficiency H(t)
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper tries to answer the question whether the competitive pressure induced by capital
tax competition enhance the efficiency of the public sector. Public-sector efficiency is modelled
as a stock variable and public-sector modernisation is seen as an investment activity that
is financed by tax revenues. The model in this paper assumes that the jurisdiction under
consideration is in an initial steady state. The main result is that the presence of tax
competition hampers public-sector modernisation.
Public-sector efficiency depends on revenue that is either invested in modernisation or
used directly as a flow input in the production of redistribution. Higher capital mobility
implies lower tax rates. Whether this is revenue- and efficiency-enhancing or not depends
on the situation the local jurisdiction is initially. But a smaller range of initial tax rates is
compatible with a revenue-gain when capital mobility is higher.
A key assumption of the model is that private agents are caught by surprise by the
government’s decision to tax capital and that it can commit itself to this policy announcement.
This is not very realistic. As long as the capital stock in the jurisdiction has some positive
level, there is an incentive to deviate from the announcement in time t = 0. Rational investors
would foresee that the announcement of a tax policy in time t = 0 is not time-consistent. With
rational expectations, a credible policy announcement must not depend on initial conditions
as in this model, see Taylor [2000, sect. 2.1]. One could see this as a major disadvantage
of the model presented above. Still, it is a dynamic model as it describes local jurisdictions
as growing economies. Furthermore, transitional dynamics matter: the speed of adjustment
of the local capital stock to the new steady state is crucial for optimal policy of the local
government. But the model is not dynamic in the sense that forward-looking decisions like
investment in a capital stock and forward-looking tax-policy without commitment is analysed
simultaneously, as it is done, for example, in Hassler et al. [2005]. A model of tax competition
between growing jurisdictions where local governments cannot commitment themselves to
their policy announcements is missing in the literature.
Another simplifying assumption is that households do not own parts of the local capital
stock. Optimal policy is therefore the optimal exploitation of foreigners in the favour of local
households. Households do not suffer from the fact that the net return of local capital is lower
than the world interest rate during the transition phase after an surprising rise in capital
taxation. The only reason not to expropriate foreign capital owners is that wages depends on
the availability of capital. This is not a very realistic setup. If the local capital stock is partly
owned by local households, the incentives for the local governments are different. The greater
the share of local ownership is, the lower is the tax rate, revenues and public-sector efficiency
in the long run. But as long as a part of the local capital stock is owned by foreigners, the
local government tries to optimally exploit them. An alternative ad-hoc modelling strategy
would be to introduce a parameter that represents the share of the local capital stock that
is owned by foreign households. The higher the share of domestic ownership, the lower the
optimal tax rate would be. This is done in Wildasin [2003]. As the qualitative results do
not change, I abandoned domestic ownership of the capital stock altogether. It might be
interesting to think about the endogenous evolution of the ownership structure of the local
capital stock in a tax competition model, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
The assumption of foreign ownership of the capital stock could have abandoned alltogether
with a different structure of the model: Assume that there are two types of households in the
economy. Worker households without access to the international capital market and capitalists
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that own capital. In this alternative model, assume further that the local government does
not care about the welfare of capitalists as they do not vote. They express their will in the
political process only by deciding where to invest in physical capital. In a model like this,
the problem of the local government would be to optimally exploit capitalists regardless
of their place of residence. Redistribution would be from “footloose” capitalists to local
worker-households. The only group with access to the international capital market were firms
or capital-owners. This alternative model would lead to similar results than those derived
above.27
Public services benefit only households in this model. But of course the public sector provides
also infrastructure and other public inputs that enter the private sector’s production function.
In a dynamic context, public inputs can be a potential source of sustained growth. Becker /
Rauscher [2007a] analyse a growth model with a balanced growth path. Imperfect capital
mobility is modelled in a way similar to this paper. They analyse a symmetric equilibrium
of tax-competing jurisdictions, but without an application to public-sector modernisation.
Whereas in Becker / Rauscher [2007a] public inputs are a flow variable, Futagami et al. [1993]
analyse a model in which a public capital stock serves as an input in private production.
Extending their analysis by a tax competition scenario and a public sector that can operate
at various levels of efficiency seems to be interesting. It might be necessary to use numerical
methods to tackle such a model, though.
The major lesson that can be drawn from this paper is that interjurisdictional tax competi-
tion might not be useful for the goal of an efficient public sector. Efficiency in this paper is the
ability of the public sector to transform tax revenue into a transfer. A more efficient sector is
one with a higher level of a accumulated knowledge or some other stock that improves the
productivity of this transformation. If public-sector efficiency is plagued by egoistic politicians
or lazy bureaucrats that waste resources, tax competition among jurisdictions might serve as
a disciplining device. But when low efficiency is caused by underinvestment, as in this paper,
competition and efficiency are no complements.
Appendix
Equation (3.17b) as a Bernouilli-Equation
A Bernoulli-Equation is a non-linear differential equation that can be reduced to a linear
form. Following Chiang [1984, p. 491], assume that the equation in question is
˙y(t) +Ry(t) = Tym.
Define z = y1−m. The equation can then be written
˙z(t) = (m− 1)Ry(t) + T.
The general solution of this transformed equation is z(t) = T
R(m−1) + e
R(m−1)tC1, where C1 is
an arbitrary constant. Substitution of z then leads to
y(t) =
(
T
R
+ eR(m−1)tC1
) 1
1−m
.
27 A referee pointed out that there are indeed examples of taxes on foreign owned firms. For example, Argentina
forced foreign firm to convert assets at the pre-devaluation rate in 2002. Since governments are sovereign
these firms had difficulties in claiming their losses back even if the Argentine government broke international
treaties.
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Applying this formula to (3.17b) with m = γ
γ−1 , T = −(1− γ)γ
γ
1−γ and R = −r then gives
as the general solution:
µ(t) =
(
1− γ
r
γ
γ
1−γ + e
r
1−γ
t
C1
)1−γ
.
Together with the appropriate border- condition, this leads to the following equation to
determine C1:
lim
t−>∞
((
1− γ
r
γ
γ
1−γ + e
r
1−γ
t
C1
) 1
1−m
)
H(t) = 0
because of r1−γ > 0, C1 is equal to 0 and (3.18) follows.
Calculation of the tax rate
Start with equation (3.15c):
d
dτ
∫ ∞
0
w(t)e−rtdt = − d
dτ
∫ ∞
0
(
R(t)γH(t)1−γ + µ(t) (τk(t)−R(t))
)
e−rtdt
The wage rate w(t) depends on the current capital stock k(t) but not on the tax rate τ
directly. The impact of taxation on the wage rate therefore is
dw(t)
dτ
=
dw(t)
dk(t)
dk(t)
dτ
= −f ′′(kSS)kSS dk(t)
dτ
= −kSS
(
1− eρ2t
)
.
The LHS of (3.15c) then can be written
−kSS
∫ ∞
0
(
1− eρ2t
)
e−rtdt = −kSS
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdt− kSS
∫ ∞
0
−e(ρ2−r)tdt.
Calculation of these integrals28 then gives for the LHS of (3.15c):
−kSS
(
1
r
− 1
(r − ρ2 )
)
=
kSSρ2
r(r − ρ2) .
Substitution of (3.16), (3.18) and rearranging then gives
kSSρ2
r(r − ρ2) = −
d
dτ
∫ ∞
0
(
γr
(
1− γ
rγ
)1−γ
H(t) + γ
(
1− γ
rγ
)1−γ
τk(t)
)
e−rtdt
= −γ
(
1− γ
rγ
)1−γ ∫ ∞
0
(
r
dH(t)
dτ
+
d (τk(t))
dτ
)
e−rtdt
Note first that ∫ ∞
0
r
dH(t)
dτ
e−rt =
1− γ
rγ
(
τ
f ′′(kSS)
+ kSS
) −ρ3
r − ρ3 .
Furthermore,
d(τk(t))
dτ
= τ
dk(t)
dτ
+ kSS .
This allows to calculate that ∫ ∞
0
((
τ
dk(t)
dτ
+ kSS
))
e−rtdt =
28 Note that
∫
∞
0
e−xtdt, x > 0↔ 1
−x
e−xt
]
∞
0
= 0− 1
−x
e0 = 1
x
.
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(
kSS
r
+
τ
f ′′(kS)
−ρ2
r(r − ρ2)
)
.
Collecting terms, the following remains. It needs to be solved for τ :
ρ2kSS
r (r − ρ2) =
−γ
(
1− γ
rγ
)1−γ (1− γ
rγ
(
τ
f ′′(kSS)
+ kSS
) −ρ3
r − ρ3 +
kSS
r
+
τ
f ′′(kS)
−ρ2
r(r − ρ2)
)
This results in:
τ =
kSS f
′′(kSS)
(
ρ2r
(
−−1+γ
rγ
)γ
+ 2 r − 3 rγ − 2 ρ2 + 3 γ ρ2 + γ2r − γ2ρ2
)
(r − 2 ρ2 − rγ + γ ρ2) (−1 + γ)
With
(
−−1+γ
rγ
)γ
=
(
1−γ
rγ
)γ
= (−ρ3)−γ :
τ =
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
kSS f
′′(kSS)


???︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ2r(−ρ3)−γ + 2 r − 3 rγ − 2 ρ2 + 3 γ ρ2 + γ2r − γ2ρ2


(ρ2(2− γ)− r(1− γ)) (1− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
From this, the optimal tax rate (3.25) follows as
τ =
kSS f
′′(kSS) (ρ2r(−ρ3)−γ + (2− γ(3− γ)) (r − ρ2))
(ρ2(2− γ)− r(1− γ)) (1− γ) .
Condition for τ being positive
The condition for τ being positive is:
ρ2r
(
1− γ
rγ
)γ
+ (2− γ(3− γ)) (r − ρ2) < 0
or, with assumption 2, as (2− γ(3− γ)) > 0 for 0 < γ < 1:
ρ2 <
(2− γ(3− γ)) r
r(−ρ3)−γ + 2− γ(3− γ) .
which is always fulfilled for 0 < γ < 1 and positive interest rates.
Calculation of (3.29)
This has been done with Maple 9.5 for Mac OS X:
dτ
dρ2
= −
(
−γ + r
(
−−1 + γ
rγ
)γ
+ 2
)
rkSS f
′′(kSS) (−r + 2 ρ2 + rγ − γ ρ2)−2
(3.29) follows after some simplifications.
Concavity check
The necessary conditions for optimal policy {τ,R(t)} discussed in the main text can be shown
to be sufficient for an optimal policy when some concavity-conditions are met. See Takayama
[1985, Theorem 8.C.5].
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What needs to be checked is whether the functions w(t) +R(t)γH(t)1−γ and τk(t)−R(t)
are concave in R(t) and H(t). For the first of these, the quadratic form is[
− (1−γ)
γ
R(t)γH(t)−γ−1 γ(1− γ)R(t)γ−1H(t)−γ
γ(1− γ)R(t)γ−1H(t)−γ γ(γ − 1)R(t)γ−2H(t)1−γ
]
.
For the second, the quadratic form is
[
1 0
0 0
]
, as it is independent of H(t) and linear in
R(t). Both of them are negative-semidefinite and therefore, the sufficiency conditions are
met.
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Chapter 4
Fiscal competition in space and time: an
endogenous-growth approach
This chapter is a slightly updated version of joint work with Michael Rauscher. Previous
versions of the corresponding paper are Becker / Rauscher [2007a,b].
4.1 The issue
Fiscal federalism and competition have been important issues in public economics in the
past two decades. Static models have shown that there is a tendency towards underprovision
of public-sector services emerging from fiscal externalities when the tax base is mobile and
the use of non-distorting taxes is restricted. See Wilson [1999] for an overview. This paper
attempts to extend this literature to an economic-growth context. In particular, we attempt
to answer two questions. Does increased competition for a mobile tax base lead to lower tax
rates? And does it enhance economic growth?
The model we use to address these questions is an endogenous-growth version of Wildasin’s
(2003) steady-state gowth model. Wildasin models tax competition in space (i.e. across
jurisdictions) and in time (i.e. across periods) by introducing a convex investment cost
function known from the economic-growth literature, e.g. Hayashi [1982] and Blanchard /
Fischer [1989, ch. 2.4], into a tax-competition model. Such an investment cost function does
not only penalise the relocation of capital from one jurisdiction to another but also makes it
more costly to relocate capital quickly than slowly. Thus, a jump in the capital stock as a
response to a change in tax rates is not feasible. As regards economic growth, Wildasin’s
model is traditional in that it assumes decreasing returns to scale in the augmentable factor
such that the growth path in the long run approaches a static equilibrium in which economic
growth has come to an end. Although such a model provides valuable insights into the impact
of tax competition on the growth dynamics along the transition path towards the equilibrium,
the concept of a static long-run equilibrium is not satisfying. We extend the Wildasin’s model
to an endogenous-growth framework. Regarding the results of the analysis, this is not an
innocent change of some minor model assumptions but it produces qualitatively different
outcomes. We show that, in contrast to Wildasin, the impact of capital mobility on the tax
base is ambiguous: depending on the parameters of the model, more mobility may induce
higher tax rates. In addition, it is seen that tax-competition growth equilibria do not always
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exist, in particular if the investment cost is extremely high. Thirdly, we are able to show
that, surprisingly, the tax rate may go to zero even if the mobility of the tax base is limited.
Our final result is more conventional: more competition for a mobile tax base is good for
economic growth.
Besides Wildasin, (2003), the literature on tax competition and growth is still small. Other
papers on growth and tax competition include Lejour / Verbon [1997], Razin / Yuen [1999],
Rauscher [2005], Brueckner [2006], and Hatfield [2006]. Lejour / Verbon [1997] look at a
two-country model of economic growth. Besides the conventional fiscal externality leading to
too-low taxes they identify a growth externality going into the opposite direction. Low taxes
in one country increase the growth rate in the rest of the world. If this effect dominates the
standard fiscal externality due to competition for a mobile tax base, uncoordinated taxes
will be too high. This contrasts the finding of the standard static tax-competition models
that taxes tend to be too low. Their result depends on the ad-hoc assumption of a taste
for investing abroad on the side of investors that balances mobility costs. This preference
for diversity makes sure that there is cross-border investment in their two-country model of
fiscal competition. Köthenbürger / Lockwood [2007] argue that risk-diversification in the
presence of technological shocks leads to similar results. Investors are diversified in their
portfolio as they wish to avoid a too high variance of investment returns. Razin / Yuen
[1999] look at a more general model that also includes human-capital accumulation and
endogenous population growth. They come to the conclusion that optimum taxes should
be residence-based, capital taxes should be abolished along a balanced growth path, and
taxes will be shifted from the mobile to the immobile factor of production if the source
principle is applied in a world of tax-competing jurisdictions. Their results extend those
derived by Judd [1985] and are in accordance with the standard economic intuition. The
underlying assumption is that the government’s set of tax instruments is large enough such
that distortion-free taxation becomes feasible. Rauscher [2005] uses an ad-hoc model of
limited interjurisdictional capital mobility and comes to the conclusion that the effects of
increased mobility are ambiguous. A central parameter in this context is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, which does not only affect the magnitude of the economic growth
rate, but also the signs of the comparative static effects. Similar results will be derived below,
albeit with a micro-founded, non ad-hoc, model of limited tax-base mobility.1
Closely related to our paper is Hatfield [2006]. He addresses the question whether countries
that are organised as federations grow faster than centralised countries and looks at the polar
cases of either perfect integration or decentralisation. The findings are that decentralised
governments choose growth-maximising tax rates, but a centralised government does not.
The reason is that the central government is not forced by capital tax competition to offer
the most attractive investment environment in order to attract capital. Instead, it balances
initial consumption and long-term growth.
The slightly broader issue whether decentralisation – that is a prerequisite for tax competi-
tion to occur – and growth is an active are of research. Feld et al. [2008] provide an almost
up-to-date review of the literature, together with a meta-analysis of the empirical results
that can be found in the literature. They include heterogeneous demands for public goods
that might be easier to meet in a decentralised economy, and the implications on saving,
1 Brueckner [2006] looks at another possible link between fiscal federalism and growth, namely the idea
that local governments are better able to tailor their services to the needs of local people. In his model, old
and young people are segregated into different jurisdictions. With decentralisation, regionally differentiated
supplies of public services are possible whereas centralisation is assumed to result in uniform provision of
public goods. The incentives to save (to consume when old) are then lower with centralisation and hence
decentralisation leads to higher growth rates.
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capital accumulation, and growth. Second, tax competition in a decentralised economy could
restrict Leviathan governments. If the behaviour of such governments is assumed to be
growth-depressing, tax competition is growth-enhancing. Third, if agglomeration economies
and knowledge spillovers play a significant role for growth, decentralised economies might
have the advantage that they can organise themselves in a core-periphery structure known
from the literature on economic geography, see Baldwin / Krugman [2004], Borck / Pfluger
[2006]. And fourth, policy innovation might be easier to achieve if a country can use its
decentralised structure as a “laboratory” to experiment with different policies, see Kollman
et al. [2000], Strumpf [2002], Kotsogiannis / Schwager [2004]. The theoretical literature
does not unambiguously predict a positive or negative relationship between decentralisation
and growth. Hence, empirical studies might provide guidance which of the aforementioned
channels – or others not yet identified in the theoretical literature – are the most important
ones. However, as the review and the meta-regression analysis2 contained in Feld et al. [2008]
shows, the diversity of results in the theoretical literature is matched by similar diversity in
the empirical literature. Overall, Feld et al. [2008] find only “mild support” for a positive
link between decentralisation and growth. An interesting result that will be picked up in the
conclusions is that this link seems to be different in developed and developing countries.
Unlike some of the aforementioned papers, we will not deal with the issue of centralisation
versus decentralisation. We rather concentrate on the questions of whether deeper integration
within a federation, modelled by declining investment costs, enhances economic growth and
whether it reduces competitive tax rates. As in most other models of tax competition, we
look at a federation consisting of a large number of very small jurisdictions that have no
power to affect economic variables determined on the federal level. In our analysis, the only
variable determined on the federal level will be the interest rate determining the remuneration
of capital. Given this interest rate, governments choose their policies, consisting of a bundle
of taxes and the provision of public goods. The set of policy instruments at hand is restricted
insofar as capital owners cannot be taxed lump-sum. Therefore, distorting taxes become
desirable. Our modifications of Wildasin’s (2003) model are the following ones. To get
long-term endogenous growth, we assume constant returns to scale with respect to the
augmentable factor(s). The simplest way of doing this would be a simple Rebelo-type (1991)
AK model. The problem with this model, however, is that factor rewards exceed output
if, realistically, a second private factor, e.g. labour, is assumed to exist. We do make this
assumption and in order to avoid problems with excessive factor rewards, we model technology
such that the marginal productivity of private capital is diminishing. To make long-run
growth possible nevertheless, we introduce a third factor of production which is augmentable
and does not earn a factor income. This input is a flow of services provided by the government
and financed through taxes like in Barro [1990].3 Besides this input, the government, like
in Wildasin [2003], provides a public consumption good which in our model for simplicity
is assumed to be a perfect substitute for private consumption and is consumed by workers
only. Two types of taxes are used: a source-based capital-income tax and a lump-sum tax on
labour. The existence of the lump-sum tax results in an optimal provision of the public input.
Underprovision like in Zodrow / Mieszkowski [1986] is excluded. With undistorted provision
of public inputs, however, the only variable affected by the distortion arisingfrom the mobility
of capital as a tax base is the public consumption good – like in Wildasin’s paper.
2 A meta-regression analysis is an empirical method that attempts to combine the results of empirical studies
and to check whether they justify that some effect holds “on average”. See Stanley [2001].
3 Mainly because the public input is not modelled as a stock variable, there are no transitional dynamics for
the evolution of output and physical capital. Models of public policy and growth that address the importance
of modelling public capital as a stock variable include Futagami et al. [1993] and Turnovsky [1997].
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Another related paper is Turnovsky [1996], who introduced convex investment costs into
the Barro [1990] model. While our modelling of endogenous growth is close to Turnovsky
[1996], we extend the model by considering the implications of tax competition for the choice
of public policy as in Wildasin [2003] and by an endogenous determination of the equilibrium
interest rate. A simplification we employ is to assume that workers do not save and that
capital owners do not vote. This helps us to avoid some algebraic complications arising in
other two-stages optimisation models in which less restrictive assumptions are made.4
The model is solved as follows. In the first step of the analysis, economic agents in
the private sector maximise their utility given the interest rate and the economic policies
announced by the government. In the next step, governments decide about policies taking as
given the interest rate and the first-order conditions of the private sector. Finally, the interest
rate itself is determined. The next section of this paper will present the assumptions of the
model regarding production technology and the frictions that limit the mobility of capital.
Sections 3 and 4 will look at the behaviour of the private sector and of the government,
respectively. Section 5 closes the model by determining the interest rate and derives the
central result by investigating the impact of capital mobility on the long-run economic-growth
path. Section 6 summarises.
4.2 Definition of variables and characterisation of technology
Let us consider a federation consisting of a continuum of infinitely small identical jurisdictions,
also labelled ’regions’, on the unit interval. There is perfect competition in all markets and
single jurisdictions do not have any market power vis-à-vis the rest of the federation. The
private sector takes prices and policies announced by regional governments as given. Regional
governments take variables determined on the federal level as given. As is always the case
in models of tax competition, there is a distinction between ex ante objectives and ex post
outcomes of actions taken to achieve the objectives. Ex ante, jurisdictions may be willing
to use policy instruments to affect the allocation of mobile tax bases. Ex post, however, it
turns out that all jurisdictions have acted in the same way and that the interjurisdictional
allocation of the tax base is unaffected despite the efforts taken in the first place.
There are three types of agents in this model: workers, governments, and entrepreneurs,
who also own the physical and financial capital in the economy. In order to save on notation,
we do not distinguish between entrepreneurs and capital owners but assume that there is a
homogenous group of capitalist producers.
• Workers are immobile across jurisdictions and inelastically supply one unit of labour per
person in the perfectly competitive labour market of their home region at the current
wage rate, which they take as exogenously given. Workers do not save and, thus, do
not own physical capital or other assets.
• Governments charge taxes and provide a productive input. They are benevolent and
maximise the utility of immobile residents. This includes the possibility of income
redistribution.
4 Optimising governments use the private-sector first-order conditions as constraints. This implies that
second-order derivatives show up in the governments’ first-order conditions. See Rauscher [2005], for an
example. In models with benevolent governments and redistributive taxation, these terms cancel out if workers
do not save.
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• Capitalist producers own capital, hire labour, produce, save, and consume the unsaved
share of their incomes. Saving yields an interest rate, which is determined on the federal
capital market and which they take as exogenously given. If they want to transform
their financial assets and invest in a particular jurisdiction, they face installation costs.
If they want do withdraw physical capital, they have to bear de-installation costs. With
these costs, federal financial assets and local physical capital are imperfectly malleable
and, thus, capital is imperfectly mobile.
As all jurisdictions are identical, let us consider a representative jurisdiction. There are
three factors of production: capital, labour, and a publicly provided input, denoted K(t),
L(t), and G(t), respectively, where t denotes time. For the sake of a simpler notation, the
time argument will be omitted when this does not generate ambiguities. Output, Q(t),
is produced by means of the three factors where marginal productivities are positive and
declining. Moreover, we assume that the production function, Φ(., ., .), is linearly homogenous
in (K,G) and in (K,L). An example is the Cobb-Douglas function
Q = Φ(K,G,L) = K1−αGαLα (4.1)
with 0 < α < 1. The size of the labour force is normalised to one. Each worker inelastically
supplies one unit of labour, i.e. L = 1. Thus, (4.1) can be rewritten
Q = F (K,G) ≡ Φ(K,G, 1) , (4.1a)
where F (...) is a neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production function measuring output
per employee. A worker’s income is the wage rate, w(t), which is determined on the regional
labour market. Moreover, let us introduce a production function in intensity terms,
f(g) ≡ F (1, g) where g ≡ G/K , (4.1b)
with f ′(g) > 0 and f ′′(g) < 0, primes denoting derivatives of univariate functions. Regarding
the marginal productivities we have
ΦK = FK = f − gf ′ , (4.2a)
ΦG = FG = f
′ , (4.2b)
ΦL = F −KFK = Kgf ′ , (4.2c)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and arguments of functions have been omitted for
convenience.
Regarding the other two factors of production, we assume:
• Capital. K(t) is the quantity of a composite capital good consisting of physical capital,
human capital, and knowledge capital. Initially, each jurisdiction is endowed with
K(0) = K0. Capital depreciates at a constant exogenous rate m. Let I(t) be the rate
of gross investment as a share of the capital stock. Then capital accumulation evolves
according to
K˙ = (I −m)K , (4.3)
a dot above a variable denoting its derivative with respect to time. Capital is mobile,
albeit at a finite speed. As already mentioned, there is a capital market on the federal
level, yielding an interest rate r(t) which is exogenous to individual capital owners and
to governments of individual jurisdictions, but endogenously determined by demand
and supply on the federal level. Assets and physical capital are imperfectly malleable.
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Transforming financial capital into physical capital and vice versa is costly. We follow
Wildasin [2003] in the specification of the installation cost function. Installation costs
are defined as
c(I)K with c(0) = 0 and c′′(.) > 0 .
The installation cost per unit depends on the rate of investment as a share of capital,
i.e. on the speed of gross accumulation. This function also covers the possibility of
de-installation costs for I < 0. For the derivation of explicit results in the forthcoming
sections of the paper we assume a quadratic shape of such that
c(I)K =
b
2
I2K , (4.4)
i.e. c′(I) = bI and c′′(I) = b, where the constant positive parameter b measures the
barriers to mobility. b = 0 represents perfect mobility and malleability. If b goes to
infinity, capital becomes absolutely immobile. For the interpretation of some of the
results to be derived in the following sections, it is useful to introduce the absolute rate
of investment, J . Using I = J/K in equation (4.4) yields
c(I)K = c
(
J
K
)
K =
b
2
J2
K
. (4.4’)
• The public-sector input. The government provides a productive input at a rate G(t).
This may be interpreted as physical infrastructure such as roads and ports, but also
institutional infrastructure including the legal framework in which economic transactions
take place. For the sake of simplicity, we treat this good as a flow variable which is
provided anew in each period. Interjurisdictional spill-overs are excluded. The provision
of the public input is financed by taxes. There are two types of fiscal instruments, a
source tax on capital, the tax rate being θ,5 and a redistributive lump-sum transfer
going to the immobile factor of production. This transfer is special case of a publicly
supplied consumption good to be consumed by workers only. We assume that the
government chooses a constant tax rate and allocates a constant share of the budget,
1− s, to redistribution. Thus
G = sθK , (4.5)
where s > 0 (s > 1 implies lump-sum taxation of immobile residents). The underlying
assumption that the budget is balanced in each period seems to be restictive, but
real-world governments are indeed subject to within-period budget constraints. A
prominent example is the European Growth and Stability Pact, which restricts the
policy makers’ discretion to borrow. Equation (4.5) is a possibility of introducing such
a restriction in a simplified way. The equation can be rewritten:
g = sθ . (4.5’)
Equation (4.5’) implies that g is constant and using this in (4.2a) and (4.2b) yields:
Lemma 1 All first derivatives of the production function F(.,.) are constant over time.
This concludes the exposition of the model.
5 Other papers like Judd [1985, 1999] and Lejour / Verbon [1997] introduce taxes on capital income rather
than on capital itself. But as long as taxation is linear, the two instruments are equivalent.
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4.3 Saving, investment and production in the private sector
As workers in this model do nothing besides inelastically supplying labour, capitalist producers
drive the dynamics of the economy. They decide about consumption and about investment
in either the local capital stock K or in financial assets A. These decisions depend on the
tax rates and the provision of public inputs set by the local government. Other important
determinants are the interest rate in the federation-wide capital market and installation (and
de-installation) costs for investment in the local capital stock.
Capitalists hire labour, they save, and they invest. Moreover, unlike workers, capital
owners are mobile and can choose to live where they want. If they are not satisfied with
their domicile, they can vote with their feet like in Tiebout [1956] and move to another
jurisdiction that offers better conditions. In contrast to the Tiebout model, mobile capitalists
in our model do not demand local public goods. Thus, they are not willing to pay taxes to
contribute to such goods. They will settle in the jurisdictions that tax them at the lowest
rates. Real-world examples are Monaco and the Swiss cantons Zug, Schwyz, and Nidwalden,
which levy very low taxes and attract millionaires from other parts of the country and from
the rest of the world.6 In a competitive world with many identical jurisdictions, there is a
race to the bottom such that capitalists ultimately do not pay any taxes anywhere. Hence,
capital income can only be taxed at source. The perfect mobility of capitalists has another
important implication for the model. Since capitalists vote with their feet, they are not
interested in participating in the political process. They do not show up at the ballot box
and, thus, their interests are not taken into account by the policy maker.
The representative capitalist producer has two sources of income. On the one hand, she
retains the share of output not being paid as wages to workers. On the other hand she has an
interest income from her stock of saved assets, A(t). There is a perfect asset market in the
federation such that all assets yield the same rate of interest, r(t), to their bearers. There
are two possibilities to spend the income. It can be consumed or it can be saved. Moreover,
savings (assets) can be transformed into physical capital, however only at a cost, the cost
function being defined by (4.4). The rate of accumulation of assets is output minus the wage
payments going to workers minus tax payments minus consumption minus investment into
physical capital minus costs of investing into physical capital plus interest income from assets
accumulated in the past. In algebraic terms:
A˙ = Φ(K,G,L)− wL− θK − C − IK − c(I)K + rA . (4.6)
Since all jurisdictions are identical, there will be no lending and borrowing ex post, i.e. A = 0.
In particular, A(0) = 0. Ex ante, however, capitalists consider the possibility of borrowing
and lending according to (4.6). Ponzi games are excluded, i.e. the present value of assets in
the long run must be non-negative
lim
t→∞
e−rtA ≥ 0 .
A representative capitalist producer maximises the present value of her utility. Utility is
derived from consumption, C(t), only and is of the constant-elasticity-of-substitution type
with σ being the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The discount rate, δ, is positive and
6 According to a report in the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” from September 23, 2005, 13 percent of the ca. 3300
citizens of the the village of Walchwil in Zug are millionaires, and other villages in Zug, Schwyz, and Nidwalden
report similar, though slightly lower, percentages.
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constant and the time horizon is infinite. Thus, the individual’s objective is to maximise
∞∫
0
e−δt u(C) dt with u(C) =
C1−
1
σ − 1
1− 1
σ
,
subject to (4.3), (4.6), the initial endowments, K0 und A0, the tax rate θ, and the public
expenditure, G(t), the latter two having been announced by the government. Note that
an individual capitalist-producer does not take the government’s budget constraint, 4.5,
into account. The decision maker’s control variables are C(t) and L(t). The corresponding
Hamiltonian is
H = u(C) + λ (Φ(K,G,L)− wL− θK − C − IK − c(I)K − rA) + µ (I −m)K ,
where λ(t) and µ(t) are the shadow prices, or co-state variables, of financial and physical
capital, respectively. The canonical equations are
λ˙ = (δ − r)λ , (4.7a)
µ˙ = (δ +m− I)µ− (ΦK − θ − I − c)λ , (4.7b)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and ΦK will be replaced FK in the remainder of
the investigation. See equation (4.2a). Complementary slackness at infinity requires
lim
t→∞
e−δtλA = 0 ,
lim
t→∞
e−δtµK = 0 ,
and, hats above variables denoting growth rates and using (4.2) to substitute for Kˆ, these
conditions imply that
λˆ+ Aˆ < δ for t→∞ , (4.8a)
µˆ+ I −m < δ for t→∞ , (4.8b)
First-order conditions are
w = ΦL , (4.9a)
u′ = λ , (4.9b)
and
µ = (1 + c′)λ . (4.9c)
Condition (4.8a) is a standard labour-demand equation and from (4.9b) we can derive the
standard Ramsey-type growth equation with Cˆ as the growth rate of consumption
Cˆ = σ(r − δ) . (4.10)
Equation (4.9c) states that there is a wedge between the shadow prices of financial capital on
the federation level and local physical capital. Plausibly, this wedge depends on the marginal
cost of installation. From (4.9c), one can derive a condition that links the rates of returns in
the two markets for capital. Taking time derivatives of the shadow prices, inserting (4.7a)
and (4.7b), and using (4.9c) again to eliminate λ/µ, we have
I˙ =
1
c′′
(
(1 + c′)r − (FK −m− θ − c)− (I −m)c′
)
. (4.11)
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The condition for a steady state, i.e. for I˙ = 0, is
FK −m− θ − c+ (I −m− r)c′ = r . (4.12)
This is a capital-market indifference condition. On the right-hand side, the interest rate
indicates the opportunity cost of investing into physical capital in terms of foregone interest.
The left-hand side measures the net benefit from investing into physical capital. The first
term is the gross productivity from which the rate of depreciation and the tax rate are
subtracted. Without mobility cost, this would constitute the net productivity of capital after
taxes. With mobility cost, however, two additional terms emerge. The first one is c. As
defined in this model (see equation 4.4), mobility costs are proportional to capital. Thus,
additional capital raises installation costs, the marginal effect being just c. The final term
on the left-hand side may be interpreted as an intertemporal benefit from a larger capital
stock. If I > m, the capital stock grows and this implies lower future installation costs per
unit of newly installed capital, J . See equation (4.4’).This intertemporal cost-saving effect
of investment is counterweighted by another intertemporal effect: Investing an additional
unit of capital has the opportunity cost of not earning the interest r in the future. Hence a
higher interest rate r lowers the (future) benefits of investing in real capital as the raise the
opportunity costs of investment.
In the derivation of the optimal rate of investment, we follow Turnovsky [1996]. Using the
quadratic shape of the investment cost function, (4.4), we can rewrite (4.11) such that
I˙ =
1
2
(
−I2 + 2 (r +m) I − 2
b
(FK −m− θ − r)
)
. (4.11’)
This is a quadratic differential equation that can be represented as a hump-shaped curve in
dI
dt
I
I1 I2
Figure 4.1: Investment dynamics
a phase diagram with a stable and an unstable equilibrium. See Figure 4.1. The condition
for a steady state with I˙ = 0 is
I1,2 = r +m±
√
(r +m)2 − 2
b
(FK −m− θ − r) , (4.13)
where the smaller value, I1, corresponds to the unstable equilibrium in Figure 4.1 and the
larger one, I2, to the stable equilibrium. An imaginary solution would imply a fluctuating
path of capital accumulation. One can show that I2 as well as an imaginary solution would
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violate the transversality condition.7 Noting that I1 is an instable solution of (4.11’), it
follows that there are no transitional dynamics. This implies
Proposition 9 The optimal rate of investment is constant along the optimal trajectory, with
I1 = r +m−
√
(r +m)2 − 2
b
(FK −m− θ − r) . (4.13’)
Constancy follows from Lemma 1, which states that FK is constant over time. Condition
(4.13’) shows that the optimum rate of investment, as expected, is increasing in the marginal
productivity of capital and decreasing in the depreciation rate, the interest rate, and the tax
rate. The impact of the cost parameter b is ambiguous. It is negative if I1 > 0 and positive
if I1 < 0. As deviations from zero in both directions are penalised by high installation and
de-installation costs, this is also plausible.
Finally, to fully characterise the savings behaviour of the private sector, the initial level of
consumption needs to be determined. Using (4.1a), (4.9a), (4.2c), (4.3), (4.4), and (4.10) in
(4.6) yields
A˙ =
(
FK − θ − I1 − 2
b
I21
)
K(0)e(I1−m)t − C(0)eσ(r−δ)t + rA .
In an intertemporal steady-state equilibrium with identical jurisdictions, there is no lending
and borrowing, i.e. A = 0 = A˙ for all t. This implies equal growth rates of the capital stock
and of consumption,
I1 −m = σ (r − δ) , (4.14)
and the starting value of C is:
C(0) =
(
FK − θ − I1 − 2
b
I21
)
K(0) . (4.15)
Equation (4.14) determines, together with (4.13’), the equilibrium interest rate as an implicit
function of the parameters of the model and of the tax rate. Note that the assumption of
identical jurisdictions is central to determine the equilibrium in the federation-wide capital
market. Identical jurisdictions imply that agents cannot differ in the sense that one agent is
a borrower and another is a lender. Equation (4.15) states that consumption is positively
related to initial capital endowment and capital productivity and negatively related to the
tax rate, the rate of investment, and the installation cost.
Note that our characterisation of the capital market equilibrium is similar to the one
implicitly found in many static models of tax competition. While the ex-ante incentives for
the local governments shape the optimal tax policy, there are no cross-border movements of
capital, i.e. neither lending nor borrowing. If we would analyse a small open economy, its
choice of fiscal policies would not have an impact on the capital market equilibrium. In a
symmetric equilibrium, however, where all countries simultaneously and identically choose
its fiscal policies, the fiscal externalities of each individual jurisdiction caused by this choice
sum up to a significant effect on the capital equilibrium. Hence, it is the presence of the
(standard) fiscal externality in a tax competition model that is responsible for the impact of
a change in capital mobility on the equilibrium interest rate, analysed later on.
7 Note that I is constant in the steady state. Thus (4.9c) implies µˆ = λˆ. Using (4.7a), we then have µˆ = δ− r.
Using this in (4.8b) yields the condition I < r +m. This is violated by by I2 and by any imaginary solution
to (4.13) because its real part would be r +m.
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Given this characterisation of private-sector behaviour, the next step is to analyse govern-
ment policies that influence private saving and investment decisions. In the next section this
is done for a small open economy. Afterwards, the equilibrium in which many tax-competing
governments interact will be addressed.
4.4 Government behaviour and taxation for a given rate of
interest
The government maximises the welfare of immobile residents. Immobile residents are workers.
Their wage rate is gf ′K and their transfer income (1− s) θK. See equations (4.9a), (4.2c),
and (4.5). The government takes the interest rate as exogenously given as the jurisdiction is
small. In particular, it does not consider condition (4.14), which determines the equilibrium
interest rate when, ex post, all governments have chosen the same tax policies. Let us assume
that workers have the same preference parameters as the capitalists. Thus, the government’s
objective is to maximise
WL =
σ
σ − 1
∞∫
0
(
[(gf ′ + (1− s)θ)K0e(I1−m)t]1−
1
σ − 1
)
e(−δt)dt . (4.16)
The condition for the objective function, (4.16), to be finite is(
1− 1
σ
)
(I1 −m) < δ , (4.17)
and it is assumed for the remainder of the investigation that the parameters of the model
are such that the condition is satisfied. Maximising (4.16) with respect to the government’s
policy parameters, θ and s, yields
Proposition 10 The optimal tax-and-expenditure policy of the government for a given
interest rate is characterised by
f ′ = 1 , (4.18)
θ = b(r +m− I1)
(
δ −
(
1− 1
σ
)
(I1 −m)
)
> 0 , (4.19)
where I1 is determined by (4.13’).
Equations (4.18) and (4.19) are derived in the appendix. Equation (4.18) states that the
marginal productivity of government expenditure is unity. This is a standard result in
tax-competition models with lump-sum tax instruments. See, e.g., Zodrow / Mieszkowski
[1986, p. 363]. The underlying intuition to explain this result in our model is the following
one. In a first step, capital is taxed and the tax revenue is added to labour income. Out of
this gross income, workers pay a lump-sum tax that is used to finance the publicly provided
good. Thus, the cost of producing one unit of G is exactly one unit of GDP. Since f ′ = ΦG
is the marginal productivity of G, f ′ = 1 is nothing else but the rule that the marginal
productivity of a factor should equal the marginal cost of employing it.
Equation (4.19) determines the optimum tax rate. This tax rate is positive since (r +m−
I1) > 0 due to Proposition 1 (see also Footnote 7) and (δ − (1 − 1σ )(I1 −m)) > 0 due to
assumption (4.17).8 For b→∞, θ goes to infinity.
8 Note that Turnovsky [1996, p. 58] derived a zero-tax rate. The difference between his and our model is
the possibility of non-distorting taxation of capital owners. In Turnovsky’s model of a small open economy,
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4.5 Government behaviour and taxation in the equilibrium
In the equilibrium, the interest rate is determined by equation (4.14). This implies that the
transversality condition, (4.17), can be rewritten such that
(1− σ)r + σδ > 0 . (4.20)
This is the transversality condition known from models of economic growth in small economies,
where the interest rate is exogenous. If σ > 1, the interest rate must not be too large.
Otherwise, the economic growth rate would be so large that the increase in utility flows would
dominate the effect of discounting.9 If σ < 1, the interest rate must not be too negative.
Otherwise, the fast rate of economic decline would make the welfare integral go to minus
infinity. In order to rule out a non-converging welfare integral, we make
Assumption 3 The parameters of the model are such that condition (4.20) is satisfied.
Using (4.14) in the tax-rate formula, (4.19) and determining the interest rate via 4.13’, yields
Proposition 11 In the tax-competition equilibrium, the tax rate and the interest rate are
determined by
θ = b((1− σ)r + σδ)2 , (4.21)
and the interest rate is determined by
b =
2(FK − r −m)
((1− σ)r + σδ)2 + (r +m)2 . (4.22)
Equation (4.21) follows directly from (4.19) and (4.22) is obtained by using first (4.21) in
(4.13’) and then (4.14) to eliminate I1. In what follows, the right-hand side of equation (4.22)
will be referred to as the b(r) function. From (4.21) we have
Corollary 1 For b > 0, the equilibrium tax rate is positive. It goes to zero if b → 0 or if
(1− σ)r + σδ → 0.
That perfect capital mobility leads to zero taxation, is a standard result. A perfectly mobile
tax base should not be taxed. The other case is more surprising. Even if b > 0, i.e. if the tax
base is imperfectly mobile, taxation may not be warranted. The underlying intuition is that
the transversality condition, (4.20) is violated if (1− σ)r + σδ happens to be zero. In this
case, the welfare integral would go to infinity. If a tax is introduced, however small it may be,
the growth rate of the economy would be reduced and the welfare integral would become
finite. Thus, in this limiting case the marginal welfare cost of taxation would be infinity and
the tax rate should therefore be zero. If (1− σ)r + σδ is slightly greater that zero, the tax
rate is very small. Finally, note that s→∞ if θ → 0, i.e. the government relies on lump-sum
taxation of immobile residents to finance the public input if the source tax on capital goes to
zero.
non-distorting taxation via consumption taxes is feasible whereas in our model capitalist producers are footloose
and their incomes can only be taxed at source.
9 This becomes more obvious if the condition is rewritten such that 1− 1/σ)r < δ, where the left-hand term
is the growth rate of utility, which must not exceed the discount rate.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium interest rate and capital mobility
Equation (4.22) determines the interest rate and, thus, the growth potential of the economy.
The properties of the b(r) function are explored in the appendix and they are depicted in
Figure 4.2. The dashed part of the curve is irrelevant as b would be negative there. If b = 0,
r = FK −m, i.e. the interest rate equals the net marginal product of capital, which is a
standard and straightforward result. If b > 0, r < FK −m. The maximum of the curve is
attained for
rmaxb = FK −m−
√
F 2K + ((1− σ)(FK −m) + σδ)2
1 + (1− σ)2 , (4.23)
which follows from eq. (4.A7) in the appendix. For many realistic parameter constellations,
(4.23) implies a negative interest rate, indicating negative growth and possibly dis-investment
at the maximum feasible level of b. An interest rate exceeding the discount rate, leading to
positive growth, is possible, but very unlikely. Note that
rmax b = −m and bmax =∞ for σ = m
m+ δ
.
For all other cases, the bmax is finite, implying that an equilibrium interest rate does not
exist if b exceeds a certain threshold value. The reason is that for large values of b a small
country’s government would choose an extensively high tax rate. An individual government
neglects the impact of its tax policy on the interest rate. If all countries do this, the asset
market equilibrium collapses – unless one introduces an exogenous upper limit to taxation.
Moreover, Figure 4.2 shows that for each b > 0, there are two values of r satisfying (4.23).
However, the lower of the two values of r is irrelevant here. Assume that b = 0. In this case r
should equal FK−m and not −∞. Increasing b generates the decreasing segment of the curve.
Hence, as the growth rate of the economy is determined by the interest rate via Ramsey’s
rule (equation (4.10), lowering capital mobility or increasing the degree of disintegration in
the federation results in slower economic growth.
Before we proceed, we restrict the parameters of the model such that positive growth rates
are possible:
Assumption 4 FK −m− δ > 0
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FK is determined via f
′ = 1 (equation (4.18)) and is constant. In the absence of installation
costs, the growth rate would be σ (FK −m− δ) like in Ramsey’s (1928) model, the difference
being that FK does not decline along the accumulation path since we are in an endogenous-
growth framework.
Given the properties of the b(r) function, one can now determine the effects of changes in b
on taxation. Differentiation of (4.22) yields
dθ
db
= ((1− σ)r + σδ)2 + 2(1− σ) ((1− σ)r + σδ)
[
db
dr
]−1
, (4.24)
where db/dr is the slope of the part of the function located to the right its maximum and
it is negative. Equation (4.24) implies that the impact of b on θ is not necessarily positive.
Let us distinguish the cases σ > 1 and σ < 1. In the limiting case σ = 1, matters are simple
because θ = bδ2 and the tax rate is linear in b.
Case A: σ > 1
From (4.24) it follows that the impact of b on the tax rate is positive as long as the
transversality condition, (4.21), is satisfied. If (1− σ)r + σδ = 0, then θ = 0 even if b 6= 0.
Using (1− σ)r + σδ = 0 in (4.23), the corresponding value of b, b0, turns out to be
b0 =
(1− σ)((1− σ)(FK −m) + σδ)
((1− σ)m+ σδ)2 , (4.25)
which may be positive or negative depending on whether σ is larger or less than FK−m
FK−m−δ
,
respectively. Figure 4.3 depicts θ(b) for the two cases. In the right-hand diagram, where
σ is relatively small, matters are simple: the tax rate is increasing in b. If, however, σ is
large the function is S shaped. As long as b < b0, the transversality condition is not satisfied
since the rate of economic growth is so large that the welfare integral does not converge
in spite of discounting. This part of the curve is depicted as a dotted line. If b > b0, the
transversality condition is met and the tax rate is again monotonically increasing in b. b = b0
is the limiting case referred to in Corollary 1. The tax rate goes to zero even though the tax
base is imperfectly mobile.
Case B: σ < 1
From (4.24) it can be seen that the impact of b on the tax rate is ambiguous even if the
transversality condition is satisfied. Like before, b0 is given by equation (4.25). If Assumption
4 is fulfilled, b0 > 0. For σ → m/(m+ δ), b0 goes to infinity. In this case, using (4.23) in the
tax-rate formula gives
θ =
2(FK −m− r)
1 + (1 +m/δ)2
if σ =
m
m+ δ
.
r ranges from FK −m for b = 0 to −m for b→∞ and is monotonously decreasing in b. This
implies that θ is monotonously increasing in b and goes to a value less than FK for b→∞.
Monoticity does not hold for the other cases in which σ is less or larger than this critical
value. Let us distinguish these two sub-cases. The shapes of the curves are derived in the
appendix and depicted in Figure 4.4.
Sub-case B1: 0 < σ < m
m+δ
The tax rate as a function of b is S shaped. Initially the tax rate is increasing in b . Above a
certain threshold level of b , the curve bends back and the tax rate declines until it becomes
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σ >
FK −m
FK −m− δ
1 < σ <
FK −m
FK −m− δ
b b
bmax bmax
Figure 4.3: The tax rate as a function of b for σ > 1
zero at for the value of b at which the transversality condition starts to be violated. For values
of b larger than b0, the transversality condition continues to be violated until b attains its
maximum level, bmax. Again the part, of the function along which the condition is not met, is
illustrated by a dotted line. The underlying intuition for the S shape is rather straightforward.
The initial increase in the tax rate is intuitive. As the tax rate increases, the interest rate
declines and at eventually the growth rate becomes negative. With σ < 1, negative growth
implies utility flows that are negative and become larger in absolute value. These losses in
utility can be reduced by lower taxes. If, in the extreme, the transversality condition is close
to be violated, an increase in the tax rate by a small amount would turn a finite negative
welfare integral into an infinite one. Such taxes are avoided and this explains why the tax
rate goes to zero as (1− σ)r + σδ → 0.
σ <
m
m + δ
σ >
m
m + δ
b b
bmax bmax
Figure 4.4: The tax rate as a function of b for σ < 1
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Sub-case B2: m
m+δ < σ < 1
In the appendix, it is shown that θ = 0 is not possible for b > 0 and that the slope of the θ(b)
function is positive for b = 0 and goes to −∞ for b→ bmax. There is a segment of the curve
along which the tax rate is decreasing in openness.
Summarising, we have the following results:
• If the elasticity of substitution exceeds 1, the tax rate is monotonically increasing in
the cost parameter, b. For particularly large values of σ, the rate of taxation may go to
zero although installation costs are still positive. The intuition behind this result is
that welfare, i.e. the present value of future utility flows, is so large that small increases
in the tax rate would lead to drastic welfare losses.
• If the elasticity of substitution is less than 1, the tax rate is a backward-bending
function of b (with the notable exception of σ = m/(m + δ), where the tax rate is
monotonously increasing in b. Decreasing taxes are possible for large values of b, for
which the economic growth rate is likely to be negative. If σ < 1, the welfare integral is
negative and with negative growth rates it becomes large in absolute value. Increases in
b then lead to large welfare losses which can be offset by lower taxes. If σ is particularly
small, the tax rate may even go to zero because the welfare integral goes to minus
infinity at a certain threshold value of b. In this situation, small increases in the tax
rate have dramatically negative consequences for welfare and the optimum tax rate,
therefore, goes to zero.
4.6 Final Remarks
The paper has addressed tax competition in a general-equilibrium endogenous growth model.
The starting point was Wildasin’s (2003) model with quadratic installation costs. We are able
to show that not all results carry over from the traditional-growth to the endogenous-growth
framework. In particular, we established the following new results:
1. A tax-competition equilibrium does not always exist. If installation costs and capital
depreciation are large and the rate of discount and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution are small, an equilibrium does not exist since the tax rate becomes very
high and capitalists want to reduce their capital stock at a rate that is incompatible
with the smooth consumption path implied by the low rate of discount and the small
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. A way out of this the problem of non-existence
would be the introduction of an exogenous upper limit to taxation.
2. Tax rates may go to zero even if installation costs are positive. This result is counter-
intuitive at a first glance, but it can be explained by the fact that the present value
of welfare may go to plus or minus infinity in an endogenous-growth framework. This
implies that even small tax rates can induce dramatic welfare losses.
3. The impact of installation cost on the capital tax rate is ambiguous. Tax rates may
be reduced when the mobility of the tax base is reduced. This result differs from the
one derived by Wildasin [2003] for a growth model that approaches a no-growth steady
state in the long run.
4.6 Final Remarks 61
4. Many of the interesting results of this paper can be established only for variants
of the model with an elasticity of substitution not equalling 1. This indicates that
the assumption of logarithmic utility made in many papers on economic growth and
taxation is by no means an innocent one. Since the empirical evidence suggests that σ
is significantly smaller than one (see Hall [1988] and Guvenen [2006]), the assumption
σ = 1 is hardly defendable on empirical grounds, too.
A result that is in line with what has been established by others, e.g. Hatfield [2006], is
that increased factor mobility enhances economic growth. This result is challenged in the
recent paper by Köthenbürger / Lockwood [2007], who, however, rely on stochastics and use
a portfolio-diversification argument. In deterministic models, the general result seems to be
that tax competition is pro-growth.
The elasticity of (intertemporal) substitution σ causes a lot of algebraic difficulties if it is
not assumed to be equal to one. But its role in a model like the one presented above also
offers a possible explanation why the link between capital mobility and growth is different in
developed and developing countries. Rich and poor people seem to have different preferences
for consumption smoothing, see Ogaki / Atkeson [1997]. In the light of our model, it is not
surprising that countries that differ with respect to the crucial parameter σ behave differently
when capital mobility changes.
A caveat we would like to mention is that our results have been derived by varying the costs
of installing new or de-installing old capital. These costs definitely constitute a real-resources
loss to the economy and no one should be surprised if the economy is worse off once these
costs are increased. However, the economic growth rate is not affected by this resource loss.
Assume that the installation cost is a pure distortion, which does not involve a direct resource
loss. An example would be a payment made by an individual investor which, at the end of
the day, is rebated lump-sum. The only effect this modification would have on the results of
the model would be a change in the level of consumption in equation (4.15). The growth rate
would remain unchanged.
As a possible agenda of future research, research could aim at looking for modifications
of the model leading to a negative impact of tax competition on growth. Moreover, one
could try to compare tax competition to a coordinated tax policy in the endogenous-growth
framework. Given the algebraic complexities of our model, however, we conjecture that this
will be possible only for specific assumptions about the parameters of the model, in particular
a logarithmic utility function, which implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of
unity.
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Appendix
Derivation of (4.18)
Assuming that the integral in (4.16) is finite, the growth rate of the integrand must be
negative. Then the integral can be rewritten:
WL =
[(gf ′ + (1− s)θ)K0]1−
1
σ
(1− 1
σ
)(δ − (1− 1
σ
)(I1 −m))
− 1
δ(1− 1
σ
)
.
Taking first derivatives with respect to s and θ and noting that g = σθ (equation (4.5’)), we
have
[(gf ′ + (1− s)θ)K0]−
1
σK0θ(gf
′′ + f ′ − 1)
δ − (1− 1
σ
)(I1 −m)
+
[(gf ′ + (1− s)θ)K0]1−
1
σ ∂I1
∂s
(δ − (1− 1
σ
)(I1 −m))2
= 0 , (4.A1)
[(gf ′ + (1− s)θ)K0]−
1
σK0(s(gf
′′ + f ′ − 1) + 1)
δ − (1− 1
σ
)(I1 −m)
+
[(gf ′ + (1− s)θ)K0]1−
1
σ ∂I1
∂θ
(δ − (1− 1
σ
)(I1 −m))2
= 0 .
(4.A2)
Combining (4.A1) and (4.A2) yields
θ(gf ′′ + f ′ − 1)
s(gf ′′ + f ′ − 1) + 1 =
∂I1/∂s
∂I1/∂θ
. (4.A3)
To determine ∂I1
∂θ
and ∂I1
∂s
, substitute (4.2a) for FK in (4.13’) and note that g = sθ according
to (4.5’). Then taking derivatives and re-substituting from (4.13’) to eliminate the square-root
term in the denominator yields
∂I1
∂s
=
−θgf ′′
b(r +m− I1) (4.A4)
and
∂I1
∂θ
=
−sgf ′′ − 1
b(r +m− I1) . (4.A5)
Using (4.A4) and (4.A5) in (4.A3) yields
θ(gf ′′ + f ′ − 1)
s(gf ′′ + f ′ − 1) + 1 =
θgf ′′
sgf ′′s+ 1
. (4.A6)
Simple calculus then leads to f ′ = 1. Thus, condition (4.18) has been derived.
Derivation of (4.19)
Rearrranging terms in (4.A2) and using f ′ = 1 yields
(sgf ′′ + 1)
(
δ −
(
1− 1
σ
)
(I1 −m)
)
= − ((gf ′ + (1− s)θ)K0) ∂I1
∂θ
.
Use (4.A5) to subtitute for ∂I1
∂θ
. Noting that sgf ′′ + 1 cancels out, we have:
b
(
δ −
(
1− 1
σ
)
(I1 −m)
)
=
g + (1− s)θ
r +m− I1 .
4.6 Final Remarks 63
From g = sθ, (4.19) then follows immediately.
Properties of (4.22)
From (4.22), we have
r = FK −m⇔ b = 0, r < FK −m⇔ b > 0 ,
r → +∞⇒ b→ −0, r → −∞⇒ b→ +0 .
Taking the derivative in (4.22), noting that dI1/dr = σ yields
db
dr
=
((1− σ) r + σδ)2 + (r +m)2 + 2 (FK −m− r) ((1− σ) ((1− σ) r + σδ) + r +m)
−12
(
((1− σ) r + σδ)2 + (r +m)2
)2 .
(4.A7)
For db/dr = 0, we get a quadratic equation in r, which implies that b(r) has two extrema, a
maximum for r < FK −m and a minimum for r > FK −m.
Properties of θ(b) for σ < 1 (Case B)
The general properties of θ(b) cannot be determined algebraically. E.g. it can be shown that
dθ/db = 0 is a highly complex polynomial of degree 3 which cannot be solved in general.
Therefore, we restrict the investigation to particular values of b, namely 0, b0, and b
max.
• Let b = 0. Then θ = 0 and dθ/db > 0.
• Let b → bmax. If (1 − σ)r + σδ > 0 (if the transversality condition is fullfilled) and
b→ bmax, then dθ/db→ −∞. If (1− σ)r + σδ < 0, then dθ/db→ +∞.
• Let b = b0. This is value of b for which (1− σ)r + σδ = 0. Using this in (4.A7) yields
db
dr
=
−2(r +m)2 − 4(FK −m− r)(r +m)
(r +m)4
=
−2(r +m)(2FK −m− r)
(r +m)4
.
Since 2FK −m − r is always positive, this implies that db/dr < 0 if r +m > 0 and
db/dr > 0 if r+m < 0. In the former case, we are on the decreasing segment of the b(r)
curve depicted in Figure 4.2, in the latter case on the increasing segment, which cannot
be equilibrium. From r +m > 0 and (1− σ)r + σδ = 0, we have that σ < m/(m+ δ).
Thus, in order to have a zero-tax equilibrium at a positive level of installation cost, the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution must be less than this critical value. For larger
values of σ, such an equilibrium is not feasible.
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Chapter 5
The efficiency of the public sector and the
intensity of interjurisdictional competition –
an empirical investigation
This chapter, or other versions of it, has not been made available to the public in written
form before.
5.1 Introduction
The provision of public goods and services requires public expenditure that is, in the end,
financed by tax revenue. It is hence natural that policymakers and their voters have an interest
in using that money as efficient as possible. In many industrialised countries, public-sector
efficiency is of high public interest as the ability and willingness to raise tax revenue is subject
to constraints. Initiatives to cut public spending while maintaining the level of public goods
and services that consumers and producers are used to can be found in many countries, both
at the national and subnational level. Or, alternatively, there are demands that the output
level is increased given the level of public expenditure. Both kinds of public-sector reform
aim to increase public-sector efficiency. Accordingly, there is a need to measure, compare and
explain differences in the performance and efficiency of governments internationally.
There is by now an immense number of studies in the literature that measure the efficiency
of private firms like banks, insurance companies, electricity providers or farmers using non-
parametric techniques to measure efficiency like data envelopment analysis (DEA). Also the
efficiency of the public sector and publicly owned firms has been assessed using DEA-methods.
Examples are studies about the efficiency of public transport systems, schools and universities,
police forces and fire services, jails, libraries and other sub-units of the public sector. Gattoufi
et al. [2004] provide a bibliography that covers the years 1951-2001. It lists over 1800 papers
in the field of data envelopment analysis.1
1 This bibliography is currently being updated to also cover in addition the years 2002 until 2007. Many
thanks to Said Gattoufi for sharing his impressive database. It is planned for the not so far future to publish
the bibliographic data on a website and to allow quick overviews of the literature according to different criteria
like publication type, keywords and others.
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Fewer studies attempt to evaluate the efficiency of the public sector of countries as a whole.
This is of course due to enormous difficulties to define a set of indicators measuring inputs
and outputs of the public sector that is treated as if it was a production unit. Regardless of
all the difficulties, Afonso et al. [2005] made an attempt and evaluate the efficiency of the
public sector for 23 industrialised countries.
The goal of this study is twofold: First, it tries to provide a robustness check for the results
found in Afonso et al. [2005]. In order to do so, the inputs and outputs of the public sector are
measured in this study in a similar way. Then efficiency measures (“scores”) are calculated. I
use two different samples that cover up to 74 countries and the years 1985, 1990, 1995 and
2000. Secondly, the efficiency scores are used in a regression analysis that tries to explain the
pattern of public sector by the intensity of interjurisdictional competition. The idea is, as has
been argued in chapter 3, that the competition between jurisdiction – in this case: countries –
has an influence on the efficiency of the public sectors that uses tax revenue to provide public
goods and services. In chapter 3 it has been argued that the competition for a mobile tax base
can lead to less efficiency. The reason there is that the efficiency of the public sector is the
result of past investment that is hurt by less tax revenue in the presence of capital mobility.
But, from a theoretical point of view, it could also be the other way round: Tax competition
can improve the efficiency of the public sector if inefficiencies are caused, for example, by a
bureaucracy that does not act in the best interest of its citizens. Then tax competition can
have a disciplining effect. Examples of the models with tax competition and “Leviathans” as
governments include Edwards / Keen [1996], Rauscher [2000], Wilson [2005].2 The theoretical
literature as a whole does not come to a clear conclusion about the efficiency-consequences of
tax competition or other forms of interjurisdictional competition. The results by and large
depend on the a priori assumptions about the correct characterisation of the public sector,
with the two extremes of assuming a benevolent vs a Leviathan government. Therefore this
study tries to explore empirically the relationship between public-sector efficiency and the
intensity of interjurisdictional competition.
The study is not only similar to Afonso et al. [2005], but also to other cross-country
comparisons of public sector-efficiency. Using similar two-stage procedures as I do, Afonso
/ Aubyn [2006b, 2007] assess the efficiency of health care systems in OECD countries and
find that factors like the GDP per capita or socio-economic variables like smoking habits or
obesity are important factors explaining the efficiencies of health care. The same authors
have also examined the efficiency of education system in the OECD, see Afonso / Aubyn
[2006a], and find that the found inefficiencies are strongly related to GDP per capita and
parents’ educational attainment. Gupta / Verhoeven [2001] look at health care and education
in Africa. Afonso et al. [2006] analyse public-sector efficiency of 24 nations from emerging
markets in different regions and the European Union, including new members and future
candidates. They find that public sector efficiency depends positively on the security of
property rights, per capita GDP, the competence of civil servants, and the education level of
people.
In terms of the sample that is considered, Angelopoulos et al. [2007] is close to this study.
They consider 64 countries and four 5-year time periods 1980-2000 and calculate efficiency
measures. As they are interested in the relationship of government size and growth, they
incorporate these scores then in a growth regression. They present various growth regressions
2 The Leviathan hypothesis in economics has nothing to do with notion of a Leviathan in mythology or in
the bible, where it is a sea monster, identified in different passages with the whale and the crocodile (e.g., Job
41, Ps. 74:14), and with the Devil (after Isa. 27:1). The Leviathan in the economics literature has to do with
the book by Thomas Hobbes, who argued that a strong government is necessary to avoid “war of all against
all”. In economics, a Leviathan is a government that is not legitimate and wastes resources.
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that include the size of government and in addition an interaction term that involves both
the size and the efficiency of the public sector. The size of government and the interaction
term both have explanatory power. The authors conclusion is that “what matters to growth
is not the size per se, but the size-efficiency mix” [Angelopoulos et al. 2007, p. 12].
This study is organised as follows: The next section describes the use of non-parametric
methods like data envelopment analysis (DEA) for the evaluation of the efficiency of production
processes. The next section explains how the input and output of the public sector is measured
in this study and present the data on the performance of public sector, i.e. the output. Section
5.4 then presents the efficiency analysis that results in a set of efficiency scores in two different
samples. The smaller one contains observations from 32 countries and one year and is analysed
using a Free Disposable Hull (FDH) method. For the second sample (74 countries, four 4-year
period 1985-2000), a data envelopment analysis (DEA) is carried out. Section 5.5 then uses
the efficiency scores from the larger sample to explore the relationships between efficiency
on the one hand and government size and intensity of interjurisdictional competition on the
other.
5.2 A digression on non-parametric efficiency analysis
This section reviews the basic concepts of (non-parametric) efficiency analysis and provides
an overview about recent research about methodological problems.
In order to measure the efficiency of a firm (or any other organization that converts inputs
into outputs), it is necessary to determine a production frontier against which the efficiency
of a firm can be evaluated.3 Modern methods to measure efficiency against a “best practice
frontier” can be seen as a refinement of ideas already presented in the 1950s, see Debreu
[1951], Koopmans [1951], Farrell [1957]. Efficiency can be measured in output orientation
(maximum attainable output given a level of inputs) or input orientation (minimum input to
produce a given level of outputs).4
The alternative methods available for efficiency analysis of production processes differ in
the way the efficiency frontier is inferred from data about inputs and outputs of a sample of
firms. A major distinction is the one between parametric and non-parametric methods.5
Parametric efficiency analysis involves the econometric estimation of parametric functions.
Whereas the estimation of a production function usually assumes a symmetric error term
representing statistical noise, the idea of stochastic frontier analysis is to assume that the
error term contains a one-sided component that is due to inefficiency.6 The advantage of
a frontier analysis is that it accounts for measurement errors and other reasons why an
observed production process deviates from the production frontier. Furthermore, conventional
3 This section draws on Coelli et al. [2005], a textbook on efficiency and productivity analysis. Where
necessary, more specific references are given in the text.
4 An alternative to input- or output oriented measurement is to measure efficiency “non-oriented”. This
concept deals with possible reductions of inputs and possible expansion of output of inefficient production
units at the same time, see Färe et al. [1985, 1994]. It is less popular than input- or output oriented models as
it requires the solution of a non-linear program, see Johnson / Mcginnis [2006] and references therein.
5 Note that the aim of this study is to evaluate the efficiency (or inefficiency) of the public sector. Hence it
would be of no use to estimate production functions with the underlying assumption that all firms are efficient
and deviations from the production function are due to random noise. For a clarification of concepts and
terms, see the box on page 70.
6 I keep the discussion of stochastic frontier analysis relatively short, as I do not use it. See Coelli et al. [2005,
ch. 9, 10] for an introduction, and Kumbhakar / Lovell [2000].
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statistical tests can be applied. But this advantage is limited since one has to specify the
functional form of the production function and make an assumption about the distribution of
the two-component error term. From a practical point of view, stochastic frontier analysis
is relatively easy to accomplish once the necessary data is available. It is implemented in
specialized packages like FRONTIER [Coelli 1996]. In Stata, frontier and xtfrontier (for
panel data) are well established commands.
Non-parametric efficiency analysis does not require assumptions about the functional form
of the production function. The idea is to calculate the production frontier as the envelope
of the observed data using linear programming. Consider a data set of an input, x, and an
output, y, for five firms as in Figure 5.1 where the triangles represent the observed data.
The production set consists of the set
Ψ =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rp+ × Rq+|x can produce y
}
with x,y representing vectors and p (q) being the number of inputs (outputs).7 A standard
assumption is free disposability. That means that for a given (x, y) ∈ Ψ, all (x′, y′) with
x′ > x and y′ 6 y belong to the production set, where the inequalities between vectors are
understood componentwise. If y consist of only one element, Ψ can also be characterised
by a function y = g(x) that is called the frontier function or production function. Free
disposability implies that g(x) is monotonously nondecreasing in inputs x. Figure 5.1 is a
one-input-one-output example (p = q = 1). The functions represented by the solid, dashed
and dotted lines are all examples of possible production frontiers.
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Figure 5.1: DEA and FDH production frontiers
Point A in Figure 5.1 represents an in-
efficient firm both in input orientation (it
would be possible to produce the same level
of outputs with less inputs) and output ori-
entation (it would be possible to produce
more of y given inputs), regardless of which
production frontiers is used.
The degree of inefficiency, i.e. the dis-
tance to the production frontier, depends
on the production frontier that is used
for the evaluation and on the orientation
chosen, as long as constant returns to scale
are not assumed.8 As can be seen in Fig-
ure 5.1, returns to scale are an important
property of the production set when it is
used to determine the degree of efficiency.
If the production set has constant returns
to scale (CRS), only point B is on the efficiency border as the production function is a straight
line. With variable returns to scale (VRS), the efficiency frontier envelops the data more
tightly and more observations are on the efficiency frontier. Other possible assumptions are
non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) or non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS).
Non-parametric efficiency analysis can being done either as DEA (Data Envelopment
Analysis) or using the method of a FDH (Free Disposable Hull). DEA assumes convexity
7 The notation and exposition follows Cízek et al. [2005, ch. 12].
8 Cízek et al. [2005, sec. 12.1] define the distance of a point x, y relative to input and output isoquants. I skip
this definition, as it is not essential for the understanding.
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of the production set (a quasi-concave production function) and free disposability. DEA-
methods can be further categorized with respect to to the assumption about returns to scale.
The seminal paper is Charnes et al. [1978]. FDH assumes free disposability but a convex
production set and has been suggested first by Deprins et al. [1984]. In terms of Figure 5.1,
FDH means that the production frontier is defined as step function.
The aim of both DEA and FDH-analysis is to calculate so called efficiency scores (or
efficiency degrees). The calculation is based on distance functions but can also stated as the
solution to an linear programme. Consider a sample of three firms and a production process
with one input, x, and one output y. Y is the 1 × 3 vector of observed outputs, X is the
1 × 3 vector of observed inputs. Then the calculation of an DEA efficiency score in input
orientation, for firm k, with the assumption of constant returns to scale (DEA-CRS), means
to solve a linear programme that can be stated as follows:
min
{θk,λ
k
1 ,λ
k
2 ,λ
k
3}
θk subject to (5.1a)
θkxk −

 x1x2
x3

( λk1 λk2 λk3 ) > 0 (5.1b)
−yk +

 y1y2
y3

( λk1 λk2 λk3 ) > 0 (5.1c)
θk, λ
k
1, λ
k
2, λ
k
3 > 0 , (5.1d)
where k is index for the firm under consideration, θk is the input orientated efficiency score
for firm k, λk1, λ
k
2, λ
k
3 are weights.
9 Choosing weights in this linear program can be see as
constructing a “hypothetical firm” that serves as the benchmark for firm k and produces on
the production frontier. The condition in (5.1c) constraints the output of this hypothetical
firm to be greater or equal to the output of firm k. Condition (5.1b) then states input of
firm k, multiplied with the score θk, is smaller or equal to the input of the hypothetical firm.
Condition (5.1d) contains non-negativity constraints. The program (5.1) needs to be solved
for each firm k separately.
As shown, for example, in Tulkens [1993, pp. 187-190] other variants of DEA or FDH
efficiency scores are similar linear programs. Accounting for additional restrictions on the
production function means to add constraints on the weights λ. The linear program to
calculate efficiency scores based on the FDH-step-function is derived by adding the constraints
λk1 + λ
k
2 + λ
k
3 = 1 and λ
k
1, λ
k
2, λ
k
3 ∈ {0, 1}, for example.
DEA- and FDH efficiency scores are bounded to be not greater than unity by construction.
Their statistical properties (they are estimates of the production frontier) are an active area
of research. It is an open question whether the numbers calculated can be seen as an accurate
estimation of ‘true” inefficiency. Grosskopf [1996] is an early survey, that focuses on the
relevance statistical inference of DEA/FDH-methods for applied research.10 Cherchye / Post
9 The problem can easily extended to the case of more inputs and more outputs and a larger sample. The
calculation of output orientated efficiency scores follows the same idea. See Coelli et al. [2005, p. 163] or any
textbook on DEA analysis.
10 Seiford [1996] describes the evolution of DEA-refinements since Charnes et al. [1978].
An issue that received a lot of attention in the literature but is not covered in this section is that of slacks. An
input or output slack occurs in a DEA analysis because of the piecewise linearity of the efficiency frontier.
Consider a production unit that has been identified as being inefficient. This inefficiency in input-orientation
is then measured in comparison to the (piecewise-linear) efficiency frontier. It may happen that the implied
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Definitions of a few key concepts in productivity and efficiency analysis
This box provides definitions of some concepts recurrently used in the analysis of efficiency
and productivity of productions processes. This analysis is usually applied to private
firms which convert inputs into outputs. But in principle, efficiency and productivity
analysis can be applied to all organisations that use inputs in order to produce outputs.
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Productivity is the ratio of outputs over in-
puts: outputsinputs or
y
x
. In the figure, the slope
of the solid straight lines measure the pro-
ductivity of the input-output combinations
A, B and C. When there is more than a single
input and/or a single output, it is necessary
to aggregate inputs and/or outputs into an
index in order to calculate the productivity
ratio.
Total factor productivity is a measure of pro-
ductivity that includes all factors of produc-
tion (labour, capital, land,...). An example
of partial factor productivity is, for example,
labour productivity.
The production frontier is the maximum out-
put attainable for a given given input. In
the Figure, this is the solid line 0F that reflects the current state of technology of using
input x to produce output y.
A firm that produces technically efficiently produces an output that is on the production
frontier (points C and B in the Figure). A firm that is producing beneath the production
frontier (like the one marked with point A), is producing inefficiently. Note that the
productivities of firms C and B are different.
The feasible production set in the Figure consist of all combinations of x and y on and
below the line 0F. An implicit assumption is that inputs and outputs are infinitely
divisible.
A question that is separate from that of being efficient is whether a firm produces at
its optimal scale. Obviously, whether there are economies of scale a firm can possibly
exploit by choosing its optimal size depends on the underlying production technology.
If the underlying technology is one that exhibits constant returns to scale, there is no
optimal firm size and improvements of productivity can never be the result of choosing
an optimal scale of production.
Technical change means a change in the state of the technology (over time), i.e. a shift
of the production function 0F in the Figure.
The possible sources of improvements in productivity of a firm can be: a) higher efficiency
by moving closer to the production frontier b) exploitation of scale economies (movement
along the efficiency frontier) and c) technical change that improves the output for any
given input (movement of the frontier).
Note that a profit-maximising firm that can employ several inputs to produce one (or
more) outputs needs to solve the problem of an optimal input-mix. (And, additionally,
that of an optimal output-mix, when there is more than one output.) This gives rise to
the concept of allocative efficiency.
Based on Coelli et al. [2005, ch. 1]
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[2003] discuss newer results in the literature. The discussion in the literature has several
persistent topics:
noisy data, outliers The fact that DEA/FDH approaches are non-parametric means that
all observed data points are considered to belong to the feasible production set. The
frontier is a hull around the observed data, including possible outliers. Hence, it might
be necessary to adjust DEA/FDH-estimates of efficiency frontiers for measurement
error and other sources of randomness. For the detection of outliers, Wilson [1993] has
suggested a detection method that is not based on OLS-residuals. Simar [2007] dicusses
the problems of several ideas in the literature to account for noisy data and outliers. He
also proposes a “stochastic DEA/FDH approach” that performs well both in simulated
examples and with real data.
bias The DEA (and also FDH) estimator of the production frontier is “obviously biased”
Gijbels et al. [1999, p. 221]”. Consider the estimation of a production frontier, for
example DEA-VRS in Figure 5.1. Add another observation that is above the estimated
frontier. In a sample that includes this additional observation, the frontier needed
to be adjusted upwards. Note that this problem is different from that of noisy data.
It occurs even if the data on inputs and outputs could be considered to be without
measurement or specification error. It is less severe the larger the sample is compared
to the population. Coelli et al. [2005, p. 202] rightly stress that in the presence of
statistical noise an additional bias with an undetermined direction is introduced that
cannot be dealt with by bootstrapping-methods.
convergence / curse of dimensionality A very general property of an estimator is its con-
sistency. It has been shown that both DEA and FDH-estimates of the efficiency border
are consistent. But the rate of convergence can be small, where the rate of convergence
depends negatively on the number of inputs and outputs used, see Banker [1993], Park
et al. [2000], Kneip et al. [1998]. Especially for the FDH-method, the distribution of
the estimates is known and hence in principle it is possible to infer from estimated
efficiency scores to their true value and a confidence band. References can be found,
for example, in Simar / Wilson [2000b]. But this knowledge about the distribution is
limited to asymptotic properties. Most studies that can be found in the literature must
be considered to deal with datasets of small sample size. The increasing number of
published research on the statistical properties of DEA/FDH estimates in small samples
is therefore highly relevant for applied research.
bias correction / bootstrapping One way to correct the bias in a small sample used for
DEA/FDH estimation is to apply bootstrap procedures. [Simar / Wilson 2000b,
p. 57] argue that this is the preferred method to correct the bias and calculate
confidence intervals. The alternative would be to estimate the parameters of the
distribution of FDH/DEA scores. This is problematic as additional noise is introduced.
In the case of DEA, the asymptotic results are limited to the one-input one-output
case. The procedures suggested in Simar / Wilson [1998, 2000a], Kneip et al. [2003]
are implemented in the FEAR package [Wilson 2007, 2008a,b]. Unfortunately, the
implementation is limited to the DEA-method. Moreover, in a recent paper co-authored
by the same authors, a new bootstrapping procedure is suggested for the case of a
possibility of input reduction is understated, see Coelli et al. [2005, p. 164] for an illustration. However, the
problem is solely due to the non-smoothness of the estimated efficiency frontier. The larger the sample used in
a DEA analysis is, the better is the approximation of a smooth production surface by the piecewise-linear
DEA-frontier and the less severe the issue of slacks. Coelli et al. [2005, p. 199] therefore consider the problem
of slacks to be exaggerated. See also Ferrier / Lovell [1990].
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DEA estimation under the assumption of variable returns to scale, see Kneip et al.
[forthcoming]. It is based on new results about the distribution of the estimator in the
case of an arbitrary number of inputs and outputs. This procedure has to my knowledge
not yet been implemented in a software package. Overall, bootstrapping might be an
alternative to methods based on estimation, especially in small samples. But to date,
a common sense about a proper bootstrapping method to be applied in the various
applications of DEA/FDH does not exist in the literature, especially as the literature
about bootstrapping DEA/FDH-estimates is dominated by only two researchers. So
far, also in terms of availability in software packages, bootstrapping is possible in the
case of DEA with variable returns to scale. This is a possible cure for the bias caused
by sampling variability. For FDH-analysis, Jeong / Simar [2006] suggest not to use
bootstrapping for the bias correction, but a “smoothed” version of the FDH-estimator
they claim to be unbiased. However, the problem that the DEA estimates suffer from
statistical noise in the input- and output-data remains.
2-stage procedures, environmental variables A possibility to account for noise would be
to use the efficiency scores as dependent variables in a regression that then allows
naturally for an error term. Such a 2-stage procedure is an attempt not only to calculate
efficiency score but furthermore to explain them, where statistical noise is one possible
explanation.
In the DEA/FDH-literature, two-stage methods have been used to examine the impact
of “environmental variables” on the performance of firms. For example, the production
of vegetables depends on the general climate conditions. A general problem is whether
the explanatory variables in the second-stage should be included in the DEA analysis
in the first stage or not. An ad-hoc solution is to include in the first stage the variables
that are “traditional inputs”under the control of the management of the firm. The
variables that describe (relevant) characteristics of the environment a firm operates in are
included in the second-stage, see [Coelli et al. 2005, p.194]11. For the case in which the
2-stage procedure is meant to account for statistical noise of the input-output data, in
addition to environmental (or “contextual”) variables, the error term demands a certain
specification known from the parametric estimation of production frontiers. Banker
/ Natarajan [2008] specify the error term “as consisting of three distinct components:
a linear function of multiple, possibly correlated, contextual variables; a one-sided
inefficiency term; and a two-sided random noise term bounded above” (p. 49). They
also show that the resulting estimate is consistent. Note that the problem arising from
a small bias is not addressed by this procedure. As efficiency scores are truncated, a
truncated regression rather than an OLS procedure might be necessary.
There are many studies that use Tobit regressions to account for the upper bound of the
efficiency scores. But the Tobit model, also known as “censored normal regression”, is
applicable only in situations where in principle, observations of the dependent variable
are normally distributed, but observation beyond a limit value are not observed, for
example because they are censored. In a Tobit model, there are observations where
the value of the dependent variable is unknown (censored) but the corresponding value
of the independent variable is available. A truncated regression should be used if
both dependent and independent variables are missing from the data if they meet a
certain criteria. In the case of DEA/FDH estimates, efficiency scores are truncated
by construction, not because of censoring. Both observations for dependent and
11 Introducing environmental variables could also be seen as relaxing the implicit assumption that firm share a
common technology [Simar / Zelenyuk 2007].
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independent variables are available. Hence the truncated regression model, not the
Tobit model, correctly accounts for the upper bound of DEA/FDH estimates. See, for
example Maddala [1992, ch. 8]. See also the appendix of Simar / Wilson [2007, pp.
58-59] for a discussion about the choice between Tobit and truncated regression in the
context of DEA analysis and why truncated regressions are to be preferred over Tobit.
An alternative would be to use log-transformed efficiency scores in the second-stage,
see for example Banker / Johnston [1995], Puig-Junoy [1998].
Simar / Wilson [2007] criticise two-stage FDH/DEA-methods as being improper: “A
[...] serious problem in all of the two-stage studies that we have found arises from
the fact that DEA efficiency estimates are serially correlated. Consequently, standard
approaches to inference – used in all but two of the studies we have seen that employ the
two-stage approach – are invalid.” The serial correlation is related to the small-sample
bias already discussed. Changing the position relative to the efficiency frontier of one
observation is likely to have an influence on the estimated efficiency of other observations.
Not surprisingly, Simar / Wilson [2007] propose a bootstrap method that has been used
in Afonso / Aubyn [2006a,b].
inefficiency and perfect competition DEA/FDH methods aim to describe the inefficiency
of some firms relative to an efficiency frontier. This means that markets somehow are
not competitive as inefficient producers would be sorted out otherwise.12 The deviations
from optimal production are an interesting information by itself. Varian [1990] suggests
to use those deviations as a measure for the goodness-of-fit. They can also be used to
think about the reasons (market-failures) that allow inefficient firms to survive, an idea
already contained in Farrell [1957].
Summing up, DEA/FDH-tools for productivity and efficiency analysis have been widely
used for a long time. But only recently have the statistical foundations been subject to
closer inspection. There is no free lunch. The advantage of DEA/FDH-methods being
non-parametric comes at the cost that it is much more difficult to understand the statistical
properties of estimates of the production frontier and individual scores of (in)efficiency. A
DEA/FDH estimator that accounts for noise and is unbiased and allows to calculate confidence
bands even in small samples is not (yet) available. For applied research this means the usual
caveat applies that results based on DEA/FDH should be interpreted with caution.13
Another point is that recent techniques are not well implemented in standard Software
packages. There is a wide variety of specialized tools for DEA- and, to a lesser extent,
FDH-analysis. See Barr [2004] for a comparison. The tool chosen for this study is FEAR
provided at no cost by Paul Wilson (2007, 2008a, 2008b) as it is well documented and
implements some of the bootstrap methodologies mentioned above.14
In this study, both FDH- and DEA-methods are used. The next section presents the data
that is used to measure inputs and outputs. Then an FDH-analysis of a sample of 32 countries
will be presented and the results compared to those of Afonso et al. [2005]. DEA-methods,
12 A possible explanation for inefficient firms to survive can be found in a model with heterogeneous firms,
differentiated products and trade. See Melitz [2003] for a very influential model in which the exposure to trade
is a key determinant for driving inefficient firms out of the market.
13 There are also attempts to develop alternative nonparametric estimators of production frontiers. See, for
example, Cazals et al. [2002], Martins-Filho / Yao [2007].
14 FEAR is distributed as an package for R, an open-source statistical program that is widely used [R Development
Core Team 2008]. However, the source code of FEAR is not open and it is not possible to adjust FEAR according
to individual needs. Note that is straightforward to write a package for Stata that allows to calculate
DEA/FDH-scores and efficiency frontiers. See Baum [2008, pp. 52-54].
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including bootstrapping, are used in a larger sample of 74 countries and a time span of
15 years (1985, 1990, 1995, 2000) where sufficient data about inputs and outputs could be
collected. In a last step, the DEA-scores of efficiency are used as the dependent variable in a
regression that aims to explore the pattern of public-sector efficiency across the 74 countries
in the sample.
5.3 Measuring output and input of public-sector production
Efficiency analysis of any production process is based on the measurement of inputs and
outputs. In case of a firm that hires workers and rents capital and other inputs and sells its
products in product markets, it is, in principle, possible to observe prices and quantities of
inputs and outputs or cost and revenue. For the public sector, it is not straightforward to
define what the output of the production process is. Furthermore it is difficult to measure
prices and quantities, especially on the output side.
The three major problems of input and output measurement in the public sector are: prices,
quantities, quality. The public sector typically provides non-market goods and services, hence
prices are usually not observed. As far as information about prices is available, these prices
are not the result of demand and supply on competitive markets but set by the public sector.
Quantities are easier to observe, but data like the number of lectures given at universities
is usually not available, in particular not for cross-country studies that include non-OECD
countries. Furthermore, information about the quality of public services can usually be found
in case studies of very specific sub-units of the public sector for only a few countries.15 Given
these difficulties especially on the output side, one has been willing to accept very crude
measures of public sector production.
In this study, the public sector of a country is understood as a production unit that aims
to provide good policy outcomes in several policy fields using tax revenue as an input. The
performance of public policy is measured by variables that reflect whether a country’s public
sector is successful, for example, in providing health care. The measured success is then
interpreted as an output measure. The inputs will be measured by public expenditure.
15 Several statistical offices, responsible for the national accounts, explored whether quality-adjusted output
measurement could be routinely done at least for some public sector activities like education. In Germany, the
Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) seems to be sceptical, see Mayer [2001] and Statistisches
Bundesamt [2003]. For the revisions in the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the Atkinson Review [Atkinson
2005] , see UK Centre for the Measurement of Government Activity, Office for National Statistics [2005].
On the other hand, there are a number of projects in several countries and within the World Bank. A relatively
recent development in this respects is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, see Kaufmann et al.
[2008]. In version VII, the governance indicators cover a wide range of countries and the period 1996-1997, see
their website www.govindicators.org for recent developments in this project.
Within the World Bank System, another rating is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).
It evaluates the quality of a country’s policies and institutional arrangements in four clusters (economic
management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity and public sector management and
institutions). They are prepared since the 1970s, but the first year for which the numbers are published is
2005. Furthermore, it does not cover developed countries in the world and the variation in the data is not very
strong. They are used internally to allocate IDA-resources among eligible countries. Hence, it is likely that the
numbers are not immune against the influence of lobbying and political negotiations. The IDA (International
Development Association) is one of the lending channels of the World Bank, tailored to the poorest countries
in the world.
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5.3.1 Output measurement: public-sector performance
The five policy fields and the variables that measure how good a public sector performs (how
much output it produces) considered in this study are listed below. Summary statistics and
data sources can be found in the appendix. The internal names of variables are those that
are typeset in a typewriter font.
administrative quality How good is the quality of the administration? I measure this aspect
of public policy by several indices contained in the Economic Freedom of the World
published by the Fraser Institute [Gwartney / Lawson 2007]. The variables used
are: Structure and security of property rights (efw_area2), Access to sound money
(efw_area3), Regulation of credit, labor, and business (efw_area5).
education The ability of the public sector to provide education is measured by its success to
provide at least elementary education for every citizen (percentage of no schooling in
the total population, adults of age 25 or older, balee_lu) and higher education for as
many people as possible (percentage of secondary school complete in the total population,
adults of age 15 or older, balee_lsc15). The data is taken from Barro / Lee [2001].
health care The output of the health care system is measured by life expectancy at birth
(life_exp).
infrastructure One of the major activities of the public sector is to provide infrastructure. The
variables used in this study to measure infrastructure are Air transport, registered carrier
departures world-wide (airtrans_rcdw_rel) and Telephone mainlines (tel_mainl),
both per 1 000 people.
economic stability & performance The performance of the public sector to stabilise the
economy and to promote economic growth is measured by the following variables: The
moving average of the annual inflation rate (inf_gdpdefl_ma), the coefficient of vari-
ation of inflation (inf_var), the moving average of real GDP per capita (pwt_cgdp_ma),
the moving average of the growth rate of real GDP per capita (pwt_grgdpch_ma) and
the coefficient of variation of the real GDP per capita (gdp_var). The data is taken
from the Penn World Tables (PWT) and the World Development Indicators (WDI),
see the appendix for further details.
It is obvious that the selected variables provide only a crude measure of the success of
public sector activities. The selection has been carried out following several guidelines. As
one of the goals of this study is to check the robustness of the results in Afonso et al. [2005],
I tried to maintain important aspects of their approach to the measurement of public-sector
performance and efficiency. Hence, the policy fields are roughly the same as in their paper.
Secondly, I tried to use similar variables for the measurement of the outcomes of public policy
in the different policy fields. On the other hand, an important goal was to include as many
observations, i.e. countries and years, as possible in the analysis. The core of the paper by
Afonso et al. [2005] is an an FDH-analysis with 23 countries for the year 2000. For the year
1990, an index for public-sector performance is calculated in addition. A potential problem
with the analysis of Afonso et al. [2005] is that 23 observations are by far too few observations
to overcome the curse of dimensionality problem mentioned above (see page 71). On the
basis of these principles – comparability with Afonso et al. [2005] and as many observations
as possible given the constraint of data availability – in mind, a panel data set containing
all countries has been created, with observation from the 1950s until 2005. Then possible
variables measuring the public sectors output and public expenditure have been selected,
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where missing values for each candidate variable reduce the panel to less years and countries.
For example, the inclusion of the Gini index to measure the success of redistributive public
policies makes the sample shrink considerably.16 In order to keep the sample reasonably large,
many variables that are possibly better indicators of public-sector performance had to be
discarded.17
In order to permit a comparison of public-sector performance across the five policy fields
mentioned above, I follow Afonso et al. [2005] and calculate “Public-Sector Performance (PSP)
Indicators” for each field. These indicators are calculated by centering each variable around
the mean of all observations and all years and then using a unweighted average of all variables
per policy field as PSP-index. The average outcome per policy field then is measured with an
index value of unity. The PSP-index for a country that performs better than the average is
greater than one and vice versa. Finally, an overall PSP index is calculated as the mean of
the sub-indices for each country and year. More formally, consider i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} countries,
j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} policy areas, y ∈ {1985, ..., 2000} years and k ∈ {1, 2, ..., l} variables xijyk
measuring the success of public policy in country i in area j and year y. Then the index
measuring the success of country i in policy area j in year y is defined as
PSPjiy =
∑l
k=1
xijyk
xjk
l
, (5.2)
where
xjk =
∑2000
y=1985
∑n
i=1 xijyk
4 · n
is the mean of variable xijyk over all countries and the four years in the sample.
xijyk
xjk
stands
for the k’th variable in policy area j, centered around the mean. The result is a panel dataset
for n countries, over the year 1985 until 2000, with PSP-indices for the five policy areas
and an PSP-index covering all policy areas, calculated as the average of PSP1-PSP5.18 The
numbers are reported below.19 Note that this approach allows to compare the PSP score
across countries and across time.
This approach of measuring the output of public sector activities has the advantage that it
is possible to construct a large data set of output measures. But of course there are numerous
problems. Obviously, policy targets in a field like education are more complex than simply
increasing the number of degrees that an educational system produces. In health care, the
aim is not only to increase the life expectancy. However, the choice of variables depends
crucially on data availability. For this study, where the sample covers both developed and
developing countries, variables were chosen in a way that provides enough potential variability
for all countries in the sample. An implicit assumption is that the actual policy targets
can be approximated by the variables chosen. Furthermore, the definition of the five policy
16 UNU-WIDER [2008] is an very useful attempt to collect and consolidate national data on income distribution.
However, for the purpose of this study, not enough observations are available.
17 See, for example, Afonso / Aubyn [2006a] for a cross-country study about education provision and Afonso /
Aubyn [2006b, 2007] for a similar study about national health care systems. Restricting a study to a specific
public sector activity and to a subset of coutries (usually the OCED) improves data availability noticeable.
18 Taking a simple average as an overall PSP-index ignores that different policy fields could be valued differently
in different societies. This is ignored in the calculation of the overall PSP-index. It is therefore an output
measure that is based on a common standard applied to all countries, where a low output in a particular
country could simply reflect that the output is not valued a lot. See footnote 29.
19 Where necessary, the variables have been recoded such that higher values reflect better outcomes. An
example is the variable percentage of no schooling in the total population. See the appendix for details.
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fields is somehow arbitrary. For example, internal and external security have been left out
although they are classic issues the public sector takes care of. This is less problematic as
long as it is possible to match the policy fields on the input side. As long as the purpose
of the expenditure used for the input measurement matches the policy field, leaving parts
of the activities of the public sector is possible. It must be kept in mind, however, that the
measurement of public-sector performance and efficiency covers only the policy fields listed
above. It could well be that a country that performs badly in all areas looked at in this study
performs well in other areas.
5.3.2 Input measurement: public expenditure
The input side of the production process in the five policy areas is measured by public
expenditure. Ideally, each PSP-index is matched with functional expenditure data that is
spent with the purpose to improve public policy in the same area. The availability of national
expenditure data, disaggregated by purpose of spending and consolidated to account for
lower than national levels of government, is very limited. For this study, the time series
from the IMF Government Finance Statistics, Historical Series (consolidated government20)
[IMF 2006] and the Penn World Tables (PWT) [Heston et al. 2006] have been used .21 The
expenditure data used to match the PSP-indices in the several policy areas is:
expenditure policy area 1 - administrative quality Expenditure of the government on goods
and services (exp_imf_econ1_real).22
expenditure policy area 2 - education Expenditure of the government on education affairs
and services (exp_imf_4_real).
expenditure policy area 3 - health care Expenditure of the government on health affairs
and services (exp_imf_5_real).
expenditure policy area 4 - infrastructure Capital expenditure of the government. This ex-
penditure category is used as an approximation of public investment
(exp_imf_econIV_real).
expenditure policy area 5 - economic stability & performance Total expenditure
and lending minus repayments (exp_imf_econI_real). The amount of total spending
can be seen as a proxy for the government activities to stabilise the economy and to
promote economic growth.
expenditure overall public-sector performance The IMF-GFS historical expenditure data
is very limited in coverage. Therefore, I use another measure of public expenditure that
covers all policy areas 1-5 and is based on the Penn World Tables only (Real govern-
20 The “consolidated government” expenditure data covers all national and subnational government layers.
21 The IMF-GFS historical series is in local currency. For the purpose of this study, the data has been converted
in expenditure measured in percent of GDP and then multiplied with the the real gross domestic product per
capita from the PWT, measured om International Dollar in current prices (International Dollar in Current
Prices) (pwt_cgdp). Note that this version of the real GDP is comparable across countries, but not over time,
see Summers / Heston [1991, p. 347] for a discussion about the relative merits of using different variants of
PWT GDP data. The appendix contains a few notes about the usage of IMF-GFS historical series.
22 The appendix contains detailed definitions of the variables. Note that the IMF-GFS historical series contains
both expenditure data that is categorised by function and by economic type. The expenditure data from
the IMF-GFS historical series and from the Penn World Tables are not comparable, as they are compiled
following different conventions (IMF [1986] vs. United Nations [2001]).
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ment expenditure per capita, exp_gov_pwt_pc_real).23 It covers final consumption
expenditure as defined in the System of National accounts (SNA, see United Nations
[2001]) and therefore excludes social transfers.24 The SNA contains a broad and a
narrow definition of government final consumption. The Penn World Tables are based
on the broad definition that includes, for example, individual consumption goods and
services like education and health care.25
For the efficiency analysis to be presented below, the moving averages (current year and
the four preceding years) of the six expenditure variables have been used to account for
business-cycle effects. The expenditure data has been converted to real expenditure in
international dollars according to the conventions in the Penn World Tables. The usage of
expenditure data as a proxy for input implicitly assumes that input prices are equal across
countries. This is a strong assumption but the Penn World Tables try to account for that.
The real expenditure data used is measured in per capita terms. Afonso et al. [2005]
use expenditure data measured in percent of GDP. But in a sample where the GDP differs
substantially, this is not a valid approach. A poor country that devotes, say, 10 percent of
GDP to some activity commands over less real resources than a rich country that spends 10
percent of GDP to the same activity.26
Obviously, the expenditure data available for this study on the one hand and the policy
targets that are taken as a measure for the results of public spending on the other hand
do not match perfectly. Although reasonable expenditure data is available for the policy
areas of education and health care, rather crude expenditure categories need to be used for
the other areas. This problem is prevalent in this study and also in Afonso et al. [2005].
The expenditure categories used in this study are roughly the same in their paper, with the
exception that redistribution as a policy field is not looked at in this study. Accordingly, the
measure for overall public expenditure does not contain social transfers as well.
For the efficiency analysis presented below, one has to keep in mind that surprising results
can first of all be caused by measurement error and misspecification on the input or on the
output side. It is difficult to argue whether the PSP-indices used in this study systematically
overestimate or underestimate the “true performance”. Also note that the preferences of
citizens in the different countries are not taken into account. But even in a hypothetical
country where citizens do not care much about the five policy areas that are under closer
inspection in this study, there should be an interest that the public sector operates close
to the efficiency border. However, when interpreting public-sector performance indices and
23 It has been calculated as pwt_rgdpl · pwt_kg. As this variable is used for comparisons over time, the real
GDP based on a Laspeyre-Index needs to be used [Summers / Heston 1991, p. 347].
24 A warning might be appropriate. As the data from the Penn World Tables follows the conventions of
the SNA, that by itself is somehow special in its treatment of government expenditure (broad vs. narrow
definition), the numbers from the Penn World are substantially lower than those published frequently in the
media or in studies that deal with smaller samples like the OECD countries. The numbers of the government
share given in the Penn World Tables are substantially lower than those frequently seen, see IMF, Fiscal Affairs
Department [1995] for an example. They exclude expenditure for social security. They include government
military expenditures that are part of governmental capital formation. The treatment of the public sector
in the System of National accounts [United Nations 2001] is rather complicated and sometimes confusing.
A description of national accounting standards on an international level, such as Brümmerhoff [2007] for
Germany, is missing.
25 United Nations Economic and Social Council [2004] contains a useful discussion about the distinction of
broad vs. narrow government consumption. The “serious defect” in applying the broad definition consistently
mentioned in United Nations Economic and Social Council [2004, p. 6] has been corrected in the current
version of the PWT.
26 However, the results turned out to be roughly the same using expenditure data in percent of GDP.
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efficiency scores, one should not confuse the utility derived from publicly provided goods and
services, or the “happiness” of people, with the issue how well the public sector performs in
terms of output.
5.3.3 Public-sector performance in two different samples
The subsequent analysis is done with two different samples. The first sample contains 32
countries in a cross section for the year 1990. These are the countries where expenditure
data for all five policy areas is available. The second sample contains 74 countries and the
years 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. A list of all countries together with their abbreviated
names can be found in Table A8 in the appendix (page 99). The smaller sample is used in
a FDH-analysis. I refer to it as the “FDH-sample” in the following. The results are then
compared to those of Afonso et al. [2005]. The larger sample contains the input and output
data for an DEA efficiency analysis that employs the bootstrap and two-stage estimation
techniques discussed earlier (section 5.2). It is henceforth referred to as “DEA-sample”.
Public-sector performance results (FDH-sample)
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for the output measurement for the smaller sample. All
PSP-indices have a mean of unity (by construction). The variation of the sub-indices differs
across the five policy areas, with the subindex for health care having a very low variability.
This reflects that the health care index is composed of only one variable (life expectancy)
that has a mean of seventy years and a standard deviation of seven years (See the codebook
in the appendix, Table A9.). The detailed results for the Public-Sector Performance can be
found in the appendix (Table A12)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PSP area 1: Administrative Quality 1.000 0.223 0.646 1.346 32
PSP area 2: Education 1.000 0.474 0.195 2.123 32
PSP area 3: Health 1.000 0.101 0.758 1.102 32
PSP area 4: Infrastructure 1.000 0.902 0.014 2.919 32
PSP area 5: econ. stability & performance 1.000 0.416 0.131 1.710 32
overall PSP 1.000 0.370 0.465 1.667 32
Table 5.1: Summary statistics for the PSP indices in the FDH-sample
Figure 5.2 plots the overall Public-Sector Performance Index (the average of PSP1-PSP5)
as a function of the KOF Index of Globalisation, an index that measures the economic,
political and cultural globalisation of a country [Dreher 2006, Dreher et al. 2008]. The plot
seems to suggest that more globalized countries perform better in terms of public good and
services provision. But this is of course not a statement about causal relationships. In the
regression analysis presented below, globalisation will be used as a proxy for the intensity of
interjurisdictional competition. The idea that interjurisdictional competition might have a
positive impact on public-sector efficiency is then explored more carefully, see section 5.5.
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Figure 5.2: Public-sector performance and globalization (FDH-sample).
Public-sector performance Results (DEA-sample)
The performance indices have been calculated separately for the DEA-sample. This is
necessary as the PSP-indices are relative measures that are sensible to sample selection. Table
5.2 reports summary statistics. The pattern of the standard deviation is similar to the one
for the FDH-sample, suggesting that it is a result of the choice of variables, not one that is
sample-dependent.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PSP area 1: Administrative Quality 1.000 0.241 0.328 1.514 296
PSP area 2: Education 1.000 0.530 0.077 2.688 296
PSP area 3: Health 1.000 0.142 0.575 1.196 296
PSP area 4: Infrastructure 1.000 1.101 0.007 5.833 296
PSP area 5: econ. stability & performance 1.000 0.581 -0.780 3.023 296
overall PSP 1.000 0.444 0.244 2.244 296
Table 5.2: Summary statistics for the PSP indices in the DEA-sample, 1985-2000
The DEA-sample contains four observation per country. The way the PSP-indizes are
calculated implies that comparisons across time and across countries are possible. A country
can be compared against itself in different years. A closer inspection of the full list of all results
– see the appendix, Table A13 – reveals that the public-sector performance has improved
for most countries over time, relative to the average performance over all countries and all
years. This is mainly due to improvements in area 5 (economic stability and performance),
see Figure A10 in the appendix.27
27 All PSP-indices seem to have a trend, albeit this is difficult to judge with only four observations in the time
dimension.
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An overview about the geographical scope of the DEA-Sample is provided in Figure 5.3
showing a world map of Public-Sector Performance for the year 1990. The darker the colour
of an area is, the better the performance of the public sector. Countries on the same continent
tend to have similar values for public-sector performance. In Europe and North America, for
example, most countries have PSP-indices in the upper quartile.
PSP0:
[0.24,0.62]
(0.62,0.87]
(0.87,1.33]
(1.33,1.87]
No data
Figure 5.3: A world map (with blanks) of public-sector performance. (DEA-sample, 1990)
5.4 Efficiency analysis
A well performing public sector benefits the citizens of a country and supports production
in the private sector. On the other hand, the inputs used in the public sector are lost for
private consumption or as an input in private production. It is therefore important to include
public expenditure in an evaluation of the public sector. This is done in the next step of the
analysis, again separately for the two samples.
5.4.1 FDH-Analysis in the small sample
One goal of this study is to provide an robustness check for the results in Afonso et al. [2005].
In their paper, a sample of OECD countries is analysed using an FDH efficiency estimator.
Their results suggest that countries that are small in terms of public expenditure use resources
more efficiently than those with a bigger government. The robustness check will be done in a
slightly larger sample, for a different year, with roughly the same policy fields. The technique
is an FDH efficiency analysis in both studies.
I will calculate efficiency scores for each policy area separately. Figure 5.4 illustrates the
FDH-method for the policy field 4 (education). Input is measured in real expenditure per
capita, output by the PSP-index. The production frontier is constructed as a step function
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as shown in the figure. I calculate the efficiency score in output-orientation, meaning that
the input is held constant. For example, the FDH-score for Cyprus (CYP) is calculated as
quotient of the actual output of Cyprus divided by the output of its “peer”, Korea. Korea
produces a higher output with less inputs.28 As an overall efficiency score, I will use the
average of the efficiency scores of the five policy fields (fdh_av).29 The results are reported
in Table 5.3.
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Figure 5.4: An illustration of the FDH-efficiency analysis
28 Note that in the example, Cyprus could not only produce more output given its input. It could also reduce
its input and still produce as much as Korea. This an example of a slack, see footnote 10.
29 This means that all five policy areas receive an equal weight in the overall efficiency score. I also calculated
an FDH-efficiency score that takes PSP0 as an output measure and exp_gov_pwt_pc_real as an input measure.
The results did not differ substantially, indicating that the weights attached to the different policy fields are
not driving the results in the FDH-sample.
Another possibility – different from assuming equal weights as I have done — to attach weights that reflect the
relative importance of the different policy areas would be to rely on survey, as has been done for a study about
health care system by the World Health organisation. See Smith / Street [2005, p. 409] and references therein.
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Table 5.3: Public-sector efficiency for the FDH-sample. The table shows the FDH-scores
for the five subareas (fdh1-5) separately and the mean of fdh1-5 as fdh_av. The
table is sorted by fdh_av.
country y
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CHE Switzerland 1990 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.97
DNK Denmark 1990 0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.95
CAN Canada 1990 1.00 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.89
KOR Korea. Rep. 1990 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.86
FIN Finland 1990 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.87 0.60 0.86
IRL Ireland 1990 1.00 0.57 0.96 1.00 0.74 0.85
GBR United Kingdom 1990 0.93 0.62 0.98 0.63 1.00 0.83
AUS Australia 1990 0.96 0.62 0.99 0.72 0.83 0.83
BOL Bolivia 1990 0.79 0.37 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.81
DEU Germany 1990 0.93 1.00 0.97 0.42 0.71 0.81
IDN Indonesia 1990 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.04 1.00 0.80
FRA France 1990 0.93 0.52 0.99 0.57 0.91 0.79
CYP Cyprus 1990 0.77 0.56 1.00 0.60 0.97 0.78
AUT Austria 1990 0.95 0.65 0.98 0.46 0.77 0.76
BHR Bahrain 1990 0.85 0.33 0.93 0.68 0.83 0.72
CHL Chile 1990 1.00 0.61 0.98 0.17 0.64 0.68
COL Colombia 1990 0.74 0.44 0.96 0.19 1.00 0.67
BRA Brazil 1990 0.64 0.38 0.89 1.00 0.32 0.65
CRI Costa Rica 1990 1.00 0.45 0.98 0.23 0.56 0.64
COG Congo. Rep. 1990 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.40 0.64
JAM Jamaica 1990 0.77 0.53 0.96 0.33 0.53 0.62
BRB Barbados 1990 0.77 0.44 0.96 0.28 0.65 0.62
DOM Dominican
Republic
1990 0.72 1.00 0.95 0.08 0.34 0.62
ISR Israel 1990 0.49 0.54 0.99 0.43 0.64 0.62
BEN Benin 1990 0.87 0.12 0.94 0.06 1.00 0.60
HND Honduras 1990 0.89 0.42 1.00 0.10 0.56 0.59
LKA Sri Lanka 1990 0.74 0.61 1.00 0.02 0.49 0.57
HUN Hungary 1990 0.72 0.63 0.93 0.12 0.41 0.56
EGY Egypt. Arab
Rep.
1990 0.83 0.35 0.87 0.04 0.67 0.55
KWT Kuwait 1990 0.52 0.47 0.97 0.24 0.35 0.51
CMR Cameroon 1990 0.98 0.24 0.83 0.02 0.13 0.44
IRN Iran. Islamic
Rep.
1990 0.71 0.37 0.91 0.07 0.13 0.44
On average, Switzerland has the most efficient public sector, followed by Denmark. The
countries that are ranked best according to the average efficiency measure can also be found
on the production frontier in several policy fields (FDH-score of 1). An interesting result is
that the ranking based on public-sector performance (PSP) is similar - countries that provide
high levels of public goods and services tend to have relatively efficient public sectors. A high
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output level is not an indicator for inefficiency.
But what about the “small is beautiful” result of Afonso et al. [2005]? Figure 5.5 plots the
efficiency score as a function of the government share of real GDP per capita (pwt_cg).30
The goverment shares of the three most efficient countries according to the FDH-analysis –
Switzerland, Canada and Denmark – cannot be characterised as being small. In the group of
countries with an average FDH-score above 0.8, there are countries with a public sector of
different size, most of them close to the median size. At least according to the results in this
study, the association of the “smallness” of the public sector with its efficiency is not justified.
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Figure 5.5: Efficiency of the public sector and government size. (FDH-sample)
According to Bjørnskov et al. [2007, p. 267], there are two polar views in the economics
profession about the size of the public sector. According to the authors, the “neoclassical
view” claims that “governments play unambiguously positive roles for individuals’ quality of
life, while the theory of public choice has been developed to understand why governments
often choose excessive involvement in – and regulation of – the economy, thereby harming
their citizens’ quality of life.” If the latter view is correct, it would be welfare-improving if the
government is decreased. One would then expect that smaller governments are more efficient,
as they interfere less in the economy and less real resources can be wasted by politicians.
30 The government share of real GDP per capita in the Penn World Tables is calculated based on nominal
expenditure taking the price level of government consumption into account. It could also be labelled “real
government share”. See Knowles [2001] and Dowrick [2005] for a review and a discussion of the PWT, including
a warning that the government share of poor countries might be overstated due to the calculation based on
international prices. However, the variable pwt_cg can be seen as representing the real resources devoted to
government activities. Because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the nominal exchange rate is undervalued
in terms of purchasing power for poor countries. The government consumption typically consists to a large
extend of non-traded goods and services. Therefore, the government share in the PWT for poor countries is
systematically higher than that found in national accounts.
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Labelling the theory of public choice as being antagonistic to the neoclassical theory as in
the quotation above is misleading. However, in the literature, there are the two mutually
exclusive assumptions of benevolent governments and governments that are seen as the result
of a political process and are not necessarily benevolent. The results in this study do not
suggest that smaller governments are less wasteful. Hence, it does not provide support for
the assumption of non-benevolent governments that should be disciplined, the smaller, the
better.31
In the next section, the sample is increased and the method of efficiency analysis changed
from FDH to DEA with bootstrapping. These efficiency scores will then be used in a
regression to explore possible explanations for the diversity of efficiency-scores across countries
empirically.
5.4.2 DEA-Analysis with bootstraping in the larger sample
It is possible to increase the sample from 32 to 74 countries by using the overall Performance
index PSP0 as the single output measure and the final consumption expenditure of the
government as the single input measure.32 The DEA approach assuming variable returns to
scale is used to analyse efficiency in the larger sample.33
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Year 1992.500 5.600 1985.000 2000.000 296
DEA score 0.622 0.164 0.145 1.000 296
bias 0.030 0.051 0.007 0.777 296
DEA score (bias corrected) 0.592 0.156 0.138 0.966 296
Table 5.4: Summary statistics for the DEA efficiency scores
Table 5.4 reports summary statistics for the DEA efficiency scores. The calculation of
the DEA-scores follows a similar procedure than that for the calculation of the FDH-scores.
The difference is that the efficiency frontier is not a step-function (see Figure 5.1 and the
discussion in section 5.2). The output-orientation is maintained.
The bias-corrected DEA-score is the result of applying the bootstrapping procedure
described in Simar / Wilson [2000a] and implemented in the software package FEAR, see the
reference on page 73. DEA (and FDH) efficiency measurement is sensitive for the inclusion of
individual observations. Each DEA efficiency score is relative to those of all other observations
in the sample. In a nutshell, the bootstrapping procedure repeatedly draws subsamples from
the 256 observations and corrects for the bias caused by the inclusion of an observation. A
bias correction is calculated for each observation, additional to a confidence interval.
31 Bjørnskov et al. [2007] claim that they contribute to the resolution of the question which of the two
assumptions is more realistic. They find in a regression analysis that people in countries with a smaller
government are happier.
32 I checked in the smaller FDH-sample whether the better match of inputs and outputs that is possible in the
smaller sample makes a big difference compared with the simpler approach used here. The results did not
differ much. This can be seen as a robustness check whether abandoning detailed functional expenditure data
has a big impact on the results.
33 Variable returns to scale is assumed because for a production process like the one considered here, stronger
assumptions like constant returns to scale cannot be justified by other empirical or theoretical studies. DEA
with variable returns to scale fits the data almost as tightly as the FDH-approach.
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Figure 5.6: The efficiency frontier (DEA-sample, 1985-2000).
The list of all results can be found in the appendix (Table A14). Figure 5.6 plots the input
and output data. The observations that define the efficiency frontier are labelled, i.e. those
that receive an uncorrected DEA-score of unity. These are Malawi in the year 1985, the
Central African Republic (2000), China (1985), Korea (1990) and Switzerland (2000). The
bias correction is moderate on average due to the relatively large number of observations. For
a few observations however, the bootstrapping procedure finds that their inclusion introduces
a strong bias. Malawi in 1985, for example, is an observation where the estimated bias is
particularly strong, followed by the Central African Republic in 2000. The intuition for
the relatively large bias that is attributed to those two observations is the following. In
a DEA analysis without bootstrapping, they are on the efficiency frontier, hence a lot of
other DEA-scores are influenced by their inclusion. Taking them out of the sample has a big
impact if there are not many other observation that can potentially play a similar role for
the definition of the efficiency frontier. This is the case for Malawi in 1985 and the Central
African Republic in 2000, but not for Switzerland in (2000).34
Figure 5.7 plots the bias-corrected efficiency scores as a function of the KOF globalization
index. A simple linear regression seems to suggest that more globalized countries are more
efficient, but the correspondence is not very strong. The next section explores this and other
relationships in the data more carefully.
With respect to the “small is beautiful” result of Afonso et al. [2005], which has already
been checked for its robustness in the FDH-sample, the result of the DEA analysis is similar.
Figure 5.8 plots the bias-corrected efficiency scores as a function of the government share
of real GDP per capita. Again, the government share of the countries with an efficiency
34 Note that given the presence of four observations per year for each country in the sample, the bootstrapping
procedure accounts for outliers in the sense that the data of a country varies a lot across
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score close to one is diverse. However, the public sectors of a few countries with a very high
goverment share operate far below the efficiency frontier.
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Figure 5.7: Public-sector efficiency and economic globalization (DEA-sample, 1985-2000).
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Figure 5.8: Public-sector efficiency and government share (DEA-sample, 1985-2000).
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5.5 Public-sector efficiency and interjurisdictional competition – a
second-stage estimation
In a DEA efficiency analysis, a second-stage estimation can be used to not only measure
inefficiency of firms (or countries), as has been done in the last section, but to explain it,
see section 5.2. The idea is that there might be circumstances that are not under control
of decision-making units responsible for the organisation of the production process. In the
context of this study, such circumstances are obvious. To build a railway line is much more
difficult in a mountainous country (Switzerland, Nepal) than in a country with a relatively
flat topography (Belgium, Netherlands).
In the theory of fiscal federalism, it has been argued that a possible determinant of public-
sector efficiency is the intensity of interjurisdictional competition for a mobile tax base. From
a theoretical point of view, the influence can go in both directions, depending on the set of
assumptions used. For example, in chapter 3 (or in Becker [2005]), where the government is
assumed to be a welfare maximiser and public-sector efficiency depends on past investment,
tax competition harms efficiency. The opposite effect is also possible, see, for example,
Edwards / Keen [1996], Rauscher [2000], Wilson [2005]. In a growth model, Rauscher [2005]
finds that it depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution whether “taming of the
Leviathan” occurs. The theoretical work on the issue of interjurisdictional competition as a
determinant of public sector efficiency so far does not come to an unambiguous result. The
goal of the estimation presented below is not to provide a test which of the two conflicting
views is supported by the data. Given the data available, it is not possible to simulate a
ceteris paribus experiment that controls for the assumptions usually taken in theoretic work
about public-sector modernisation. But “letting the data speak” can give an idea about the
importance and the sign of the intensity of interjurisdictional competition as an explanatory
variable.35
As a measure for the intensity of public-sector modernisation, I use the KOF index of
globalization [Dreher 2006, Dreher et al. 2008]. Ideally, one would like to measure factor
mobility, i.e. the ease of relocating taxable production factors to another jurisdiction. This
measure should not be based on, for example, actual cross-border flows of capital. The
actual flows of capital do not necessarily reflect that even with zero flows, there could
be a credible threat of moving capital out of a jurisdiction.36 In theoretical models of
capital-tax competition with perfect capital mobility and identical jurisdictions, there are
not necessarily cross-border flows of capital in the (long-run) equilibrium. But this does not
mean that capital does not flee the country in which capital tax rates are raised.37 The KOF
35 Oates [1985] tests whether the size of government is smaller in decentralised countries. The idea is that in
decentralised countries, the intensity of interjurisdictional countries should be higher and therefore, the public
sector should be smaller in decentralised countries if it is correctly described as a Leviathan that needs to be
tamed. He doesn’t find evidence for the Leviathan hypothesis and concludes that Perhaps, after all, Leviathan
is a mythical beast” Oates [1985, 756]. See also Oates [1989] and Anderson / van den Berg [1998] for a recent
test that does not find evidence for the Leviathan hypothesis.
36 Hence, measures of capital mobility based on the correlation between domestic savings and investment
[Feldstein / Horioka 1980] are not appropriate in this context. They should be seen as measures of actual
capital mobility, not of potential capital mobility. Coakley et al. [1998] review the literature about the claim
of Feldstein / Horioka [1980] that capital mobility is relatively small. See Hoffmann [2004], Caporale et al.
[2005], Christopoulos [2007], Evans et al. [2008] for recent re-estimations of the Feldstein-Horioka regression.
37 See, for example, Wilson [1986, p. 300], for a model where it is only the potential of capital movements that
matters for local governments when choosing their policy. Of course there are many models where even in
equilibrium, capital goods are traded. Davies [2003] is an example. But the essential point here is that the
actual flows of capital are not a good measure of the intensity of capital tax competition.
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data on globalisation contains sub-indices about economic, social and political globalisation.
The economic globalisation index is compiled from data about actual flows but also about
restrictions for trade and capital account transactions. I use the overall globalisation index
(kof_index) as a proxy for the mobility of the tax base, which in turn is a measure for
the intensity of interjurisdictional competition. The reasoning behind is that the political
and social dimension of the index captures barriers to mobility like language and cultural
differences or difficulties for foreign investors to adjust to another political system [Persson /
Tabellini 1992, Gordon / Bovenberg 1996].
Other possible explanatory variables that have an impact on public sector efficiency are
population density and two variables capturing attributes of the political system. Population
density (pwt_pop/landarea, 1000 people per sq. km) is a proxy for the urbanisation of
a country. Whether the urbanisation of a country offers cost-advantages or disadvantages
is not clear per se. The degree of agglomeration has an influence on property prices and
transport costs for example, but the overall effect on the efficiency of public goods and services
production is ambiguous, see, for example Geys et al. [2007, p. 10]. A political variable
considered is the Herfindahl-index of all political parties (pn_herftot). The reasoning behind
the inclusion of this index is that a higher concentration of political parties implies less
political competition and hence lower public-sector efficiency. While the KOF index of
globalisation might be a proxy for the elasticity of mobile tax bases internationally, it does
not capture whether there is competition within the country between different subnational
jurisdictions. I therefore include a federalism index (pn_Gerring) as another political variable.
The theoretical literature about fiscal federalism and public-sector efficiency can be interpreted
as statements about competition between countries or between lower levels of government.
The expected sign of the coefficient is therefore ambiguous, for the reasons discussed above.
I include time dummies in all regressions (year1990, year1995, year2000). The regression
analysis is done as a pooled cross section, hence including 296 (74 countries and 4 years)
observations of the dependent variable, the bias-corrected DEA efficiency score. The time
dummies capture possible time trends in the pattern of efficiency scores.38 Furthermore,
dummies for the continent a country belongs to are included as possible explanatory variables.
They allow to answer the question if the pattern of public-sector efficiency is similar to the
geographic dispersion of countries, perhaps because they share a common culture and history.
Another characteristic of the data is that it contains several observations per country.
This construction has the advantage that the number of observations is multiplied by four
compared with a procedure that looks at every year separately. The disadvantage is that
a country in different years is treated as if it was a different country. This ignores that
it is very likely that a country that performs well in 1985 performs similar well in later
years. It can be expected that the variance of the residual is not constant. I am therefore
using robust standard errors. A simple correlation matrix (not reported) does not indicate
any problems with multicollinearity. As has been argued above, see page 72, I am using a
trunctated regression approach, where the upper limit of the dependent variable is set to one,
the maximal possible efficiency score.
The selection of the estimated model follows a general-to-specific approach, where the
main explanatory variable of interest is the index of economic globalisation. In the absence
of an identification strategy, significance of globalisation – a proxy for the intensity of
interjurisdictional competition - would allow the statement that a relationship between
38 Note that four observations in time are not suitable to perform a time-series analysis. Hence a pooled
regression has been chosen to increase the number of observations.
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public-sector efficiency and interjurisdictional competition cannot be denied given the data I
have. A statement about causality is not possible.
Equation (1) in Table 5.5 corresponds to the simple linear fit in Figure 5.7. Economic
globalisation is a highly significant explanatory variable.39 As for all other equations, the
lower part of the table reports summary and diagnostic statistics. Under the heading “sigma
(St.E. of Estimate)”, the estimated standard error of the regression is reported. The lower
the estimated value is, the better the fit of the regression. The log pseudo-likelihood can be
used as relative measure to compare different models. A higher value indicates that the fit of
the model is better. And, finally, I report the Wald Chi-Square statistic. It can be used to
test the hypothesis that the coefficients for all variables in the model (except the constant)
are equal to zero. This hypothesis can be rejected for all regressions with a probability value
of 1% or less.
Equation (2) is the most general model estimated. It includes all variables that are possible
explanatory variables. Globalisation remains a significant variable. Most of the time and
regional dummies are significant. The goodness of fit of the model is improved compared to
model (1). The time dummies and a few of the continent dummies are significant. For the
political variables, I do not have observations for all countries. Hence, they are left out in
model (3) and will be considered separately. In equation (3), the globalisation measure, the
government share and population density are significant. Most regional and all time dummies
are significant as well. Equation (3) in Table 5.5 indicates40 that the pattern of inefficiency
in the sample can be explained by
• Time. Efficiency is higher in later years. For example, observations from the year 2000
on average improved their efficiency score by roughly 0.09 percent.
• Continent. The continent dummies are in most regressions (reported and unreported)
significant. The reference group consists of the pacific countries. This suggests that
public-sector efficiency is partly driven by common characteristics of countries located
on the same continent, such as climate conditions or a common history.
• Population density. Countries in the sample that are sparsely populated are less efficient.
The population density variable is very stable in the several models I looked at.
• Percentage Government Share. Countries in which the government claims less real
resources in percentage of GDP tend to have a more efficient public sector. The effect
is very stable but of moderate size.
Table 5.6 reports the base regression (2) with all variables for easier reference, followed
by three other equations that explore the political variables. Model (5) is an equation that
includes the Herfindahl index of political fractionalisation and the unitary (inverse federalism)
variable, together with the globalisation index and the government share. Population density
has been left out as it is insignificant in model (2). From the two political variables, only the
unitarism index is significant. This does not change if the continent dummies are left out,
see equation (6). Globalisation, gains significance in this step, indicating that the pattern
39 I use the term “significant” when p-values are 10% or less.
40 Equation (3) can be seen as the “best” model. The selection of models has been done with having in mind
Sala-I-Martin [1997] who argues in favour of running multiple regressions and looking out for variables that
are good predictors “on average”. The main variables of interest, the globalisation index and the percentage
government share, are never dropped. Moving from model (1) to (2) and (3) shows that the inclusion of
additional variables improves the goodness of fit. Dropping insignificant variables has not to be considered in
model (3). Note that dropping a single continent dummy changes the reference group and is therefore not
advisable.
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(1) (2) (3)
Variables:
overall globalization index (KOF Index) 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Perce. Gov. Share (pwt_cg) -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
Population Density 0.059 0.091*
(0.052) (0.048)
Herfindahl Index political fractionalisation 0.008
(0.049)
Unitarism index (Gerring-Thacker) 0.011**
(0.005)
Asia (dummy) 0.333 0.461**
(0.240) (0.213)
Australia (dummy) 0.412* 0.535**
(0.244) (0.222)
Caribbean (dummy) 0.245 0.373*
(0.235) (0.213)
Europe (dummy) 0.289 0.415*
(0.235) (0.212)
Latin America (dummy) 0.203 0.326
(0.247) (0.221)
North Africa (dummy) 0.318 0.470**
(0.246) (0.222)
North America (dummy) 0.402* 0.516**
(0.243) (0.222)
Sub Saharan Africa (dummy) 0.274 0.410*
(0.246) (0.221)
year1990 0.054*** 0.049**
(0.021) (0.021)
year1995 0.072*** 0.056***
(0.023) (0.021)
year2000 0.097*** 0.080***
(0.027) (0.025)
Constant 0.447*** 0.274 0.175
(0.027) (0.271) (0.232)
sigma (St.E. of Estimate) 0.148*** 0.112*** 0.119***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 296 262 296
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 151.292 205.535 213.966
Wald Chi-Square 37.699 315.495 306.202
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Truncated regressions, upper limit set to 1. Estimation with robust Standard-Errors.
Point estimates of coefficients and standard errors rounded to three digits.
For the time-dummies, the reference year is 1985.
For the continent dummies, Pacific is the reference category.
Table 5.5: Regression results with environmental variables (dependent variable: bias-
corrected DEA-scores). Models (1)-(4)
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of globalisation across continents is not uniformly distributed. Equation (7), finally, is a
model without the Herfindahl Index. I could not find a significant association of political
fractionalisation with efficiency in all models I tried. The unitary (inverse federalism) variable,
however, seems to be a useful predictor of public-sector efficiency.41
The additional results from Table 5.6 are:
• Globalisation. The globalisation index is significant in model (3) that excludes political
variables. In the models that include political variables, globalisation is not a very
stable predictor. Overall, there is weak evidence that globalisation has a positive but
small impact on public-sector efficiency.
• Unitarism (inverse federalism). Among the political variables I tried, the unitarism
measure proved to be the only one with explanatory power. The public sector of more
centralised countries seems to be more efficient.
An issue that has not been covered so far is privatisation of public sector activities. Imagine
a government that decides to cut spending on, for example, health care to a very low level.
The variable measuring output (life expectancy) cannot be expected to drop proportionally,
as people will spend private income on health care. A similar argument applies to all policy
areas covered. One could therefore expect that countries where the provision of many public
services and goods is not paid for with government expenditure systematically are more
efficient than others where privatisation is less important. To capture this effect, I calculated
a “privatisation index” that relies on private versus public expenditure on health care and
education, using data from the World Development indicators and the UNESCO. I did not
find evidence that this index explains the pattern of measured inefficiency in my sample. A
possible reason could be that the impact of privatisation is covered by other variables like the
continent and time dummies. Or, more likely, that the index I calculated is not appropriate.
The regression analysis so far has dealt with the levels of efficiency scores. To investigate
the dynamics of public-sector modernisation, Table 5.7 reports models where the dependent
variable is the change of public-sector efficiency between 1985 and 2000. For the independent
variables, I took the values from 1985. Regression (8) contains only the globalisation index,
the government share and a constant. Countries that in 1985 were more globalised made
more progress in terms of public-sector efficiency during the 15 years covered in the sample.
The constant, representing a trend, is not significant. A regression that contains all possible
explanatory variables, model (9), has a better goodness of fit. Model (10) is derived by
subsequently leaving insignificant variables out of the model. Whereas for the levels of
public-sector efficiency the continental dummies have a relatively high explanatory power, this
is reversed when the change of public-sector efficiency is considered. I could not find a model
specification where the continental dummies have explanatory power. The Unitarism-Index
and the government share proved to be stable in the models I tried. Its sign indicates that
more centralised countries are more successful in improving public-sector efficiency. This is
in line with Kotsogiannis / Schwager [2006], who argue on theoretical grounds against the
popular idea that more federalised countries have advantages in creating policy innovations.42
The time span covered in this study is too short to inspect dynamic properties of the
measured efficiency-scores more closely, especially as public-sector modernisation presumably
41 I also tried the democracy and human rights indices from Freedom House [2008] and several other variables
describing the political system covered by Norris [2008], but could not find a model where these have explanatory
power.
42 See Inman / Rubinfeld [1997] for an overview of the literature about federalised countries as a “laboratory”
for policy innovations and Kollman et al. [2000], Strumpf [2002].
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(2) (5) (6) (7)
Variables:
overall globalization index (KOF Index) 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Perce. Gov. Share (pwt_cg) -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population Density 0.059
(0.052)
Herfindahl Index political fractionalisation 0.008 0.007 0.018
(0.049) (0.050) (0.038)
Unitarism index (Gerring-Thacker) 0.011** 0.011** 0.012* 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Asia (dummy) 0.333 0.050 0.048
(0.240) (0.065) (0.053)
Australia (dummy) 0.412* 0.121** 0.117**
(0.244) (0.056) (0.049)
Caribbean (dummy) 0.245 -0.036 -0.038
(0.235) (0.056) (0.052)
Europe (dummy) 0.289 0.007 0.003
(0.235) (0.052) (0.041)
Latin America (dummy) 0.203 -0.088 -0.095*
(0.247) (0.062) (0.049)
North Africa (dummy) 0.318 0.025 0.022
(0.246) (0.056) (0.052)
North America (dummy) 0.402* 0.112* 0.108**
(0.243) (0.060) (0.054)
Sub Saharan Africa (dummy) 0.274 -0.018 -0.027
(0.246) (0.064) (0.057)
year1990 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.054** 0.053***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020)
year1995 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.066***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
year2000 0.097*** 0.103*** 0.093*** 0.092***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
Constant 0.274 0.577*** 0.532*** 0.598***
(0.271) (0.107) (0.057) (0.082)
sigma (St.E. of Estimate) 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.124*** 0.114***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 262 262 262 275
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 205.535 204.708 178.393 209.962
Wald Chi-Square 315.495 321.038 142.305 342.882
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Truncated regressions, upper limit set to 1. Estimation with robust Standard-Errors.
Point estimates of coefficients and standard errors rounded to three digits.
For the time-dummies, the reference year is 1985.
For the continent dummies, Pacific is the reference category.
Table 5.6: Regression results with environmental variables (dependent variable: bias-
corrected DEA-scores). Models (2),(5)-(7)
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must be thought of as a slow process. But it is an interesting result that the explanatory
variables affect the levels and the change of public-sector efficiency differently. Whereas for the
level of public sector efficiency, the continent dummies are important predictors, both in terms
of significance and size, this is not true for the change, i.e. the modernisation of the public
sector. This suggests that the issue of public-sector modernisation is one where the distinction
of stocks and flows really matters.43 A more thorough analysis of the dynamic properties of
public-sector efficiency, based on a longer period of time, could investigate whether there is
long-run equilibrium of public sector efficiency. The results in this study suggest that there is
no tendency that countries with a less efficient public sector are improving faster. Hence, a
convergence of public-sector efficiency cannot be expected.
43 Note that this distinction is explicitly made in chapter 3.
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(8) (9) (10)
Variables:
overall globalization index (1985, KOF) 0.003*** 0.001 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Perce. Gov. Share (pwt_cg) 0.004*** 0.004* 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Pop. Density -0.034 -0.066***
(0.029) (0.013)
Herfindahl Index political fractionalisation -0.088
(0.092)
Unitarism index (Gerring-Thacker) 0.029*** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.011)
Asia (dummy) -0.047
(0.084)
Australia (dummy) 0.130
(0.092)
Caribbean (dummy) 0.111
(0.084)
Europe (dummy) 0.077
(0.099)
Latin America (dummy) 0.092
(0.077)
North Africa (dummy) 0.144*
(0.078)
North America (dummy) 0.133
(0.108)
Constant -0.082 -0.129 -0.185**
(0.061) (0.104) (0.075)
sigma (St.E. of Estimate) 0.150*** 0.133*** 0.139***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
Observations 74 62 68
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 35.440 37.337 37.812
Wald Chi-Square 16.502 334.754 98.103
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Truncated regressions, upper limit set to 1. Estimation with robust Standard-Errors.
Point estimates of coefficients and standard errors rounded to three digits.
Table 5.7: Regression results with environmental variables (dependent variable: change in
bias-corrected DEA-score 1985-2000). Models (8)-(10).
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5.6 Conclusions
This study explores empirically the efficiency of the public sector of a large set of countries. Furthermore,
it uses a regression analysis to explain the pattern of public sector (in-)efficiency. The focus here is
on the “small-is-beautiful”-result found in Afonso et al. [2005] and on globalisation as a proxy for
the intensity of interjurisdictional competition between countries. The regression analysis shows that
the level of public-sector efficiency can partly be explained by continent dummies, suggesting that
common history and cultural background are important factors. Smaller governments in the sample
systematically have more efficient public sectors, what can be seen as support of the “small-is-beatiful”-
result. Furthermore, it cannot be said that smaller countries tend to be closer to the efficiency border.
The bulk of countries that are close to the efficiency border achieve this with a public sector of medium
size, compared to all countries in the sample. More globalised countries also tend to be more efficient,
albeit the effect is, again, not very sizable. Hence this can be seen as only mild evidence that the
intensity of interjurisdictional competition plays a crucial role in the determination of public sector
efficiency. Furthermore, it could be shown that the more centralised countries in the sample are more
efficient. The effect is again not very big. But overall, the efficiency scores calculated in this study do
not show a pattern that would be consistent with the idea that public sector efficiency is better when
the degree of interjurisdictional competition (either between countries, or, within countries, between
local jurisdictions) is higher. Over time, public sector efficiency has improved on average in the full
sample of 74 countries. While continent dummies played an important and sizable role in explaining
the level of public sector efficiency, this is not true for the change between 1985 and 2000.
Even if the “small-is-beautiful”-effect could have been shown to be sizable and significant, it would
not be clear whether the result was useful in terms of policy advice. One might be tempted to suggest
that an inefficient public sector should be scaled down to improve efficiency. In the terminology
of an DEA-analysis, the diagnosis would be that a public sector that is large and inefficient is not
scale-efficient. But this study is not dealing with private firms, where an optimal firm size might exist.
The size of the public sector cannot be optimised following standard optimisation rules that can be
applied to private firms.44 How much the public sector spends to produce public goods and services is
a political decision. Still, given that a society somehow has decided to spend a particular amount of
tax revenue for education, health care and other policy fields, it is an important information whether
the achieved outcome is as high as possible, compared to the efficiency frontier.45
Stone [2002] formulates a harsh criticism of DEA and stochastic frontier analysis being applied to
the efficiency of public services. Many of his recommendations apply to any empirical analysis, but his
major point is that for the evaluation of public sector efficiency, one ideally would need to know how a
society weights different goods and services. In this study, I chose to attach equal weights to policy
fields – assuming that all policy fields are equally important in a social welfare function – and to all
output measures – assuming that in the several policy fields, all societies weight the importance of a
particular output similar. If efficiency scores for a particular country were to be criticised, the easiest
defence would be to claim that the country, for example, defines its success in the area of health care
not in terms of life expectancy at birth but tries to minimise the number of illnesses in a life span. It
is not possible to account for this kind of criticism in a study like this that deals with a large variety
of countries from all over the globe. Hence, the results for the countries should be interpreted with
care. If a country is marked as a bad performer, or as inefficient, this is only a first indicator that the
production of goods and services of the public sector is malfunctioning. See also Smith / Street [2005]
for a discussion of the interplay of scientific studies of organisational efficiency and policy.
The best approach to gain an insight into the specifics of a particular country or a particular policy
field seem to be studies that deal exclusively with the specific problems associated with, for example,
44 Hence, statistical tests that try to infer the scale properties of a production process from the data in
the context of an DEA- or FDH-analysis – see Banker [1996], Briec et al. [2000], Soleimani-damaneh et al.
[2006] – are not used above. Instead, I assumed variable returns to scale to enclose the data as tightly as
possible. Especially for a study like this one, where the production process under inspection is as complex as
policy-making, the concept of returns to scale is in my view not applicable.
45 In the sample used for this study, the governments with a relatively high government share of GDP could
be asked why they do not perform as well as Switzerland in 2000, see Figure 5.6.
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the educational system in Germany. The Atkinson Review [Atkinson 2005] surely provides more
insight into the functioning of the public sector in Great Britain than any cross-country study of the
type presented here can ever attain. But this does not mean that cross-country studies that compare
the performance and efficiency of the public sector and are (necessarily) based on indicators chosen
by the researcher are useless. They reveal common features and patterns in the operation of public
sectors, for example in the case of this study, that globalisation seems to improve the efficiency of the
input-usage of the public sector, but only mildly. An output-oriented efficiency measurement as it has
been done in this study could be used to identify those countries that potentially can serve as a role
model for others and that are similar in terms of the inputs that are used for the production of public
goods and services. Overall, this study – and other that apply FDH- or DEA-methods to cross-country
data – should be seen as an attempt to gain an oversight about the efficiency of public sectors that
suggest where a more detailed analyis might be interesting.46 It would be a crude misinterpretation
to take the numbers presented here literally for the individual countries.47 Even worse would be to
base political decision solely on a study like this one.48
After having mentioned at several places the caveats of DEA-efficiency measurement in a cross-
country context, a robustness check might be interesting. How well do the bias-corrected DEA
efficiency scores show a similar picture than other attempts to evaluate the efficiency of the public
sector? The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, see Kaufmann et al. [2008], aggregates
in its recent edition 340 variables from 35 different sources into common indicators. Figure 5.9 shows
the relationship between their index for government effectiveness and the bias-corrected DEA efficiency
scores for the year 2000. There is a positive correlation between both indices that seems to be strong
enough to claim that the efficiency scores calculated in this study are surprisingly robust and reliable
when compared with Kaufmann et al. [2008].
46 That the specifics and details matter when it comes to policy advice is also acknowledged in the final report
of the Commission on Growth and Development, see Commission on Growth and Development [2008] and
Rodrik [2008].
47 See Starck [2007] for an example of a politicians that could not resist. He argues that the public sector
should not exceed the size of 35% and could still attain core objectives. This number is based on a rough
calculation of a possible government share of a hypothetical country, that is a “best performer” and at the
same time a “low spender” in each of several policy fields including education, infrastructure investment and
redistribution. See also Heipertz [2007].
48 In the words of one of the commentators to Stone [2002]: Reports that contain efficiency indices similar to
those calculated in this study, should not “hide political values behind a technical smoke-screen” [Stone 2002,
p. 423].
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Figure 5.9: Bias-corrected DEA efficiency scores and the government effectiveness as rated
in Kaufmann et al. [2008] for the year 2000.
I hope the study demonstrates that one way to proceed in further research about the relationship
between public-sector efficiency is to apply DEA-methods. In particular, it seems to be reasonable and
also possible to construct a panel-dataset that contains a broad range of countries and covers a longer
time spam than the one used in this study.49 For example, the international data on educational
attainment by Barro / Lee [2001] covers the years 1960-2000. A longer time-span would allow to
assess the dynamics of public-sector efficiency empirically.50
49 Another reason to pin hopes on DEA- and, to a lesser extent, FDH-methods of efficiency analysis is that
the methodology will be developed further in the near future, see the review of the recent literature in section
5.2 or the textbook by Cooper et al. [2007] that provides a comprehensive exposition of the state of the art in
DEA.
50 The approach could then be similar to the one in Büttner / Wildasin [2006]. They analyse the dynamics of
fiscal adjustments in a large sample of municipalities in the United States.
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Appendix
The dataset (as far as licensing issues can be resolved), the “do-files” for use with Stata (and R) are
available on request. The do-files start with reading in the original data, to avoid unrecoverable mistakes
that happen when data is edited “by hand” in a spreadsheet program. Hence, the documentation of
the data-cleaning is also available on request. See also my website, www.wiwi.uni-rostock.de/~wsf8545/.
It contains a few scripts and other “tricks” to use Stata and LATEX efficiently.
List of countries
Table A8: List of countries in the dataset. The last column indicates whether a country is
included in the FDH study or not.
countrycode countryname DEA/FDH?
ARG Argentina DEA
AUS Australia DEA FDH
AUT Austria DEA FDH
BEL Belgium DEA
BEN Benin DEA FDH
BGD Bangladesh DEA
BHR Bahrain DEA FDH
BOL Bolivia FDH
BRA Brazil DEA FDH
BRB Barbados FDH
BWA Botswana DEA
CAF Central African Republic DEA
CAN Canada DEA FDH
CHE Switzerland DEA FDH
CHL Chile DEA FDH
CHN China DEA
CMR Cameroon DEA FDH
COG Congo. Rep. DEA FDH
COL Colombia DEA FDH
CRI Costa Rica DEA FDH
CYP Cyprus DEA FDH
DEU Germany DEA FDH
DNK Denmark DEA FDH
DOM Dominican Republic FDH
ECU Ecuador DEA
EGY Egypt. Arab Rep. DEA FDH
ESP Spain DEA
FIN Finland DEA FDH
FRA France DEA FDH
GBR United Kingdom DEA FDH
GHA Ghana DEA
GRC Greece DEA
HND Honduras FDH
HUN Hungary DEA FDH
IDN Indonesia DEA FDH
IND India DEA
IRL Ireland DEA FDH
IRN Iran. Islamic Rep. DEA FDH
ISR Israel DEA FDH
(continued on next page)
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Table A8: List of countries in the dataset – continued
countrycode countryname DEA/FDH?
ITA Italy DEA
JAM Jamaica DEA FDH
JOR Jordan DEA
JPN Japan DEA
KEN Kenya DEA
KOR Korea. Rep. DEA FDH
KWT Kuwait DEA FDH
LKA Sri Lanka DEA FDH
MEX Mexico DEA
MUS Mauritius DEA
MWI Malawi DEA
MYS Malaysia DEA
NER Niger DEA
NIC Nicaragua DEA
NLD Netherlands DEA
NZL New Zealand DEA
PAK Pakistan DEA
PAN Panama DEA
PER Peru DEA
PHL Philippines DEA
PNG Papua New Guinea DEA
PRT Portugal DEA
SEN Senegal DEA
SGP Singapore DEA
SLE Sierra Leone DEA
SLV El Salvador DEA
SWE Sweden DEA
SYR Syrian Arab Republic DEA
TGO Togo DEA
THA Thailand DEA
TTO Trinidad and Tobago DEA
TUN Tunisia DEA
TUR Turkey DEA
UGA Uganda DEA
URY Uruguay DEA
USA United States DEA
VEN Venezuela. RB DEA
ZAF South Africa DEA
ZWE Zimbabwe DEA
(end of table)
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Codebooks and description of variables
Table A9: Codebook for the FDH-Analysis
Variable obs mean sd min max label
year 32 1990.0 0.0 1990.0 1990.0 Year
countrycode 32 . . . . Country Code
countryname 32 . . . . Country Name
country_id 32 58.8 30.1 13.0 115.0 ID number of country
airtrans_rcdw 32 114006.3 163737.9 500.0 670700.0 Air transport, registered
carrier departures world-
wide
airtrans_rcdw_rel 32 7.0 7.1 0.1 22.6 Air transport, registered
carrier departures world-
wide per 1000 people
balee_lsc15 32 14.3 11.0 1.7 44.7 percentage of secondary
school complete in the
total pop. (adults of age
15+)
balee_lu 32 20.8 22.6 0.0 78.5 percentage of no school-
ing in the total population
(adults of age 25+)
efw_area2 32 5.7 2.0 2.2 8.3 Area 2: Legal Structure
and Security of Property
Rights (EFW Index)
efw_area3 32 7.0 2.4 0.0 9.7 Area 3: Access to Sound
Money (EFW Index)
efw_area5 32 5.5 0.9 3.5 6.8 Area 5: Regulation of
Credit, Labor, and Busi-
ness (EFW Index)
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real 32 237651.9 194768.8 12875.0 766907.0 Real government expendit-
ure per capita (PWT)
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real_ma 32 223149.5 176284.3 9828.4 720072.8 Moving Average of
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real
exp_imf_4 32 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 Expenditure: Education
affairs and services (in per-
cent of GDP)
exp_imf_4_real 32 751.6 1761.4 39.7 8869.4 real expenditure (based on
exp_imf_4)
exp_imf_4_real_ma 32 661.7 1572.3 34.9 8034.7 Moving Average of
exp_imf_4_real
exp_imf_5 32 0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.7 Expenditure: Health af-
fairs and services (in per-
cent of GDP)
exp_imf_5_real 32 976.0 2531.1 -16.5 12324.4 real expenditure (based on
exp_imf_5)
exp_imf_5_real_ma 32 842.4 2195.3 -10.2 10736.1 Moving Average of
exp_imf_5_real
(continued on next page)
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Table A9: Codebook for the FDH-Analysis – continued
Variable obs mean sd min max label
exp_imf_econ1 32 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.3 Expenditure: Expenditure
on goods and services (in
percent of GDP)
exp_imf_econ1_real 32 2249.2 4650.1 100.5 24099.5 real expenditure (based on
exp_imf_econ1)
exp_imf_econ1_real_ma 32 2012.3 4189.2 90.2 21765.3 Moving Average of
exp_imf_econ1_real
exp_imf_econI 32 0.6 1.0 0.1 5.2 Expenditure: Total ex-
penditure and lending
minus repayments (II+V)
(in percent o
exp_imf_econIV 32 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 Expenditure: Capital ex-
penditure (in percent of
GDP)
exp_imf_econIV_real 32 689.2 1524.4 39.7 8329.7 real expenditure (based on
exp_imf_econIV)
exp_imf_econIV_real_ma 32 634.9 1359.9 34.6 7414.1 Moving Average of
exp_imf_econIV_real
exp_imf_econI_real 32 8181.6 19049.3 301.9 98281.2 real expenditure (based on
exp_imf_econI)
exp_imf_econI_real_ma 32 7293.5 16760.8 280.3 86365.6 Moving Average of
exp_imf_econI_real
gdp_curr_LCU 32 1.5e+13 4.9e+13 1.2e+07 2.1e+14 GDP (current LCU)
gdp_var 32 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 stability of real GDP per
capita (coefficient of vari-
ation)
health_exp_private 32 . . . . Health expenditure,
private (% of GDP)
health_exp_public 32 . . . . Health expenditure, public
(% of GDP)
health_priv 32 0.9 0.7 0.2 2.9 Reliance on private vs.
public expenditure in
health care (2000)
inf_gdpdefl 32 92.3 448.7 -1.0 2509.5 Inflation, GDP deflator
(annual %)
inf_gdpdefl_ma 32 11.9 13.0 1.5 59.2 Inflation (moving average)
inf_var 32 1.2 2.7 0.1 14.8 stability of price level (coef-
ficient of variation)
kof_index 32 51.8 19.8 22.6 84.6 overall globalization index
(KOF Index)
kof_index_a 32 54.8 18.4 16.6 87.0 economic globalization
(KOF index)
kof_index_ai 32 55.4 16.6 7.9 88.8 actual flows (KOF index)
kof_index_aii 32 51.4 22.9 17.6 85.2 restrictions (KOF index)
(continued on next page)
5.6 Conclusions 103
Table A9: Codebook for the FDH-Analysis – continued
Variable obs mean sd min max label
kof_index_bii 32 51.4 25.0 7.3 90.7 information flows (KOF in-
dex)
landarea 32 1116968.1 2437883.2 430.0 9093510.0 Land area (sq. km)
life_exp 32 70.2 7.1 53.2 77.4 Life expectancy at birth,
total (years)
pn_Gerring 32 3.8 1.5 1.0 5.0 Unitarism index (Gerring-
Thacker)
pn_herftot 32 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.0 Herfindahl Index political
fractionalisation
pwt_cg 32 20.8 8.5 8.3 48.2 Government Share of
CGDP (percent in Current
Prices)
pwt_cgdp 32 9594.7 6747.9 839.0 22772.1 Real Gross Domestic
Product per Capita (Int-
Dollar in Current Prices)
pwt_cgdp_ma 32 8587.3 6023.7 853.1 20284.1 Moving Average of
pwt_cgdp
pwt_grgdpch 32 1.3 6.9 -26.8 11.1 growth rate of Real GDP
per capita (Constant
Prices: Chain series)
(percent in 2
pwt_grgdpch_ma 32 1.9 2.9 -5.2 9.4 Moving Average of
pwt_grgdpch
pwt_kg 32 20.4 8.0 8.1 44.6 Government Share of RG-
DPL (percent in 2000 Con-
stant Prices)
pwt_pop 32 27688.7 43236.4 262.6 188005.4 Population (thousands)
pwt_rgdpch 32 11508.3 8065.9 1086.5 27515.3 Real GDP per capita (Con-
stant Prices: Chain series)
(IntD in 2000 Constant
Price
region 32 . . . . Geographic Region
region_antarc 32 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Antarctica dummy
region_asia 32 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 Asia dummy
region_aus 32 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 Australia dummy
region_carib 32 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 Caribbean dummy
region_europe 32 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 Europe dummy
region_latinam 32 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Latin America dummy
region_northafr 32 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 North Africa dummy
region_northam 32 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 North America dummy
region_paci 32 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Pacific dummy
region_subsahafr 32 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 Sub Saharan Africa
dummy
(continued on next page)
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Table A9: Codebook for the FDH-Analysis – continued
Variable obs mean sd min max label
tel_mainl 32 220.6 207.6 2.8 587.4 Telephone mainlines (per
1,000 people)
wb_class_eap 32 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 East Asia + Pacific (World
Bank Classification, April
2008)
wb_class_eca 32 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Europe + Central Asia
(World Bank Classification,
April 2008)
wb_class_emu 32 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Euro area (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
wb_class_hic 32 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 High income (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
wb_class_hpc 32 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 Heavily indebted poor
countries (HIPC) (World
Bank Classification, April
2008)
wb_class_lac 32 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 Latin America + Carib-
bean (World Bank Classi-
fication, April 2008)
wb_class_ldc 32 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Least developed countries
(UN classification)
wb_class_lic 32 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 Low income (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
wb_class_lmc 32 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 Lower middle income
(World Bank Classifica-
tion, April 2008)
wb_class_mna 32 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 Middle East + North
Africa (World Bank Classi-
fication, April 2008)
wb_class_noc 32 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 High income: nonOECD
(World Bank Classification,
April 2008)
wb_class_oec 32 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 High income: OECD
(World Bank Classifica-
tion, April 2008)
wb_class_sas 32 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 South Asia (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
wb_class_ssa 32 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 Sub-Saharan Africa
(World Bank Classifica-
tion, April 2008)
wb_class_umc 32 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Upper middle income
(World Bank Classifica-
tion, April 2008)
wgi_goveff 32 . . . . Government Effectiveness
(WGI, 2000)
(end of table)
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Table A10: Codebook for the DEA-Analysis. Years: 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000. Number of
Countries: 74.
Variable obs mean sd min max label
year 296 1992.5 5.6 1985.0 2000.0 Year
countrycode 296 . . . . Country Code
countryname 296 . . . . Country Name
country_id 296 37.5 21.4 1.0 74.0 ID number of country
airtrans_rcdw 296 203974.1 850077.8 200.0 8820878.0 Air transport, registered
carrier departures world-
wide
airtrans_rcdw_rel 296 6.8 8.9 0.0 62.9 Air transport, registered
carrier departures world-
wide per 1000 people
balee_lsc15 296 11.1 9.2 0.2 44.9 percentage of secondary
school complete in the
total pop. (adults of age
15+)
balee_lu 296 26.4 24.3 0.0 90.6 percentage of no school-
ing in the total population
(adults of age 25+)
efw_area2 296 5.8 1.9 2.0 9.6 Area 2: Legal Structure
and Security of Property
Rights (EFW Index)
efw_area3 296 7.0 2.4 0.0 9.8 Area 3: Access to Sound
Money (EFW Index)
efw_area5 296 5.6 1.1 2.7 8.8 Area 5: Regulation of
Credit, Labor, and Busi-
ness (EFW Index)
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real 296 187186.2 159819.2 2806.9 766907.0 Real government expendit-
ure per capita (PWT)
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real_ma 296 184224.5 159543.7 6450.8 849452.9 Moving Average of
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real
gdp_curr_LCU 296 4.7e+14 7.3e+15 23.1 1.2e+17 GDP (current LCU)
gdp_var 296 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 stability of real GDP per
capita (coefficient of vari-
ation)
health_exp_private 296 2.7 1.2 0.6 7.4 Health expenditure,
private (% of GDP)
health_exp_public 296 3.5 2.0 0.5 8.2 Health expenditure, public
(% of GDP)
health_priv 296 1.1 0.8 0.2 3.8 Reliance on private vs.
public expenditure in
health care (2000)
inf_gdpdefl 296 72.0 527.1 -7.0 6836.9 Inflation, GDP deflator
(annual %)
(continued on next page)
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Table A10: Codebook for the DEA-Analysis – continued
Variable obs mean sd min max label
inf_gdpdefl_ma 296 12.2 15.6 1.5 59.2 Inflation (moving average)
inf_var 296 0.0 11.8 -140.7 20.3 stability of price level (coef-
ficient of variation)
kof_index 296 51.2 19.3 12.3 93.6 overall globalization index
(KOF Index)
kof_index_a 296 54.7 20.4 7.8 96.5 economic globalization
(KOF index)
kof_index_ai 296 55.4 21.3 5.5 98.5 actual flows (KOF index)
kof_index_aii 296 53.6 23.5 9.1 97.1 restrictions (KOF index)
kof_index_bii 296 51.5 24.5 3.3 96.6 information flows (KOF in-
dex)
landarea 296 1009653.2 2172284.4 670.0 9326410.0 Land area (sq. km)
life_exp 296 67.8 9.6 39.0 81.1 Life expectancy at birth,
total (years)
pn_Gerring 296 4.0 1.4 1.0 5.0 Unitarism index (Gerring-
Thacker)
pn_herftot 296 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 Herfindahl Index political
fractionalisation
pwt_cg 296 20.1 8.4 3.0 56.7 Government Share of
CGDP (percent in Current
Prices)
pwt_cgdp 296 8781.4 7801.5 531.7 34364.5 Real Gross Domestic
Product per Capita (Int-
Dollar in Current Prices)
pwt_cgdp_ma 296 8005.8 7083.2 503.4 31361.3 Moving Average of
pwt_cgdp
pwt_grgdpch 296 2.0 4.8 -26.8 22.0 growth rate of Real GDP
per capita (Constant
Prices: Chain series)
(percent in 2
pwt_grgdpch_ma 296 1.6 3.0 -7.6 13.8 Moving Average of
pwt_grgdpch
pwt_kg 296 20.4 8.7 3.0 56.7 Government Share of RG-
DPL (percent in 2000 Con-
stant Prices)
pwt_pop 296 58110.2 170124.9 424.0 1262474.3 Population (thousands)
pwt_rgdpch 296 9962.1 8437.2 680.0 34364.5 Real GDP per capita (Con-
stant Prices: Chain series)
(IntD in 2000 Constant
Price
region 296 . . . . Geographic Region
region_antarc 296 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Antarctica dummy
region_asia 296 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 Asia dummy
(continued on next page)
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Table A10: Codebook for the DEA-Analysis – continued
Variable obs mean sd min max label
region_aus 296 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 Australia dummy
region_carib 296 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 Caribbean dummy
region_europe 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Europe dummy
region_latinam 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Latin America dummy
region_northafr 296 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 North Africa dummy
region_northam 296 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 North America dummy
region_paci 296 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 Pacific dummy
region_subsahafr 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Sub Saharan Africa
dummy
tel_mainl 296 192.8 209.4 1.0 758.6 Telephone mainlines (per
1,000 people)
wb_class_eap 296 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 East Asia + Pacific (World
Bank Classification, April
2008)
wb_class_eca 296 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 Europe + Central Asia
(World Bank Classification,
April 2008)
wb_class_emu 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Euro area (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
wb_class_hic 296 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 High income (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
wb_class_hpc 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Heavily indebted poor
countries (HIPC) (World
Bank Classification, April
2008)
wb_class_lac 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Latin America + Carib-
bean (World Bank Classi-
fication, April 2008)
wb_class_ldc 296 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Least developed countries
(UN classification)
wb_class_lic 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Low income (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
wb_class_lmc 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Lower middle income
(World Bank Classifica-
tion, April 2008)
wb_class_mna 296 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 Middle East + North
Africa (World Bank Classi-
fication, April 2008)
wb_class_noc 296 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 High income: nonOECD
(World Bank Classification,
April 2008)
wb_class_oec 296 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 High income: OECD
(World Bank Classifica-
tion, April 2008)
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Table A10: Codebook for the DEA-Analysis – continued
Variable obs mean sd min max label
wb_class_sas 296 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 South Asia (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
wb_class_ssa 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Sub-Saharan Africa
(World Bank Classifica-
tion, April 2008)
wb_class_umc 296 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 Upper middle income
(World Bank Classifica-
tion, April 2008)
wgi_goveff 296 0.4 1.0 -1.5 2.2 Government Effectiveness
(WGI, 2000)
(end of table)
Table A11: Description of variables
variable / label / source description
year: Year
Source: -
-
countrycode: Country Code
Source: -
Countrycodes follow WDI [2007]
countryname: Country Name
Source: -
The full names of countries follow WDI [2007].
country_id: ID number of
country
Source: -
-
airtrans_rcdw: Air transport,
registered carrier departures
worldwide
Source: WDI [2007]
Registered carrier departures worldwide are domestic takeoffs
and takeoffs abroad of air carriers registered in the country.
Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Civil Avi-
ation Statistics of the World and ICAO staff estimates.
airtrans_rcdw_rel: Air
transport, registered carrier
departures worldwide per 1000
people
Source: own calculations
calculated as airtrans_rcdw/pwt_pop
balee_lsc15: percentage of
secondary school complete in the
total pop. (adults of age 15+)
Source: Barro / Lee [2001]
For a detailed description, see Barro / Lee [2001] and Barro /
Lee [1993, 1996].
balee_lu: percentage of no
schooling in the total population
(adults of age 25+)
Source: Barro / Lee [2001]
For a detailed description, see Barro / Lee [2001] and Barro /
Lee [1993, 1996].
efw_area2: Area 2: Legal
Structure and Security of
Property Rights (EFW Index)
Source: Gwartney / Lawson
[2007]
EFW Index - Area 2: Legal Structure and Security of Property
Rights. Computed from subindices efw_area2a - efw_area2g.
efw_area3: Area 3: Access to
Sound Money (EFW Index)
Source: Gwartney / Lawson
[2007]
EFW Index - Area 3: Access to Sound Money. Computed from
subindices efw_area3a - efw_area3d.
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Table A11: Description of variables – continued
variable / label / source description
efw_area5: Area 5: Regulation
of Credit, Labor, and Business
(EFW Index)
Source: Gwartney / Lawson
[2007]
EFW Index - Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business.
Computed from subindices efw_area5a - efw_area5c.
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real:
Real government expenditure per
capita (PWT)
Source: own calculations, based
on PWT data
Real government expenditure per capita (PWT) (Current
Prices). Calculated as pwt_rgdpl · pwt_kg.
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real_ma:
Moving Average of
exp_gov_pwt_pc_real
Source: own calculations
Moving Average of exp_gov_pwt_pc_real (Mean of current
year and the four preceding years)
exp_imf_4: Expenditure:
Education affairs and services (in
percent of GDP)
Source: IMF [2006]
Expenditure on education affairs and services (pre-primary and
primary education affairs and services, secondary education
affairs and services, tertiary education affairs and services, edu-
cation services not definable by level, subsidiary services to
education, education affairs and services not elsewhere classi-
fied). All Data has been converted from nominal expenditure
in national currency to percentage of GDP using data on
the nominal GDP from the World Development Indicators
(gdp_curr_LCU). Zero values have been set to missing. The
historical series uses the GFSM 1986 classification, see IMF
[1986, p. 153-155].
exp_imf_4_real: real
expenditure (based on
exp_imf_4)
Source: own calculations
Real expenditure per capita, based on exp_imf_4 (exp_imf_4
· pwt_cgdp)
exp_imf_4_real_ma:
Moving Average of
exp_imf_4_real
Source: own calculations
Moving Average of exp_imf_4_real (Mean of current year and
the four preceding years)
exp_imf_5: Expenditure:
Health affairs and services (in
percent of GDP)
Source: IMF [2006]
Expenditure on health affairs and services (hospital affairs and
services, clinics, and medical, dental, and paramedical practi-
tioners, public health affairs and services, medicaments, pros-
theses, medical equipment, and appliances or other prescribed
health-related products, applied research and experimental de-
velopment related to the health and medical delivery system,
health affairs and services not elsewhere classified). All Data
has been converted from nominal expenditure in national cur-
rency to percentage of GDP using data on the nominal GDP
from the World Development Indicators (gdp_curr_LCU).
Zero values have been set to missing. The historical series uses
the GFSM 1986 classification, see IMF [1986, p. 156-158].
exp_imf_5_real: real
expenditure (based on
exp_imf_5)
Source: own calculations
Real expenditure per capita, based on exp_imf_5 (exp_imf_5
· pwt_cgdp)
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Table A11: Description of variables – continued
variable / label / source description
exp_imf_5_real_ma:
Moving Average of
exp_imf_5_real
Source: own calculations
Moving Average of exp_imf_5_real (Mean of current year and
the four preceding years)
exp_imf_econ1: Expenditure:
Expenditure on goods and
services (in percent of GDP)
Source: IMF [2006]
Expenditure on goods and services. This includes all govern-
ment payments in exchange for goods and services, whether
in the form of wages and salaries to employees, employer con-
tributions to employee benefit schemes outside this level of
government in compensation for employee services, or other
purchases of goods and services. All Data has been converted
from nominal expenditure in national currency to percentage of
GDP using data on the nominal GDP from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (gdp_curr_LCU). Zero values have been set to
missing. The historical series uses the GFSM 1986 classification,
see IMF [1986, p. 177].
exp_imf_econ1_real: real
expenditure (based on
exp_imf_econ1)
Source: own calculations
Real expenditure per capita, based on exp_imf_econ1
(exp_imf_econ1 · pwt_cgdp)
exp_imf_econ1_real_ma:
Moving Average of
exp_imf_econ1_real
Source: own calculations
Moving Average of exp_imf_econ1_real (Mean of current year
and the four preceding years)
exp_imf_econI: Expenditure:
Total expenditure and lending
minus repayments (II+V) (in
percent o
Source: IMF [2006]
Total expenditure and lending minus repayments (total ex-
penditure and capital expenditure). All Data has been conver-
ted from nominal expenditure in national currency to percent-
age of GDP using data on the nominal GDP from the World
Development Indicators (gdp_curr_LCU). Zero values have
been set to missing. The historical series uses the GFSM 1986
classification, see IMF [1986, p. 177].
exp_imf_econIV:
Expenditure: Capital
expenditure (in percent of GDP)
Source: IMF [2006]
Capital expenditures. Capital expenditures are payments for
the acquisition of fixed capital assets, strategic or emergency
stocks, land, or intangible assets, or unrequited payments for
the purpose of permitting the recipients to acquire such assets,
compensating the recipients for damage or destruction of capital
assets, or increasing the financial capital of the recipients. All
Data has been converted from nominal expenditure in national
currency to percentage of GDP using data on the nominal GDP
from the World Development Indicators (gdp_curr_LCU).
Zero values have been set to missing. The historical series uses
the GFSM 1986 classification, see IMF [1986, p. 182].
exp_imf_econIV_real: real
expenditure (based on
exp_imf_econIV)
Source: own calculations
Real expenditure per capita, based on exp_imf_econIV
(exp_imf_econIV · pwt_cgdp)
exp_imf_econIV_real_ma:
Moving Average of
exp_imf_econIV_real
Source: own calculations
Moving Average of exp_imf_econIV_real (Mean of current
year and the four preceding years)
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Table A11: Description of variables – continued
variable / label / source description
exp_imf_econI_real: real
expenditure (based on
exp_imf_econI)
Source: own calculations
Real expenditure per capita, based on exp_imf_econI
(exp_imf_econI · pwt_cgdp)
exp_imf_econI_real_ma:
Moving Average of
exp_imf_econI_real
Source: own calculations
Moving Average of exp_imf_econI_real (Mean of current year
and the four preceding years)
gdp_curr_LCU: GDP
(current LCU)
Source: WDI [2007]
GDP (current LCU). GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum
of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current local
currency.
gdp_var: stability of real GDP
per capita (coefficient of
variation)
Source: own calculations, Heston
et al. [2006]
Own calculations, based on pwt_rgdpch. A coefficient of
variation is calculated for the current year and two years in the
past and in the future.
health_exp_private: Health
expenditure, private (% of GDP)
Source: WDI [2007]
Private health expenditure includes direct household (out-of-
pocket) spending, private insurance, charitable donations, and
direct service payments by private corporations. Source: World
Health Organization, World Health Report and updates and
from the OECD for its member countries, supplemented by
World Bank poverty assessments and country and sector stud-
ies, and household surveys conducted by governments or by
statistical or international organizations.
health_exp_public: Health
expenditure, public (% of GDP)
Source: WDI [2007]
Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital
spending from government (central and local) budgets, external
borrowings and grants (including donations from international
agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or
compulsory) health insurance funds. Source: World Health
Organization, World Health Report and updates and from the
OECD for its member countries, supplemented by World Bank
poverty assessments and country and sector studies.
health_priv: Reliance on
private vs. public expenditure in
health care (2000)
Source: own calculations, WDI
[2007]
Reliance on private vs. public expenditure in health care
in the year 2000. Calculated as health_exp_private /
health_exp_public. High values indicates that private health
care spending is important. If health_priv is equal to one,
health care expenditure is equally private and public.
inf_gdpdefl: Inflation, GDP
deflator (annual %)
Source: WDI [2007]
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP
implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the eco-
nomy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of
GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local cur-
rency. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files.
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Table A11: Description of variables – continued
variable / label / source description
inf_gdpdefl_ma: Inflation
(moving average)
Source: own calculations, Heston
et al. [2006].
Own calculations, based on inf_gdpdefl. Moving Average, cur-
rent year and two years in the past and in the future. To
account for hyperinflation, values higher than the 90% percent-
ile (59.23400115966797) have been replaced by the the 90%
percentile. On the lower end, the data has been truncated at
the 10% percentle.
inf_var: stability of price level
(coefficient of variation)
Source: own calculations, Heston
et al. [2006]
Own calculations, based on inf_gdpdefl. A coefficient of vari-
ation is calculated for the current year and two years in the
past and in the future.
kof_index: overall globalization
index (KOF Index)
Source: Dreher [2006], Dreher
et al. [2008]
Index of globalization, compiled from subindices of economic,
social and political globalization. See Dreher [2006], Dreher
et al. [2008] for the weights used and other details.
kof_index_a: economic
globalization (KOF index)
Source: Dreher [2006], Dreher
et al. [2008]
Index of economic globalization, compiled from data on actual
flows (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment,
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals) and restrictions (Hid-
den Import Barriers, Mean Tariff Rate, Taxes on International
Trade, Capital Account Restrictions). See Dreher [2006], Dre-
her et al. [2008] for the weights used and other details.
kof_index_ai: actual flows
(KOF index)
Source: Dreher [2006], Dreher
et al. [2008]
Index of economic globalization (actual flows), compiled from
data on trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment,
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals. See Dreher [2006],
Dreher et al. [2008] for the weights used and other details.
kof_index_aii: restrictions
(KOF index)
Source: Dreher [2006], Dreher
et al. [2008]
Index of economic globalization (restrictions), compiled from
data on Hidden Import Barriers, Mean Tariff Rate, Taxes on
International Trade, Capital Account Restrictions. See Dreher
[2006], Dreher et al. [2008] for the weights used and other
details.
kof_index_bii: information
flows (KOF index)
Source: Dreher [2006], Dreher
et al. [2008]
Index of social globalization (information flows), compiled from
data on Internet Users, Cable Television, Trade in Newspapers,
Radios. See Dreher [2006], Dreher et al. [2008] for the weights
used and other details.
landarea: Land area (sq. km)
Source: WDI [2007]
Land area is a country’s total area, excluding area under inland
water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive
economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water
bodies includes major rivers and lakes. Source: Food and
Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook and data files.
life_exp: Life expectancy at
birth, total (years)
Source:
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a new-
born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at
the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its
life. Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources
including census reports, the United Nations Population Divi-
sion’s World Population Prospects, national statistical offices,
household surveys conducted by national agencies, and Macro
International.
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Table A11: Description of variables – continued
variable / label / source description
pn_Gerring: Unitarism index
(Gerring-Thacker)
Source: Norris [2008]
Data taken from dataset that accompanies Norris [2008]. The
actual data is from Gerring / Thacker [2004]. The index
measures the degree of centralization on a scale of 1 to 5.
Examples of very federalised countries with a value of 1 are
Switzerland and Germany.
pn_herftot: Herfindahl Index
political fractionalisation
Source: Norris [2008]
Data taken from dataset that accompanies Norris [2008]. The
actual data is from Beck et al. [2001]. pn_herftot is the sum of
the squared seat shares of all parties. Equals NA (missing) if
there is no parliament or if there are no parties in the legislature
and blank if any government or opposition party seats are blank.
Higher values indicate that the political concentration is less.
pwt_cg: Government Share of
CGDP (percent in Current
Prices)
Source: Heston et al. [2006]
See Data Appendix and Technical Documentation of Heston
et al. [2006].
pwt_cgdp: Real Gross
Domestic Product per Capita
(IntDollar in Current Prices)
Source: Heston et al. [2006]
See Data Appendix and Technical Documentation of Heston
et al. [2006].
pwt_cgdp_ma: Moving
Average of pwt_cgdp
Source: own calculations
Moving Average of pwt_cgdp (Mean of current year and the
four preceding years)
pwt_grgdpch: growth rate of
Real GDP per capita (Constant
Prices: Chain series) (percent in
2
Source: Heston et al. [2006]
See Data Appendix and Technical Documentation of Heston
et al. [2006].
pwt_grgdpch_ma: Moving
Average of pwt_grgdpch
Source: own calculations
Moving Average of pwt_grgdpch, current year and the four
preceding years.
pwt_kg: Government Share of
RGDPL (percent in 2000
Constant Prices)
Source: Heston et al. [2006]
See Data Appendix and Technical Documentation of Heston
et al. [2006].
pwt_pop: Population
(thousands)
Source: Heston et al. [2006]
See Data Appendix and Technical Documentation of Heston
et al. [2006].
pwt_rgdpch: Real GDP per
capita (Constant Prices: Chain
series) (IntD in 2000 Constant
Price
Source: Heston et al. [2006]
See Data Appendix and Technical Documentation of Heston
et al. [2006].
region: Geographic Region
Source: Information from this
variable has been converted into
0,1-variables region_XYZ.
International Potato Center [2002]
region_antarc: Antarctica
dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
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Table A11: Description of variables – continued
variable / label / source description
region_asia: Asia dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
region_aus: Australia dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
region_carib: Caribbean
dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
region_europe: Europe
dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
region_latinam: Latin
America dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
region_northafr: North Africa
dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
region_northam: North
America dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
region_paci: Pacific dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
region_subsahafr: Sub
Saharan Africa dummy
Source: International Potato
Center [2002]
See region
tel_mainl: Telephone mainlines
(per 1,000 people)
Source: WDI [2007]
Telephone mainlines are fixed telephone lines connecting a
subscriber to the telephone exchange equipment. Source: Inter-
national Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication
Development Report and database, and World Bank estimates.
Footnote: Please cite the International Telecommunication
Union for third-party use of these data.
wb_class_eap: East Asia +
Pacific (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
East Asia + Pacific according to the World Bank Classification
from April 2008.
wb_class_eca: Europe +
Central Asia (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Europe + Central Asia according to the World Bank Classific-
ation from April 2008.
wb_class_emu: Euro area
(World Bank Classification, April
2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Euro area according to the World Bank Classification from
April 2008.
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Table A11: Description of variables – continued
variable / label / source description
wb_class_hic: High income
(World Bank Classification, April
2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
High income according to the World Bank Classification from
April 2008.
wb_class_hpc: Heavily
indebted poor countries (HIPC)
(World Bank Classification, April
2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) according to the World
Bank Classification from April 2008.
wb_class_lac: Latin America
+ Caribbean (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Latin America + Caribbean according to the World Bank
Classification from April 2008.
wb_class_ldc: Least developed
countries (UN classification)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Least developed countries (UN classification) -
wb_class_lic: Low income
(World Bank Classification, April
2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Low income according to the World Bank Classification from
April 2008.
wb_class_lmc: Lower middle
income (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Lower middle income according to the World Bank Classifica-
tion from April 2008.
wb_class_mna: Middle East +
North Africa (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Middle East + North Africa according to the World Bank
Classification from April 2008.
wb_class_noc: High income:
nonOECD (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
High income: nonOECD according to the World Bank Classi-
fication from April 2008.
wb_class_oec: High income:
OECD (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
High income: OECD according to the World Bank Classifica-
tion from April 2008.
wb_class_sas: South Asia
(World Bank Classification, April
2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
South Asia according to the World Bank Classification from
April 2008.
wb_class_ssa: Sub-Saharan
Africa (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Sub-Saharan Africa according to the World Bank Classification
from April 2008.
wb_class_umc: Upper middle
income (World Bank
Classification, April 2008)
Source: World Bank [2008]
Upper middle income according to the World Bank Classifica-
tion from April 2008.
wgi_goveff : Government
Effectiveness (WGI, 2000)
Source: Kaufmann et al. [2008]
Government Effectiveness index in the year 2000 from the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project.
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Public-sector performance in the FDH-sample
Table A12: Public-sector performance for the FDH-sample. Reported are the PSP-indices
for the six subareas (PSP1-6) and overall (PSP0). The table is sorted by the
ranking based on PSP0.
ra
nk
co
un
tr
y
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P
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P
1
P
S
P
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P
S
P
3
P
S
P
4
P
S
P
5
P
S
P
0
1 DNK Denmark 1990 1.29 2.03 1.07 2.54 1.40 1.67
2 CHE Switzerland 1990 1.30 1.61 1.10 2.92 1.38 1.66
3 FIN Finland 1990 1.28 1.93 1.07 2.55 1.03 1.57
4 AUS Australia 1990 1.29 1.32 1.10 2.12 1.32 1.43
5 CAN Canada 1990 1.35 1.14 1.10 2.14 1.20 1.39
6 GBR United Kingdom 1990 1.25 1.00 1.08 1.84 1.71 1.38
7 IRL Ireland 1990 1.15 1.20 1.06 2.25 1.17 1.37
8 FRA France 1990 1.25 1.11 1.09 1.68 1.55 1.34
9 CYP Cyprus 1990 1.03 1.19 1.09 1.76 1.53 1.32
10 KOR Korea. Rep. 1990 0.95 2.12 1.01 0.90 1.58 1.31
11 AUT Austria 1990 1.27 1.39 1.08 1.34 1.32 1.28
12 DEU Germany 1990 1.25 1.61 1.07 1.22 1.22 1.27
13 BHR Bahrain 1990 1.14 0.69 1.03 1.99 1.31 1.23
14 ISR Israel 1990 0.66 1.14 1.09 1.26 1.09 1.05
15 BRB Barbados 1990 1.04 0.93 1.06 0.83 1.02 0.98
16 CHL Chile 1990 1.05 0.98 1.05 0.37 0.96 0.88
17 COL Colombia 1990 0.74 0.71 0.97 0.41 1.49 0.87
18 CRI Costa Rica 1990 1.11 0.72 1.08 0.50 0.84 0.85
19 JAM Jamaica 1990 0.86 0.86 1.02 0.72 0.79 0.85
20 KWT Kuwait 1990 0.71 1.00 1.07 0.69 0.60 0.81
21 HUN Hungary 1990 0.97 1.01 0.99 0.35 0.64 0.79
22 IDN Indonesia 1990 1.00 0.54 0.88 0.09 1.03 0.71
23 LKA Sri Lanka 1990 0.75 0.98 1.01 0.05 0.73 0.70
24 EGY Egypt. Arab
Rep.
1990 0.88 0.56 0.89 0.09 1.00 0.68
25 BOL Bolivia 1990 0.79 0.59 0.84 0.23 0.97 0.68
26 HND Honduras 1990 0.89 0.67 0.94 0.30 0.54 0.67
27 BRA Brazil 1990 0.65 0.62 0.95 0.34 0.51 0.61
28 COG Congo. Rep. 1990 0.76 0.57 0.81 0.15 0.60 0.58
29 DOM Dominican
Republic
1990 0.73 0.60 0.97 0.20 0.36 0.57
30 IRN Iran. Islamic
Rep.
1990 0.75 0.60 0.92 0.14 0.19 0.52
31 BEN Benin 1990 0.88 0.20 0.76 0.01 0.76 0.52
32 CMR Cameroon 1990 0.98 0.38 0.78 0.05 0.13 0.47
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Public-sector performance in the DEA-sample
Table A13: Public-sector performance for the DEA-sample. Reported are the PSP-indices
for the six subareas (PSP1-6) and overall (PSP). The table is sorted by the
ranking based on PSP0.
rank country y
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5
P
S
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0
1 CHE Switzerland 2000 1.44 1.95 1.18 4.84 1.82 2.24
2 SWE Sweden 2000 1.39 2.66 1.17 4.01 1.83 2.21
3 NZL New Zealand 2000 1.45 1.20 1.16 5.83 1.39 2.21
4 USA United States 2000 1.48 1.57 1.14 4.04 2.16 2.08
5 CHE Switzerland 1995 1.40 1.95 1.16 3.65 2.09 2.05
6 IRL Ireland 2000 1.38 1.42 1.13 4.05 2.26 2.05
7 DNK Denmark 2000 1.44 2.38 1.13 3.36 1.83 2.03
8 FIN Finland 2000 1.42 2.21 1.14 3.48 1.72 1.99
9 USA United States 1995 1.46 1.66 1.12 3.64 2.00 1.98
10 CAN Canada 2000 1.44 1.23 1.17 4.05 1.78 1.93
11 DNK Denmark 1995 1.44 2.40 1.11 3.01 1.64 1.92
12 SWE Sweden 1995 1.35 2.69 1.16 3.18 1.15 1.90
13 USA United States 1990 1.34 1.66 1.11 3.38 1.85 1.87
14 NZL New Zealand 1995 1.51 1.21 1.13 3.77 1.62 1.85
15 DNK Denmark 1990 1.28 2.49 1.10 2.76 1.49 1.83
16 CHE Switzerland 1990 1.29 1.96 1.14 3.15 1.49 1.81
17 SWE Sweden 1990 1.18 1.73 1.14 3.55 1.34 1.79
18 USA United States 1985 1.32 2.17 1.10 2.94 1.40 1.78
19 CHE Switzerland 1985 1.28 2.17 1.13 2.61 1.43 1.72
20 FIN Finland 1990 1.27 2.36 1.10 2.76 1.12 1.72
21 AUS Australia 1995 1.40 1.51 1.15 2.89 1.62 1.71
22 AUT Austria 2000 1.38 1.62 1.15 2.55 1.85 1.71
23 AUS Australia 2000 1.42 1.45 1.17 2.87 1.57 1.70
24 FIN Finland 1995 1.41 2.29 1.13 2.82 0.74 1.68
25 NZL New Zealand 1990 1.22 1.21 1.11 3.86 0.94 1.67
26 BEL Belgium 2000 1.35 1.11 1.14 2.88 1.82 1.66
27 NLD Netherlands 2000 1.46 1.25 1.15 2.67 1.63 1.63
28 SWE Sweden 1985 1.13 1.90 1.13 2.95 1.01 1.63
29 DEU Germany 2000 1.34 1.70 1.15 2.24 1.66 1.62
30 GBR United
Kingdom
2000 1.46 1.16 1.15 2.62 1.70 1.62
31 FRA France 2000 1.33 1.32 1.16 2.50 1.72 1.61
32 CYP Cyprus 2000 1.05 1.52 1.15 2.86 1.41 1.60
33 IRL Ireland 1995 1.44 1.42 1.12 2.65 1.34 1.59
34 KWT Kuwait 1995 1.09 1.25 1.12 1.36 3.02 1.57
35 AUT Austria 1995 1.31 1.63 1.13 2.23 1.53 1.57
36 NZL New Zealand 1985 1.08 1.31 1.09 3.20 1.14 1.56
37 SGP Singapore 2000 1.37 1.04 1.15 2.51 1.70 1.55
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38 BHR Bahrain 2000 1.17 1.02 1.10 3.12 1.34 1.55
39 KOR Korea. Rep. 2000 1.06 2.49 1.12 1.78 1.29 1.55
40 NLD Netherlands 1995 1.40 1.26 1.14 2.32 1.58 1.54
41 AUS Australia 1990 1.28 1.57 1.14 2.29 1.41 1.54
42 KOR Korea. Rep. 1995 0.99 2.55 1.08 1.38 1.66 1.53
43 CAN Canada 1995 1.43 1.28 1.15 2.26 1.51 1.53
44 DEU Germany 1995 1.34 1.75 1.13 1.81 1.58 1.52
45 SGP Singapore 1995 1.41 1.03 1.13 2.14 1.83 1.51
46 FRA France 1995 1.26 1.31 1.15 2.06 1.71 1.50
47 CAN Canada 1990 1.33 1.34 1.14 2.34 1.29 1.49
48 KOR Korea. Rep. 1990 0.94 2.62 1.05 1.01 1.79 1.48
49 CYP Cyprus 1995 1.03 1.46 1.14 2.47 1.29 1.48
50 GRC Greece 2000 1.09 1.84 1.15 2.07 1.23 1.48
51 GBR United
Kingdom
1990 1.23 1.16 1.12 2.01 1.86 1.48
52 GBR United
Kingdom
1995 1.46 1.15 1.13 2.23 1.36 1.47
53 IRL Ireland 1990 1.14 1.42 1.10 2.38 1.28 1.46
54 JPN Japan 2000 1.32 1.30 1.20 1.64 1.84 1.46
55 AUS Australia 1985 1.29 1.57 1.12 2.13 1.17 1.46
56 PRT Portugal 2000 1.27 0.97 1.13 1.90 1.95 1.44
57 FRA France 1990 1.24 1.30 1.13 1.85 1.67 1.44
58 CYP Cyprus 1990 1.02 1.40 1.13 1.92 1.71 1.43
59 CAN Canada 1985 1.28 1.37 1.13 2.24 1.15 1.43
60 TTO Trinidad and
Tobago
2000 1.20 1.11 1.02 2.33 1.50 1.43
61 ESP Spain 2000 1.29 1.16 1.16 1.98 1.56 1.43
62 BEL Belgium 1995 1.26 1.13 1.13 2.22 1.39 1.43
63 DNK Denmark 1985 1.09 1.49 1.10 2.37 1.08 1.43
64 FIN Finland 1985 1.17 1.47 1.09 2.21 1.08 1.40
65 MYS Malaysia 1995 1.21 1.13 1.05 1.09 2.52 1.40
66 ISR Israel 2000 1.20 1.31 1.16 1.93 1.38 1.40
67 DEU Germany 1990 1.24 1.94 1.11 1.36 1.32 1.39
68 MUS Mauritius 2000 1.22 1.95 1.06 1.37 1.37 1.39
69 NLD Netherlands 1990 1.26 1.28 1.13 1.77 1.50 1.39
70 AUT Austria 1990 1.26 1.65 1.11 1.48 1.43 1.39
71 JPN Japan 1990 1.28 1.30 1.16 1.43 1.67 1.37
72 JOR Jordan 2000 1.24 0.93 1.04 0.58 3.02 1.36
73 ISR Israel 1995 1.05 1.33 1.14 1.76 1.53 1.36
74 JPN Japan 1995 1.31 1.31 1.17 1.60 1.42 1.36
75 ITA Italy 2000 1.22 1.13 1.17 1.70 1.56 1.36
76 GRC Greece 1995 1.02 1.83 1.14 1.87 0.88 1.35
77 GRC Greece 1990 1.00 1.79 1.13 1.58 1.16 1.33
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78 ESP Spain 1990 1.03 1.15 1.13 1.30 2.04 1.33
79 DEU Germany 1985 1.20 2.10 1.09 1.05 1.19 1.33
80 BHR Bahrain 1995 1.17 0.93 1.09 2.34 1.05 1.32
81 BEL Belgium 1990 1.26 1.16 1.12 1.51 1.46 1.30
82 TTO Trinidad and
Tobago
1995 1.09 1.08 1.03 2.29 1.00 1.30
83 BHR Bahrain 1990 1.13 0.81 1.06 2.09 1.38 1.29
84 AUT Austria 1985 1.18 1.67 1.09 1.30 1.23 1.29
85 SGP Singapore 1990 1.23 0.93 1.10 1.64 1.57 1.29
86 MUS Mauritius 1995 1.24 1.89 1.04 0.92 1.29 1.28
87 NLD Netherlands 1985 1.25 1.24 1.13 1.54 1.12 1.26
88 ESP Spain 1995 1.24 1.16 1.15 1.57 1.16 1.26
89 PAN Panama 2000 1.14 1.51 1.10 1.03 1.49 1.25
90 ITA Italy 1990 1.20 1.13 1.13 1.32 1.42 1.24
91 GBR United
Kingdom
1985 1.20 1.11 1.10 1.59 1.16 1.23
92 ITA Italy 1995 1.12 1.13 1.15 1.49 1.27 1.23
93 JPN Japan 1985 1.21 1.27 1.15 1.23 1.24 1.22
94 SGP Singapore 1985 1.18 0.94 1.08 1.60 1.27 1.21
95 MUS Mauritius 1990 1.02 1.82 1.02 0.71 1.44 1.20
96 CHL Chile 2000 1.23 1.15 1.13 0.98 1.38 1.17
97 KOR Korea. Rep. 1985 0.88 1.63 1.01 0.50 1.84 1.17
98 CYP Cyprus 1985 0.88 1.33 1.12 1.34 1.18 1.17
99 HUN Hungary 2000 1.16 1.26 1.05 1.20 1.19 1.17
100 PRT Portugal 1990 0.99 0.89 1.09 0.95 1.90 1.16
101 PRT Portugal 1995 1.24 0.94 1.11 1.46 0.99 1.15
102 ISR Israel 1990 0.65 1.35 1.13 1.38 1.20 1.14
103 FRA France 1985 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.43 1.01 1.14
104 GRC Greece 1985 0.91 1.20 1.11 1.38 1.09 1.14
105 MYS Malaysia 2000 1.09 1.19 1.07 1.09 1.24 1.14
106 BHR Bahrain 1985 1.15 0.81 1.04 2.25 0.42 1.13
107 PAN Panama 1995 1.17 1.52 1.08 0.75 1.06 1.12
108 CHL Chile 1995 1.23 1.14 1.11 0.73 1.36 1.11
109 BEL Belgium 1985 1.23 1.14 1.11 1.12 0.93 1.11
110 ARG Argentina 1995 1.02 1.10 1.07 0.66 1.64 1.10
111 IRL Ireland 1985 1.07 1.29 1.08 1.19 0.84 1.09
112 MYS Malaysia 1990 1.19 1.04 1.04 0.78 1.28 1.06
113 CRI Costa Rica 2000 1.17 0.81 1.15 1.07 1.09 1.06
114 CHN China 2000 0.96 1.20 1.04 0.33 1.74 1.06
115 MUS Mauritius 1985 1.10 1.26 1.00 0.56 1.24 1.03
116 ESP Spain 1985 1.00 1.23 1.12 0.98 0.82 1.03
117 KWT Kuwait 2000 1.09 1.27 1.13 1.20 0.44 1.03
118 ITA Italy 1985 0.98 1.12 1.11 1.02 0.88 1.02
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119 CRI Costa Rica 1995 1.11 0.82 1.13 0.94 1.08 1.02
120 TUN Tunisia 2000 1.04 0.85 1.07 0.41 1.71 1.02
121 JAM Jamaica 2000 1.09 1.04 1.05 0.95 0.95 1.02
122 MYS Malaysia 1985 1.15 0.93 1.02 0.60 1.33 1.01
123 LKA Sri Lanka 1995 0.95 1.20 1.07 0.07 1.74 1.00
124 MEX Mexico 2000 0.90 1.31 1.09 0.54 1.13 0.99
125 TTO Trinidad and
Tobago
1990 1.00 1.05 1.03 1.67 0.23 0.99
126 ARG Argentina 2000 1.17 1.10 1.09 0.88 0.72 0.99
127 URY Uruguay 2000 1.10 1.03 1.10 0.97 0.76 0.99
128 HUN Hungary 1995 1.09 1.23 1.03 0.69 0.88 0.98
129 ISR Israel 1985 0.65 1.40 1.11 1.13 0.61 0.98
130 PHL Philippines 2000 1.08 1.65 1.03 0.15 0.97 0.97
131 URY Uruguay 1995 0.89 1.03 1.08 0.71 1.15 0.97
132 COL Colombia 2000 0.83 0.90 1.05 0.82 1.19 0.96
133 THA Thailand 1990 1.08 0.65 0.99 0.15 1.88 0.95
134 CHL Chile 1990 1.04 1.14 1.09 0.39 1.07 0.95
135 PAN Panama 1990 1.06 1.52 1.07 0.40 0.68 0.95
136 THA Thailand 1995 1.12 0.71 1.00 0.26 1.62 0.94
137 CHN China 1995 0.85 1.15 1.02 0.11 1.55 0.94
138 SLV El Salvador 2000 1.09 0.52 1.03 0.70 1.31 0.93
139 JAM Jamaica 1995 0.95 1.01 1.06 0.79 0.86 0.93
140 COL Colombia 1990 0.74 0.81 1.01 0.44 1.63 0.93
141 TTO Trinidad and
Tobago
1985 0.96 0.96 1.02 1.69 -0.02 0.92
142 PAN Panama 1985 1.07 1.09 1.05 0.43 0.95 0.92
143 PHL Philippines 1995 1.08 1.59 1.00 0.12 0.78 0.91
144 BRA Brazil 2000 0.95 0.74 1.04 0.72 1.08 0.91
145 JAM Jamaica 1990 0.85 0.98 1.05 0.75 0.89 0.90
146 PER Peru 2000 1.04 1.09 1.02 0.25 1.12 0.90
147 KWT Kuwait 1985 1.07 1.21 1.08 0.94 0.21 0.90
148 CRI Costa Rica 1990 1.10 0.81 1.12 0.54 0.91 0.89
149 URY Uruguay 1990 0.90 1.01 1.07 0.46 1.01 0.89
150 TUN Tunisia 1995 1.00 0.75 1.05 0.27 1.37 0.89
151 CHN China 1990 0.84 1.09 1.02 0.03 1.46 0.89
152 TUR Turkey 2000 0.82 0.73 1.04 0.84 0.99 0.88
153 EGY Egypt. Arab
Rep.
2000 1.10 0.84 1.01 0.26 1.19 0.88
154 LKA Sri Lanka 2000 0.92 1.24 1.09 0.12 1.03 0.88
155 HUN Hungary 1985 0.92 1.14 1.02 0.30 1.01 0.88
156 ZAF South Africa 1990 0.78 0.63 0.91 0.41 1.64 0.88
157 BWA Botswana 2000 1.24 0.86 0.72 0.51 1.01 0.87
158 KWT Kuwait 1990 0.70 1.21 1.11 0.75 0.57 0.87
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159 IRN Iran. Islamic
Rep.
2000 0.94 0.97 1.02 0.48 0.85 0.85
160 ZAF South Africa 2000 1.16 0.73 0.72 0.48 1.17 0.85
161 HUN Hungary 1990 0.95 1.18 1.02 0.38 0.70 0.85
162 JOR Jordan 1995 1.05 0.87 1.02 0.49 0.78 0.84
163 BWA Botswana 1990 0.98 0.63 0.93 0.37 1.28 0.84
164 CHN China 1985 0.86 0.89 1.01 0.01 1.42 0.84
165 MEX Mexico 1995 0.93 1.26 1.07 0.43 0.48 0.83
166 JOR Jordan 1985 0.95 0.62 0.96 0.57 1.06 0.83
167 ECU Ecuador 1995 0.89 0.87 1.05 0.30 1.02 0.83
168 TUR Turkey 1990 0.72 0.66 0.97 0.37 1.35 0.82
169 IDN Indonesia 1995 0.94 0.73 0.94 0.14 1.28 0.81
170 SLV El Salvador 1995 1.07 0.51 1.01 0.39 1.03 0.80
171 TUR Turkey 1995 0.79 0.73 1.00 0.64 0.85 0.80
172 COG Congo. Rep. 1985 0.80 0.62 0.84 0.25 1.50 0.80
173 PHL Philippines 1990 0.70 1.17 0.97 0.11 1.05 0.80
174 JAM Jamaica 1985 0.72 0.92 1.05 0.94 0.36 0.80
175 VEN Venezuela. RB 2000 0.79 1.05 1.08 0.70 0.37 0.80
176 LKA Sri Lanka 1985 0.87 1.14 1.03 0.04 0.91 0.80
177 COL Colombia 1995 0.74 0.86 1.03 0.65 0.69 0.79
178 VEN Venezuela. RB 1995 0.55 1.12 1.06 0.56 0.67 0.79
179 COL Colombia 1985 0.81 0.81 1.00 0.45 0.85 0.78
180 ECU Ecuador 2000 0.67 0.89 1.08 0.36 0.90 0.78
181 PER Peru 1995 0.90 1.07 1.00 0.23 0.68 0.78
182 PRT Portugal 1985 0.90 0.75 1.08 0.59 0.57 0.78
183 THA Thailand 1985 1.02 0.66 0.97 0.10 1.14 0.78
184 VEN Venezuela. RB 1985 1.02 0.93 1.03 0.60 0.31 0.78
185 BWA Botswana 1985 1.02 0.42 0.92 0.25 1.23 0.77
186 THA Thailand 2000 1.03 0.75 1.01 0.36 0.71 0.77
187 IRN Iran. Islamic
Rep.
1995 0.72 0.84 0.99 0.28 1.01 0.77
188 BWA Botswana 1995 1.11 0.75 0.83 0.29 0.86 0.77
189 ECU Ecuador 1990 0.75 0.85 1.02 0.32 0.90 0.77
190 LKA Sri Lanka 1990 0.74 1.16 1.05 0.05 0.81 0.76
191 IND India 2000 1.02 0.67 0.93 0.10 1.10 0.76
192 ZAF South Africa 1995 1.06 0.74 0.86 0.40 0.76 0.76
193 PAK Pakistan 1995 0.95 0.87 0.90 0.09 1.01 0.76
194 PNG Papua New
Guinea
1995 0.94 0.34 0.83 0.48 1.22 0.76
195 IDN Indonesia 1990 1.00 0.64 0.91 0.10 1.16 0.76
196 MEX Mexico 1990 0.87 1.21 1.05 0.32 0.33 0.75
197 EGY Egypt. Arab
Rep.
1995 0.96 0.76 0.97 0.16 0.92 0.75
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198 PAK Pakistan 1990 0.84 0.92 0.87 0.06 1.06 0.75
199 ZAF South Africa 1985 0.86 0.68 0.88 0.33 0.96 0.74
200 SYR Syrian Arab
Republic
2000 0.76 0.79 1.07 0.32 0.77 0.74
201 EGY Egypt. Arab
Rep.
1990 0.87 0.67 0.92 0.10 1.11 0.73
202 PNG Papua New
Guinea
1985 1.03 0.21 0.79 1.19 0.44 0.73
203 PNG Papua New
Guinea
1990 1.06 0.29 0.81 1.21 0.28 0.73
204 SYR Syrian Arab
Republic
1995 0.76 0.74 1.04 0.21 0.87 0.73
205 TUN Tunisia 1990 0.86 0.65 1.04 0.21 0.86 0.72
206 CRI Costa Rica 1985 0.94 0.82 1.10 0.44 0.32 0.72
207 CMR Cameroon 1985 0.95 0.38 0.80 0.07 1.43 0.72
208 CHL Chile 1985 0.96 1.12 1.06 0.27 0.19 0.72
209 PAK Pakistan 2000 0.88 0.83 0.93 0.09 0.87 0.72
210 URY Uruguay 1985 0.86 1.04 1.06 0.45 0.12 0.70
211 ECU Ecuador 1985 0.84 0.84 0.98 0.29 0.55 0.70
212 VEN Venezuela. RB 1990 0.81 0.76 1.05 0.51 0.37 0.70
213 ARG Argentina 1990 0.72 1.09 1.06 0.49 0.12 0.70
214 BRA Brazil 1995 0.64 0.70 1.01 0.42 0.71 0.69
215 IND India 1990 0.88 0.53 0.87 0.03 1.16 0.69
216 IND India 1995 0.96 0.60 0.91 0.05 0.94 0.69
217 IND India 1985 0.93 0.47 0.83 0.02 1.17 0.69
218 NIC Nicaragua 2000 1.01 0.60 1.03 0.09 0.69 0.68
219 CMR Cameroon 2000 0.86 0.52 0.75 0.04 1.17 0.67
220 TUN Tunisia 1985 0.80 0.55 0.96 0.20 0.77 0.66
221 KEN Kenya 1990 0.96 0.40 0.88 0.06 0.99 0.66
222 MEX Mexico 1985 0.71 0.76 1.02 0.32 0.48 0.66
223 SEN Senegal 2000 0.87 0.34 0.90 0.07 1.06 0.65
224 BRA Brazil 1990 0.64 0.69 0.98 0.36 0.56 0.65
225 PNG Papua New
Guinea
2000 0.93 0.38 0.84 0.44 0.63 0.65
226 TUR Turkey 1985 0.75 0.59 0.94 0.16 0.78 0.64
227 SLV El Salvador 1985 0.70 0.49 0.90 0.20 0.92 0.64
228 EGY Egypt. Arab
Rep.
1985 1.02 0.59 0.86 0.09 0.65 0.64
229 UGA Uganda 2000 1.04 0.42 0.69 0.01 1.02 0.63
230 BGD Bangladesh 2000 0.86 0.48 0.90 0.01 0.90 0.63
231 ARG Argentina 1985 0.65 0.99 1.04 0.47 -0.01 0.63
232 IDN Indonesia 1985 0.94 0.68 0.86 0.09 0.53 0.62
233 IDN Indonesia 2000 0.76 0.81 0.97 0.14 0.41 0.62
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234 ZWE Zimbabwe 1990 0.78 0.58 0.90 0.10 0.73 0.62
235 SLV El Salvador 1990 0.66 0.50 0.97 0.22 0.74 0.62
236 GHA Ghana 1990 0.81 0.42 0.84 0.07 0.94 0.62
237 KEN Kenya 2000 1.02 0.50 0.77 0.09 0.65 0.61
238 COG Congo. Rep. 1990 0.75 0.67 0.84 0.15 0.58 0.60
239 PAK Pakistan 1985 0.86 0.34 0.85 0.05 0.90 0.60
240 GHA Ghana 2000 0.88 0.48 0.86 0.05 0.71 0.60
241 BGD Bangladesh 1990 0.78 0.44 0.81 0.01 0.94 0.60
242 CAF Central
African
Republic
2000 0.82 0.35 0.65 0.04 1.06 0.58
243 SEN Senegal 1990 0.83 0.32 0.85 0.05 0.85 0.58
244 BRA Brazil 1985 0.58 0.57 0.95 0.32 0.45 0.57
245 MWI Malawi 1985 0.87 0.40 0.69 0.07 0.84 0.57
246 GHA Ghana 1995 0.86 0.46 0.86 0.02 0.66 0.57
247 BGD Bangladesh 1995 0.89 0.46 0.86 0.01 0.62 0.57
248 BGD Bangladesh 1985 0.74 0.40 0.76 0.01 0.90 0.57
249 BEN Benin 2000 0.86 0.29 0.80 0.04 0.83 0.56
250 ZWE Zimbabwe 2000 0.74 0.63 0.63 0.13 0.65 0.56
251 IRN Iran. Islamic
Rep.
1990 0.75 0.71 0.96 0.16 0.18 0.55
252 NIC Nicaragua 1995 0.87 0.54 1.00 0.07 0.27 0.55
253 PHL Philippines 1985 0.71 1.03 0.93 0.10 -0.04 0.55
254 TGO Togo 1990 0.86 0.32 0.85 0.02 0.66 0.54
255 JOR Jordan 1990 0.88 0.78 1.00 0.52 -0.48 0.54
256 BEN Benin 1985 0.82 0.15 0.76 0.05 0.91 0.54
257 KEN Kenya 1995 0.87 0.46 0.83 0.06 0.44 0.53
258 UGA Uganda 1995 0.77 0.41 0.68 0.01 0.79 0.53
259 SEN Senegal 1985 0.82 0.32 0.80 0.08 0.63 0.53
260 BEN Benin 1990 0.87 0.22 0.78 0.02 0.74 0.53
261 IRN Iran. Islamic
Rep.
1985 0.72 0.60 0.91 0.11 0.29 0.53
262 MWI Malawi 1995 0.66 0.37 0.71 0.04 0.81 0.52
263 KEN Kenya 1985 1.00 0.33 0.87 0.06 0.32 0.52
264 ZWE Zimbabwe 1985 0.80 0.49 0.91 0.11 0.26 0.51
265 SYR Syrian Arab
Republic
1985 0.63 0.55 0.97 0.14 0.23 0.50
266 CAF Central
African
Republic
1990 0.85 0.30 0.73 0.10 0.51 0.50
267 PER Peru 1985 0.33 0.99 0.93 0.16 0.06 0.49
268 ZWE Zimbabwe 1995 0.86 0.59 0.77 0.10 0.14 0.49
269 NER Niger 2000 0.92 0.13 0.79 0.02 0.59 0.49
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270 BEN Benin 1995 0.78 0.26 0.80 0.03 0.53 0.48
271 TGO Togo 1995 0.78 0.37 0.86 0.03 0.32 0.47
272 TGO Togo 2000 0.78 0.40 0.85 0.04 0.24 0.46
273 CMR Cameroon 1990 0.98 0.43 0.81 0.05 0.04 0.46
274 NER Niger 1990 0.90 0.09 0.69 0.01 0.62 0.46
275 SYR Syrian Arab
Republic
1990 0.60 0.68 1.01 0.17 -0.18 0.46
276 MWI Malawi 2000 0.76 0.38 0.68 0.04 0.42 0.45
277 PER Peru 1990 0.45 0.91 0.97 0.14 -0.23 0.45
278 SEN Senegal 1995 0.72 0.33 0.88 0.06 0.26 0.45
279 COG Congo. Rep. 1995 0.71 0.64 0.80 0.20 -0.15 0.44
280 MWI Malawi 1990 0.81 0.37 0.72 0.04 0.12 0.41
281 CAF Central
African
Republic
1985 0.67 0.19 0.73 0.13 0.29 0.40
282 CMR Cameroon 1995 0.83 0.48 0.78 0.03 -0.14 0.40
283 NIC Nicaragua 1985 0.34 0.44 0.90 0.08 0.19 0.39
284 UGA Uganda 1990 0.42 0.43 0.74 0.01 0.35 0.39
285 SLE Sierra Leone 1985 0.58 0.15 0.58 0.07 0.52 0.38
286 GHA Ghana 1985 0.52 0.39 0.81 0.04 0.07 0.37
287 CAF Central
African
Republic
1995 0.75 0.32 0.70 0.04 -0.02 0.36
288 NER Niger 1985 0.83 0.08 0.65 0.02 0.06 0.33
289 NER Niger 1995 0.73 0.12 0.74 0.01 -0.05 0.31
290 UGA Uganda 1985 0.44 0.27 0.75 0.01 0.05 0.31
291 NIC Nicaragua 1990 0.40 0.47 0.95 0.11 -0.41 0.30
292 TGO Togo 1985 0.85 0.26 0.83 0.04 -0.49 0.30
293 COG Congo. Rep. 2000 0.63 0.66 0.78 0.18 -0.78 0.29
294 SLE Sierra Leone 1995 0.63 0.20 0.58 0.01 -0.06 0.27
295 SLE Sierra Leone 2000 0.80 0.24 0.60 0.01 -0.41 0.25
296 SLE Sierra Leone 1990 0.58 0.17 0.58 0.02 -0.12 0.24
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Figure A10: Change of public-sector performance 1985-2000. Left: Overall PSP. Right:
PSP5, economic stability and performance.
Public-sector efficiency in the DEA-sample
Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample. (Bias, 95% confidence interval,
uncorrected DEA-score, corrected DEA-score)
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SWE Sweden 2000 0.02 0.93 0.99 0.99 0.97
NZL New Zealand 2000 0.03 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.96
KOR Korea. Rep. 1990 0.05 0.91 0.99 1.00 0.95
CHN China 1985 0.05 0.90 0.99 1.00 0.95
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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CHE Switzerland 2000 0.08 0.88 0.99 1.00 0.92
USA United States 2000 0.03 0.86 0.93 0.93 0.90
CHN China 1990 0.03 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.89
KEN Kenya 1990 0.06 0.83 0.94 0.95 0.89
DNK Denmark 2000 0.02 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.88
KOR Korea. Rep. 1985 0.03 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.88
KOR Korea. Rep. 1995 0.03 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.88
FIN Finland 2000 0.02 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.87
IRL Ireland 2000 0.05 0.82 0.91 0.91 0.86
USA United States 1995 0.02 0.82 0.88 0.88 0.86
EGY Egypt. Arab Rep. 2000 0.03 0.82 0.88 0.88 0.85
PHL Philippines 2000 0.02 0.82 0.87 0.88 0.85
CHE Switzerland 1985 0.03 0.80 0.87 0.88 0.84
CHE Switzerland 1995 0.08 0.80 0.91 0.92 0.84
DNK Denmark 1995 0.02 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.84
PHL Philippines 1995 0.02 0.81 0.86 0.86 0.84
CAN Canada 2000 0.03 0.80 0.86 0.86 0.83
SWE Sweden 1995 0.02 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.83
CHE Switzerland 1990 0.04 0.78 0.86 0.86 0.82
KOR Korea. Rep. 2000 0.03 0.78 0.84 0.85 0.82
BGD Bangladesh 1990 0.06 0.76 0.87 0.88 0.81
USA United States 1990 0.02 0.77 0.83 0.83 0.81
NZL New Zealand 1995 0.03 0.76 0.82 0.82 0.80
BGD Bangladesh 2000 0.05 0.75 0.84 0.85 0.80
EGY Egypt. Arab Rep. 1995 0.03 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.80
DNK Denmark 1990 0.02 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.80
BEN Benin 2000 0.07 0.73 0.86 0.86 0.79
SGP Singapore 1995 0.03 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.79
BGD Bangladesh 1985 0.07 0.73 0.85 0.85 0.79
PAN Panama 2000 0.03 0.76 0.82 0.82 0.79
SWE Sweden 1990 0.02 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.78
CHN China 1995 0.02 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.77
USA United States 1985 0.03 0.73 0.79 0.80 0.77
COG Congo. Rep. 1985 0.02 0.73 0.78 0.78 0.76
BEN Benin 1990 0.10 0.69 0.85 0.86 0.75
PHL Philippines 1990 0.02 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.75
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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THA Thailand 1990 0.02 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.75
MYS Malaysia 1995 0.02 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.75
FIN Finland 1990 0.02 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.75
MUS Mauritius 1990 0.03 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.75
EGY Egypt. Arab Rep. 1990 0.03 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.75
BEN Benin 1985 0.15 0.69 0.89 0.90 0.75
AUT Austria 2000 0.02 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.74
MUS Mauritius 2000 0.02 0.71 0.76 0.77 0.74
AUS Australia 1995 0.02 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.74
MUS Mauritius 1995 0.02 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.74
BGD Bangladesh 1995 0.05 0.69 0.78 0.79 0.74
SGP Singapore 1985 0.03 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.74
AUS Australia 2000 0.02 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.74
SEN Senegal 2000 0.04 0.70 0.77 0.77 0.73
FIN Finland 1995 0.02 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.73
GRC Greece 2000 0.03 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.73
CMR Cameroon 2000 0.03 0.69 0.75 0.76 0.73
BEL Belgium 2000 0.02 0.69 0.74 0.74 0.72
SGP Singapore 1990 0.02 0.69 0.74 0.75 0.72
GHA Ghana 1990 0.04 0.68 0.76 0.76 0.72
NZL New Zealand 1990 0.02 0.69 0.74 0.74 0.72
CAF Central African
Republic
1990 0.07 0.65 0.78 0.78 0.71
CMR Cameroon 1985 0.02 0.68 0.73 0.74 0.71
NLD Netherlands 2000 0.02 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.71
KEN Kenya 2000 0.04 0.68 0.75 0.75 0.71
SWE Sweden 1985 0.01 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.71
PAK Pakistan 1995 0.02 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.71
PER Peru 2000 0.02 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.71
DEU Germany 2000 0.02 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.70
PAN Panama 1995 0.03 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.70
SLV El Salvador 2000 0.02 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.70
GBR United Kingdom 2000 0.02 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.70
SYR Syrian Arab
Republic
2000 0.02 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.70
BWA Botswana 1985 0.02 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.70
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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MWI Malawi 1995 0.18 0.65 0.87 0.88 0.70
FRA France 2000 0.02 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.70
COL Colombia 1990 0.02 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.70
PAK Pakistan 2000 0.02 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.70
GRC Greece 1995 0.02 0.66 0.72 0.72 0.70
CYP Cyprus 2000 0.02 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.69
KEN Kenya 1985 0.05 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.69
PAK Pakistan 1990 0.02 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.69
TUN Tunisia 2000 0.03 0.66 0.71 0.72 0.69
KWT Kuwait 1995 0.01 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.68
KEN Kenya 1995 0.04 0.64 0.72 0.72 0.68
AUT Austria 1995 0.02 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.68
BEN Benin 1995 0.06 0.62 0.74 0.74 0.68
CHN China 2000 0.03 0.65 0.70 0.71 0.68
NZL New Zealand 1985 0.02 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.67
NLD Netherlands 1995 0.01 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.67
GRC Greece 1990 0.02 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.67
LKA Sri Lanka 1995 0.03 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.67
SYR Syrian Arab
Republic
1995 0.02 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.67
MUS Mauritius 1985 0.03 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.67
PER Peru 1995 0.02 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.67
IND India 1985 0.02 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.67
SGP Singapore 2000 0.05 0.63 0.71 0.71 0.66
UGA Uganda 2000 0.03 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.66
AUS Australia 1990 0.02 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.66
TUR Turkey 1990 0.02 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.66
BHR Bahrain 2000 0.03 0.63 0.69 0.69 0.66
CAN Canada 1995 0.02 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.66
DEU Germany 1995 0.02 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.66
THA Thailand 1995 0.03 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.66
LKA Sri Lanka 1985 0.02 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.65
IRL Ireland 1995 0.06 0.62 0.70 0.71 0.65
FRA France 1995 0.01 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.65
CAF Central African
Republic
2000 0.35 0.69 0.98 1.00 0.65
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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TUN Tunisia 1995 0.02 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.65
IDN Indonesia 1990 0.02 0.62 0.66 0.67 0.65
CAN Canada 1990 0.02 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.64
MWI Malawi 2000 0.11 0.59 0.74 0.75 0.64
THA Thailand 1985 0.02 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.64
JAM Jamaica 1995 0.03 0.61 0.66 0.67 0.64
GBR United Kingdom 1990 0.02 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.64
CYP Cyprus 1995 0.02 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.64
IDN Indonesia 1995 0.02 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.64
EGY Egypt. Arab Rep. 1985 0.02 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.64
IRL Ireland 1990 0.04 0.60 0.68 0.68 0.64
GBR United Kingdom 1995 0.02 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.64
JOR Jordan 2000 0.03 0.60 0.66 0.67 0.64
MYS Malaysia 1990 0.02 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.63
JPN Japan 2000 0.02 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.63
PRT Portugal 2000 0.01 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.63
SLV El Salvador 1995 0.02 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.63
COL Colombia 1985 0.02 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.63
FRA France 1990 0.01 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.63
CRI Costa Rica 2000 0.02 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.63
MEX Mexico 2000 0.03 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.62
GHA Ghana 2000 0.02 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.62
GHA Ghana 1995 0.03 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.62
DNK Denmark 1985 0.01 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.62
BEL Belgium 1995 0.01 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.62
SEN Senegal 1990 0.03 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.62
AUS Australia 1985 0.03 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.62
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 2000 0.04 0.59 0.66 0.66 0.62
TUR Turkey 1995 0.02 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.62
PAK Pakistan 1985 0.02 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.62
CAN Canada 1985 0.02 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.62
JAM Jamaica 2000 0.02 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.61
TUR Turkey 2000 0.03 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.61
ESP Spain 2000 0.03 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.61
ISR Israel 2000 0.01 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.61
CYP Cyprus 1990 0.03 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.61
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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FIN Finland 1985 0.02 0.58 0.62 0.63 0.61
NLD Netherlands 1990 0.01 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.60
JAM Jamaica 1990 0.03 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.60
DEU Germany 1990 0.02 0.57 0.62 0.62 0.60
AUT Austria 1990 0.02 0.57 0.62 0.62 0.60
CRI Costa Rica 1995 0.02 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.60
ISR Israel 1995 0.01 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.59
IND India 1990 0.02 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.59
UGA Uganda 1995 0.03 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.59
MYS Malaysia 1985 0.02 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.59
COG Congo. Rep. 1990 0.02 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.58
ITA Italy 2000 0.02 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.58
TUR Turkey 1985 0.02 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.58
JPN Japan 1995 0.03 0.55 0.60 0.61 0.58
TGO Togo 1990 0.03 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.58
MYS Malaysia 2000 0.02 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.58
ZWE Zimbabwe 2000 0.02 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.58
SEN Senegal 1985 0.03 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.58
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 1995 0.03 0.55 0.61 0.61 0.58
GRC Greece 1985 0.02 0.55 0.59 0.60 0.58
BHR Bahrain 1995 0.01 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.57
ESP Spain 1990 0.04 0.54 0.61 0.61 0.57
JPN Japan 1990 0.04 0.54 0.61 0.61 0.57
DEU Germany 1985 0.02 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.57
CAF Central African
Republic
1985 0.05 0.52 0.61 0.62 0.57
BEL Belgium 1990 0.01 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.57
NER Niger 2000 0.03 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.57
BHR Bahrain 1990 0.01 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.57
IND India 1995 0.02 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.56
CHL Chile 1995 0.02 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.56
TUN Tunisia 1990 0.02 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.56
PAN Panama 1990 0.02 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.56
AUT Austria 1985 0.02 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.56
IDN Indonesia 1985 0.02 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.56
CHL Chile 2000 0.03 0.52 0.57 0.58 0.55
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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TGO Togo 2000 0.03 0.52 0.58 0.58 0.55
CYP Cyprus 1985 0.03 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.55
NLD Netherlands 1985 0.01 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.55
BWA Botswana 1990 0.03 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.54
MWI Malawi 1990 0.15 0.51 0.68 0.69 0.54
ARG Argentina 1995 0.02 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.54
IRN Iran. Islamic Rep. 2000 0.03 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.54
SLE Sierra Leone 1985 0.05 0.50 0.59 0.60 0.54
LKA Sri Lanka 1990 0.02 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.54
GBR United Kingdom 1985 0.02 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.53
PAN Panama 1985 0.02 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.53
LKA Sri Lanka 2000 0.02 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.53
JAM Jamaica 1985 0.02 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.53
IND India 2000 0.02 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.53
TGO Togo 1995 0.03 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.53
ITA Italy 1990 0.02 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.53
ITA Italy 1995 0.02 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.53
ESP Spain 1995 0.03 0.50 0.56 0.56 0.53
TUN Tunisia 1985 0.02 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.53
ZWE Zimbabwe 1990 0.02 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.53
SLV El Salvador 1985 0.02 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.52
CRI Costa Rica 1990 0.02 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.52
MEX Mexico 1995 0.02 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.52
IDN Indonesia 2000 0.02 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.52
ECU Ecuador 1995 0.02 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.52
ESP Spain 1985 0.02 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.52
ECU Ecuador 2000 0.02 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.51
CAF Central African
Republic
1995 0.06 0.47 0.57 0.58 0.51
JPN Japan 1985 0.04 0.49 0.55 0.55 0.51
COL Colombia 1995 0.02 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.50
SEN Senegal 1995 0.03 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.50
CHL Chile 1990 0.02 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.50
COL Colombia 2000 0.02 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.50
HUN Hungary 2000 0.02 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.50
ISR Israel 1990 0.01 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.50
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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PHL Philippines 1985 0.01 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.50
PRT Portugal 1995 0.01 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.50
VEN Venezuela. RB 2000 0.02 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.50
PRT Portugal 1990 0.02 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.50
FRA France 1985 0.01 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.50
BHR Bahrain 1985 0.01 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50
BRA Brazil 2000 0.02 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.49
IRN Iran. Islamic Rep. 1995 0.02 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.49
THA Thailand 2000 0.02 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.49
SLV El Salvador 1990 0.02 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.48
URY Uruguay 1995 0.02 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.48
BEL Belgium 1985 0.01 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.48
PNG Papua New Guinea 1995 0.02 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.48
MEX Mexico 1990 0.02 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.48
PNG Papua New Guinea 1990 0.02 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.48
NER Niger 1990 0.02 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.47
ZWE Zimbabwe 1985 0.01 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.47
ARG Argentina 2000 0.02 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.47
VEN Venezuela. RB 1995 0.02 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.47
URY Uruguay 2000 0.02 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.47
IRL Ireland 1985 0.04 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.46
CMR Cameroon 1990 0.02 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.46
VEN Venezuela. RB 1985 0.02 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.46
PNG Papua New Guinea 1985 0.02 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.46
ECU Ecuador 1990 0.02 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.46
URY Uruguay 1990 0.02 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.45
KWT Kuwait 2000 0.01 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.45
BWA Botswana 2000 0.01 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.45
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 1990 0.03 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.45
BWA Botswana 1995 0.01 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.45
UGA Uganda 1990 0.03 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.44
COG Congo. Rep. 1995 0.02 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.44
NIC Nicaragua 2000 0.02 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.44
GHA Ghana 1985 0.03 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.43
CMR Cameroon 1995 0.02 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.43
ITA Italy 1985 0.03 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.43
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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ISR Israel 1985 0.01 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.43
HUN Hungary 1995 0.02 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.42
VEN Venezuela. RB 1990 0.01 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.42
JOR Jordan 1995 0.02 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.42
ZWE Zimbabwe 1995 0.01 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.42
CRI Costa Rica 1985 0.01 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.41
SYR Syrian Arab
Republic
1990 0.01 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.41
MEX Mexico 1985 0.02 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.41
PNG Papua New Guinea 2000 0.02 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.41
ZAF South Africa 2000 0.02 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.40
ZAF South Africa 1990 0.02 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.40
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 1985 0.03 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.39
KWT Kuwait 1985 0.01 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.39
SLE Sierra Leone 1995 0.04 0.36 0.43 0.43 0.39
ECU Ecuador 1985 0.01 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.38
KWT Kuwait 1990 0.01 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.38
URY Uruguay 1985 0.01 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.37
CHL Chile 1985 0.01 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.37
ARG Argentina 1990 0.01 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.37
IRN Iran. Islamic Rep. 1990 0.02 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.36
HUN Hungary 1985 0.03 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.36
SYR Syrian Arab
Republic
1985 0.01 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.36
HUN Hungary 1990 0.02 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.35
JOR Jordan 1985 0.02 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.35
SLE Sierra Leone 1990 0.05 0.32 0.39 0.40 0.35
ZAF South Africa 1985 0.02 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.35
ZAF South Africa 1995 0.02 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.35
NIC Nicaragua 1995 0.01 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.35
PER Peru 1990 0.01 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.34
UGA Uganda 1985 0.02 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.34
BRA Brazil 1995 0.01 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.34
NER Niger 1995 0.02 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.34
PER Peru 1985 0.01 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.34
SLE Sierra Leone 2000 0.09 0.31 0.41 0.42 0.33
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Table A14: Public-sector efficiency for the DEA-sample – continued
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NER Niger 1985 0.01 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.33
ARG Argentina 1985 0.01 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.33
PRT Portugal 1985 0.03 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.33
COG Congo. Rep. 2000 0.02 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.32
BRA Brazil 1985 0.01 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.32
BRA Brazil 1990 0.02 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.29
TGO Togo 1985 0.01 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.29
IRN Iran. Islamic Rep. 1985 0.01 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.29
MWI Malawi 1985 0.78 0.59 0.96 1.00 0.22
JOR Jordan 1990 0.02 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.22
NIC Nicaragua 1985 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16
NIC Nicaragua 1990 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14
Chapter 6
Summary and outlook
Summary
This dissertation consists of four chapters dealing with selected topics in the field of fiscal
competition and public-sector modernisation. The detailed results and the summary can be
found in the respective chapters. This summary describes the most important contributions
of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 introduces a particular method (“comparative dynamics”) to analyse a dynamic
model of fiscal competition. This method was used by Wildasin [2003] and earlier by Boadway
[1979]. Fiscal competition is modelled as tax competition for mobile capital. In many
tax competition models, tax competition is associated with a negative “fiscal externality”,
see Wilson [1999, p. 272]. If a country tries to attract capital by lowering its capital tax
rate, it triggers an outflow of capital in other regions. Ceteris paribus, this makes their
tax base and revenues smaller [Wildasin 1989]. In a static model of tax competition, when
undistorting taxes are available, this implies zero taxation of capital. Chapter 2 shows the
implications of this externality for capital taxation in a traditional growth model where the
economy converges to a stationary steady state and adjustment costs for the installation
and de-installation of capital are a convex function of investment. While this is already
contained in Wildasin [2003], chapter 2 is more elaborate on the technical details, including
the necessary assumptions. Of particular importance is the assumption that the economy of
a local jurisdiction can be described as one that is in a steady state initially, then the local
government sets an optimal tax rate and the economy converges to a new steady state.
Chapter 2 tries to be as clear as possible about methodological issues. Furthermore it
introduces the modelling of imperfect competition that is used in the subsequent chapters 3
and 4. The convexity of the adjustment cost function is shown to provide a measure for the
mobility of capital. The more convex the adjustment cost function is, the more expensive is
the relocation of capital. It is hence optimal from the point of view of the capital owner to
avoid sudden jumps in the capital stock and to adjust the capital stock only gradually, in
a process that takes time. Note that the fiscal competition literature usually compares the
polar cases of perfect capital mobility in a decentralised federation with a centralised (closed)
economy. An exception is Lee [1997]. But his results are mainly driven by his assumption
that there are only two periods. The concept of adjustment costs in a growing economy
allows to model imperfect capital mobility that is measured by a parameter. To improve the
exposition, a functional form for the adjustment costs is assumed and the algebra is shown in
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a step-by-step fashion. In addition, the time-inconsistency of the optimal tax rate in Wildasin
[2003] is highlighted.
Chapter 3 applies the methodology of comparative dynamics to the issue of public-sector
modernisation. The economic content of the model is that the issue of public-sector efficiency
is not linked to the assumption of a wasteful government as it is usually done in the literature.
In this model, the efficiency of the public sector is the result of past investment. It is,
hence, modelled as a stock variable that plays a crucial role in the public sector’s production
technology. The application in chapter 3 considers a specific task of the public sector: the
redistribution between two groups in the society. On the one hand, there are capital owners.
The government tries to optimally exploit them in favour of the other group in the society,
worker households. Doing so, it faces the trade-off that capital taxation is a prerequisite for
transfers to households. On the other hand, capital taxation depresses the accumulation of
capital and this eventually depresses the wages of workers. Furthermore, the government faces
a trade-off whether it should invest the tax revenue in its own production process (benefiting
future worker households) or use it directly as a transfer. Public-sector efficiency is the result
of past investment of the public sector and could be IT technology, knowledge or some other
stock that is necessary to fulfill the task of providing a transfer to a target group. An example
of one of the tasks that can be done more or less efficiently is to identify whether the transfer
receivers qualify for the payment, given the rules governing the transfer program.
The title of chapter 3 contains the notion of “tax competition”. The literature usually solves
for the Nash equilibrium in a system of jurisdictions. But still, the individual jurisdiction
behaves in a fashion that is usually associated with tax competition. Raising the tax rate
triggers an outflow of capital that benefits other jurisdictions. The optimal tax rate is the
lower, the more mobile capital is. This is the standard externality around which many tax
competition models are built, albeit the model framework is somehow different. In chapter
3, the negative relationship between capital mobility and capital tax rates may cause a less
efficient public sector. But, due to the aforementioned assumption of an initial steady state,
the efficiency consequences of a variation of capital mobility depend on the description of the
economy in this initial steady state. See section 3.3.3 for the details. Subtleties acknowledged,
chapter 3 shows that the intensity of interjurisdictional competition, measured by capital
mobility, and public-sector efficiency are possibly negatively related.
While chapters 2 and 3 analyse a traditional growth model, chapter 4 contains a model of
endogenous growth. The idea of this paper is to use an relatively easy model of endogenous
growth to model tax competition in a federation where capital is imperfectly mobile. The
growth framework is the same as in Barro [1990], where sustained growth is based on the
provision of a flow of public services. This flow enters a production function with constant
returns to scale in capital and public services. The assumption that public service is a flow,
not a stock, simplifies the model substantially, as it has a balanced growth path and no
transitional dynamics.1 The core of chapter 4 is the modelling of the capital market in a
federation where the taxation of capital is decentralised. As the federation is assumed to
consist of identical jurisdictions, the capital market equilibrium can be characterised by the
interest rate that ensures that no agent with access to the capital market has an incentive
to act as a borrower or a lender. In equilibrium, symmetry in the model ensures that there
is no interjurisdictional lending and borrowing. Based on this insight, the implications of a
variation of capital mobility on the market clearing interest rate are shown. In the growth
1 Introducing additional stock variables in a growth model complicates them to a large extend as the resulting
dynamic systems get more and more complex. An example is Futagami et al. [1993] that differs from Barro
[1990] only in the assumption that the public sector provides a stock of public capital.
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framework used, there is a simple relationship between the market clearing interest rate and
the equilibrium growth rate of the federation and its local jurisdictions.
One finding in chapter 4 is that capital mobility is beneficial for growth. Other findings
are that a linear relationship between capital mobility and taxation is a special case and in
general, the relationship is non-monotonous. Perfect capital mobility implies zero capital
taxation. But zero taxation is also a possibility with imperfect capital mobility. Increasing
the parameter measuring the mobility of capital sometimes implies higher tax rates, but the
opposite is also possible. The crucial parameter in this respect is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, i.e. the taste for consumption smoothing. The tax policy of the local government
takes into account its implications on the consumption path of households. The somehow
unconventional results in chapter 4 are mainly due to this complication that only occurs in
an explicitly dynamic model that does not fix the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to
unity (log-utility). Furthermore, chapter 4 shows that an equilibrium with a balanced growth
path does not exist if capital mobility falls below a certain threshold. Hence, a minimum
level of capital mobility is a prerequisite for the economy modelled in chapter 4 to exist.
Chapters 2 to 4 are theoretic contributions. In chapter 5, public-sector efficiency is explored
empirically. It provides a robustness check for a closely related paper by Afonso et al. [2005],
with which it shares the general concept on how to measure the inputs and outputs of
the public sector. Also similar to Afonso et al. [2005] it uses non-parametric methods to
construct efficiency-scores for the public sector of countries relative to an estimated efficiency
border. But, after a discussion of methodological issues and recent developments in the field
of non-parametric efficiency measurement, it applies a more advanced method to calculate
those efficiency scores. Other differences include a slightly different choice of variables in the
input and output measurement and that the sample is larger both cross-sectional (up to 74
countries) and in time (four 5-year periods 1985-2000). Additional value is added insofar
as the efficiency scores are used in a regression analysis that tries to explain the pattern of
public sector by the intensity of interjurisdictional competition. The idea is, as has been
argued in chapter 3, that the competition between jurisdiction – in this case: countries – has
an influence on the efficiency of the public sectors that use tax revenue to provide public
goods and services. The regression analysis is also used to check the robustness of the major
result of Afonso et al. [2005]. According to their study, countries with a small government in
terms of government expenditure in relation to the GDP tend to be more efficient.
The results in chapter 5 suggest that the pattern of public-sector inefficiency can be
explained by continent dummies, with the implication that common cultural background and
common shared history shapes the public sector to a considerable extent. Both government
size and the intensity of interjurisdictional competition (measured by a globalisation index as
a proxy) are shown to have explanatory power, but the size of the estimated coefficients is not
very strong. Still, smaller and more globalised countries do better in terms of public-sector
efficiency in the sample I have considered. A somehow surprising result is that more centralised
countries are also shown to be more efficient. In chapter 5, I argue that the numbers produced
by the analysis should not be taken literally and also that political decisions are better based
on a careful consideration of all the details that can hardly be considered in a large panel of
countries. Still, the efficiency measures I calculate are not very different from an index that
is based on surveys, the perception of country analysts and commercial risk rating agencies
[Kaufmann et al. 2008].
138 6 Summary and outlook
Outlook
As maybe all dissertations, this one does not only provide answers but also leads to new
questions and items on the research agenda. Some of those are already described in the
conclusions of chapters 2-5.
For the empirical investigation of the nexus between interjurisdictional competition and
public-sector efficiency, the most pressing issue is whether studies like the one presented in
chapter 5 are robust. One obvious way to check robustness is replication, see the footnotes in
de Haan [2007]. Another way is to find other, probably better, solutions for the measurement
problem. The measurement of the inputs and outputs of the public sector will always be
imperfect, but still, I think that it is possible to construct datasets that are a reasonable
basis for studies similar to the one contained in chapter 5. Future studies in the same fashion
need to keep pace with the methodological developments in parametric and non-parametric
efficiency measurement, see section 5.2. One task in this respect is a very practical one: new
methods need to be implemented in statistical packages in such a way that the research
community is able to check for coding errors and in a transparent way.
Theoretical work could proceed in many directions, some of them are mentioned in the
conclusions of earlier chapters. An issue of particular importance seems to understand better
why the link between decentralisation and tax competition on the one hand and growth and
public-sector efficiency on the other is different between developed and developing countries,
see Acemoglu et al. [2004] for a review of the literature about institutions and growth.
Maybe the most challenging direction for future research – not mentioned earlier – is to
proceed further in the direction of a truly dynamic theory of tax competition. The dynamics
in the models presented in the theoretical chapters above are, of course, not “untrue”. The
models are dynamic as they are growth models, where the economy is described by differential
equations. But in some important respect, they do not model tax competition dynamically
as all models assume that governments can commit themselves credibly to the tax policy
they announce. In the game-theoretic language, governments (and all other agents) pursue
open-loop strategies.2 To simplify matters even more, this strategy has been assumed to be
time-invariant. This is not meant as a dismissal of modelling of tax competition in dynamic
growth models that is an area of active research in public finance. For example, it allows to
model imperfect capital mobility consistently, as has been argued repeatedly above. But the
issue of dynamics could be taken even more seriously in models that also consider closed-loop
strategies.3 This implies to abandon the assumption of the availability of a commitment
technology and would hence be a step towards more realism. Instead of the deterministic
theory of optimal control, differential games then need to be considered.
Why should it be interesting to model tax competition as a differential game? In a standard
tax competition model, governments face, ex ante, an incentive to relax capital taxation in
order to attract the mobile tax base capital. Ex post, however, capital does not move if
all jurisdictions are assumed to be equal. All governments face the same incentives, behave
identically and therefore the relative attractiveness of the jurisdictions is unchanged. In a
dynamic model with adjustment cost as they were used in the preceding chapters, capital
flight is a time-consuming process. Hence, governments have a possibility to learn about the
2 An open-loop strategy in a dynamic system depends on time t and on the initial conditions of a dynamic
system. See Feichtinger / Hartl [1986, ch. A.7] and for an introduction into the theory of differential games
Dockner et al. [2000].
3 Closed-loop strategies depend on time t, on the initial conditions of a dynamic system, and, in addition, on
the current state of the dynamic system.
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environment they operate in and adjust their expectations about the elasticity of the tax
base accordingly. One would expect that the equilibrium of (closed-loop) strategies is one
where tax rates are higher than in a model that assumes open-loop strategies.
Once a basic tax-competition game in closed-loop strategies is well understood, a next
step could be to analyse the role of infrastructure investment in such a game. An important
characteristic of infrastructure capital in this context is that its adjustment might be more
difficult and time consuming than changing the capital tax rate. What does this mean for
the equilibrium strategies? Is the competition for mobile resources more intense when public
capital is considered to be one of the instruments to attract capital? Are there possibilities
to use public capital as a commitment device?
The answers to these and other open questions cannot be found in this thesis. But,
hopefully, they will be given in not so far future, in papers that yet need to be written.
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